FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 41 APRIL 1963 No. 3

CHANGING INDIA

By Jawaharlal Nehru

AUGUST 1947 brought independence to India. In spite of the long-drawn-out struggle that preceded it, it came in peace and goodwill. Suddenly all bitterness of past conflict was forgotten and a new era of peace and friendship began. Our relations with Britain became friendly and we appeared to have no inherited problems and conflicts with any other country.

We had been conditioned for 30 years by Mahatma Gandhi and his gospel of peace which had left a powerful imprint not only on the minds of those actively interested in politics but also on the mass mind. Our success in attaining freedom through peaceful methods confirmed this way of thinking. Thus we entered the family of independent nations with a clean slate, without any inherited hatreds or enmities or territorial or other ambitions, determined to cultivate friendly and coöperative relations with all countries and to devote ourselves to the economic and social progress of India without getting entangled in national or international conflicts.

India had become free, but there were still some small parts of it under French and Portuguese control which were under colonial domination. Thus in our minds the freedom of India was not quite complete. We felt certain that France and Portugal would also follow the British example and that these enclaves of colonial territory would inevitably, and through peaceful methods, join independent India. We made the necessary approaches to the French and Portuguese Governments. The French enclaves became a part of the Union of India peacefully by agreement with France. Portugal proved much more intractable and gave a lot of trouble. There was serious trouble in 1955 involving the killing and wounding of many Indian and Goan passive resisters by Portuguese

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soldiers. There was also severe internal repression in Goa. Such incidents continued, and it was only after some show of military force, following further incidents in 1961, that this last remnant of colonial rule in India was ended. After that the independence of India was complete.

August 1947 brought long-cherished freedom to our country. But in the wake of it came the Partition of India and, immediately after, mass killing on both sides of the new frontier and vast migrations. We had hoped that the Partition of India, which was brought about by agreement, would lead to the creation of two states which would be friendly neighbors and would coöperate with each other. That was natural, as not only geography but a common history and culture and the same language and many other factors common to both would, we thought, inevitably lead to friendly coöperation.

But this was not to be. The events after the Partition left a trail of great bitterness. We were trying to get over the immediate results of the Partition when the State of Kashmir was suddenly invaded from Pakistan and a new conflict arose. To us, trained and conditioned as we had been by Mahatma Gandhi, this came as a shock, for we had hoped that there would be no military conflicts with any other nation. After 14 months, a cease-fire was agreed to and actual fighting stopped. Since then, although the Kashmir problem remained with us and gave a great deal of trouble, feelings in both countries gradually lost their bitterness and approached normality, in so far as the people were concerned.

We devoted ourselves to the major problem that confronted us —economic and social progress and the betterment of our people. Even before independence, we had given much thought to this matter and had come to the conclusion that we should proceed by the method of planning. Our resources were limited, and we wanted to utilize them to the best advantage to attain declared objectives. After independence, a Constituent Assembly was formed to draw up the new Constitution of India; this declared that India was to be a sovereign, democratic Republic which should secure for all its citizens: justice—social, economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; equality of status and of opportunity. And among them all it was to promote fraternity, assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation.

On January 26, 1950, this new Republic came into existence and

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all our efforts were directed toward realizing the objectives laid down—political democracy and economic justice. We called the objective socialistic without adhering to any doctrinaire definition of the word. The system we evolved was consciously directed toward the welfare of the common man rather than to enrichment of the few; it is democratic because its processes are ultimately controlled by public discussion and by Parliament elected on the basis of universal adult franchise, and not by the secret purposes of a privileged minority.

While benefiting from foreign experiences—more especially, in the constitutional sense, from England and the United States—we did not wish to copy any foreign models. We believed that India had, by virtue of her long history and traditions, an individuality of her own and we should retain this without adhering to outworn ideas or traditions. We realized that the world was rapidly changing and we must keep pace with these changes without being swept away by them. We wanted to help, however modestly, in this developing pattern of international relations. We had no desire to interfere with other countries or impose our views on them. Thus, India started changes in her own life and institutions that are so decisive and far-reaching in their scope and intent that they may well be considered revolutionary, especially when viewed against the background of an ancient civilization and its ingrained conservatism. In foreign affairs, in a period when cataclysmic conflicts seem never too far below the horizon, she has invariably taken her stand with those who are striving for the maintenance of peace and for reconciliation and coöperation.

The twin policies which have guided us since independence are, broadly, democratic planning for development at home and, externally, a policy which has come to be named, rather inadequately, "non-alignment." Like the basic policies of most countries, these are not the product of any inspiration or arbitrary choice, but have their roots in our past history and way of thinking as well as in fundamental national exigencies. India's overriding and most urgent task is to raise the standard of living of her people, and in order to achieve this, to carry out structural and organizational reforms not only as speedily as possible but with maximum popular support and participation. In foreign affairs, we had no interest other than to cultivate friendly coöperation with all countries and to help to keep world peace, as the sine qua non of everything else. In our approach to these problems, our

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attitude and ideas had inevitably been shaped by our own recent struggle for freedom, as well as by the accumulated experience of centuries, and above all by Mahatma Gandhi's teachings.

It is no sign of complacency to recognize that these policies have met with an encouraging measure of success. India, with a population of 446,000,000 and an electorate of over 200,000,000, remains the largest functioning democracy in the world. Without deviating from democratic principles and procedures, she has launched upon extensive programs of modernization which are already bearing fruit. Far-reaching land reforms have taken place and our economy, still predominantly agricultural, is being steadily transformed by the spread of industrialization and the completion of vast new projects in the fields of power, transport and irrigation. Our Community Development schemes represent a rural reconstruction program which promises to transform the countryside and the vast population that live there. Recently, the Community Development movement has been extended to what is called *Panchayati Raj;* that is, there has been decentralization in favor of village-elected councils which have been given authority and resources to carry out schemes of development. Both industrial and agricultural production have increased substantially in volume as well as variety, and every effort is being made to ensure that the benefits of an expanding economy are shared equitably by all classes of the population. Education has spread remarkably at all stages and there are at present over 50,000,000 boys and girls in schools and colleges. Special attention has been paid to scientific and technical education. The health conditions of the people have also made substantial progress. In the 1940s the expectation of life in India was 32; now it is approaching 50. Our planning, designed to equip the country with the technical skills and the productive facilities of a modern society, is essentially welfare-oriented. Two Five Year Plans have been completed and the third is now in mid-course.

What is called "non-alignment" has also not fared badly. This, strictly speaking, represents only one aspect of our policy; we have other positive aims also, such as the promotion of freedom from colonial rule, racial equality, peace and international coöperation, but "non-alignment" has become a summary description of this policy of friendship toward all nations, uncompromised by adherence to any military pacts. This was not due to any indifference to issues that arose, but rather to a desire to judge them

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for ourselves, in full freedom and without any preconceived partisan bias. It implied, basically, a conviction that good and evil are mixed up in this world, that the nations cannot be divided into sheep and goats, to be condemned or approved accordingly, and that if we were to join one military group rather than the other it was liable to increase and not diminish the risk of a major clash between them. Essentially, "non-alignment" is freedom of action which is a part of independence. This attitude no doubt displeased some people to begin with, but it has been of service to the cause of world peace at some critical moments in recent history. A large number of countries, including most of the newly independent states of Asia and Africa, have adopted a similar outlook on international affairs. It is possible that India has influenced their thinking to some extent in this matter; but, however that may be, "non-alignment" is now an integral part of the international pattern and is widely conceded to be a comprehensible and legitimate policy, particularly for the emergent Afro-Asian states.

II

Consistent with our policy of promotion of peace and international coöperation, we welcomed the end of the civil war in our neighboring country China and the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in December 1949. We began developing friendly and coöperative relations with our northern neighbor.

The wanton and massive invasion of last autumn has, however, brought an incalculable, ominous and explosive new element into the situation. Peking's propagandists have tried to sow confusion in the public mind over this; but no amount of sophistry can conjure away the fact that the People's Republic of China is guilty of premeditated aggression. In 1954 India and China signed a general treaty on Tibet, in the preamble of which both parties pledged themselves to mutual nonaggression and respect for each other's territorial integrity. At that date, China knew precisely what the extent of India's territorial jurisdiction was; India, on the other hand, was not only not aware of the Chinese claims (they were not disclosed until five years later), but she had no reason even to suspect that there was any major question about the frontier.

All the fighting that has taken place, and the forcible seizure of territory by China, has been to the south and west—that is, on

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the Indian side—of the frontier as implicitly accepted by China herself in 1954. At no point have Indian troops ever gone beyond that line. The charge of aggression against the People's Republic of China thus holds, regardless of the controversy about the correct delineation of the border. This subject has been voluminously documented; what needs to be said here is that India's northern frontiers are not the result of any British imperialistic expansion, achieved in violation of China's rights or interests, but have their sanction in the facts of geography and history, and the generally accepted principles of international law.

It is difficult to forecast the further course of this dispute. Recently some non-aligned powers took the initiative in making certain proposals which, if accepted, could lead to talks between India and China on the merits of the question. We have accepted these proposals in their entirety. China has thus far not done so. We have suggested that we are prepared to refer these frontier disputes to the International Court of Justice at The Hague or to arbitration.

The initiative lies always with the aggressor, and the Chinese have been exceptionally devious and deceptive in their methods. What has happened so far serves to define, more clearly than before, certain considerations which must continue to govern our attitude and policy on this question.

First, it would be wrong and inexpedient, and also repugnant to every sentiment of national honor and self-respect, to acquiesce in aggression, as plainly established as it is in this case. We must, therefore, insist that the aggression be undone to our satisfaction before normal relations can be restored. Whether a peaceful settlement can eventually be reached, therefore, depends largely on China.

Secondly, despite our friendliness, China's behavior toward us has shown such utter disregard of the ordinary canons of international behavior that it has shaken severely our confidence in her good faith. We cannot, on the available evidence, look upon her as other than a country with profoundly inimical intentions toward our independence and institutions.

Thirdly, the Himalayan barrier has proved to be vulnerable. If it is breached, the way to the Indian plains and the ocean beyond would lie exposed; and the threat to India would then, likewise, be a threat to the other countries of South and Southeast Asia. India's determination to resist aggression and retain her ter-

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ritorial integrity is, therefore, a vital factor in the safeguarding of peace and stability throughout this whole area.

This is no doubt appreciated by all the friendly countries whom we have asked for military and other assistance in the present emergency; and the prompt response that the request evoked, particularly from the United States and Great Britain, has been warmly acknowledged by the Government of India and the leaders of Indian opinion. It is obvious, however, that the defense of India in any long-term view calls for a sustained effort by India herself—an effort, moreover, which cannot be conceived entirely or directly in narrow military terms. In the past, our preoccupation with the human problems of poverty and illiteracy was such that we were content to assign a relatively low priority to defense requirements in the conventional sense. We will now clearly have to give considerably more attention to strengthening our armed forces and to the production within the country, to the extent possible, of all weapons and equipment needed by them.

Measures to this end have already been taken in hand. But, over and above these, even for the specific purpose of defense, the prime requisite is a solid and broad-based economy and a population increasingly trained to make full use of the resources of modern science and technology. Our development plans and programs have had precisely these objectives; and with such modifications and minor changes in emphasis as may be necessary, it is, if anything, more essential than ever to press forward with them. We are aware that the additional burden on our resources, entailed by the larger defense expenditure, must in any event call for further sacrifices on our part. We are making these sacrifices and are determined to carry through the current Five Year Plan without any significant scaling down. We hope external aid in adequate measure will be available in support of this special effort.

I have mentioned earlier that Indo-Pakistan relations had been steadily improving in recent years. The Chinese attack on India has, however, caused a setback. Pakistan authorities tended to regard the crisis in Sino-Indian relations as an opportunity to press India to make all sorts of concessions to them.

A new series of talks has been started between the two countries, and we in India would be the first to rejoice if they helped to ease the tension. Without prejudging the outcome of these discussions, it may be said, however, that they have no direct bearing on the problems we face with regard to China. The boundary to

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be protected delimits the territories of the Indian state and their defense is the responsibility of the Indian Government. What India needs is not manpower but weapons and other military equipment, which in the short run she must get from other sources, and in the long run manufacture herself.

Pakistan, like other states, can help by refraining from giving aid and encouragement to China and thereby enabling her to multiply her pressures against us. Unfortunately, the attitude of Pakistan ever since the Chinese aggression on India has been the reverse of this, and this has undoubtedly added to our difficulties. We are eager to come to agreement with Pakistan in regard to Kashmir and other problems, but it must be remembered that the question of moving toward a possible change in Kashmir is so pregnant with explosive possibilities that any incautious step might have far-reaching effects involving the internal stability of the sub-continent, and thus weaken instead of strengthen our defenses. Also the settlement reached must be such that it makes for permanent improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations.

The conflict provoked by Chinese aggression raises wider issues than the simple demarcation of a remote border. It is difficult to understand why China chose to conceal her territorial claims for many years, pleading subsequently that "the time was not ripe" for revising her maps; or why she had to mount large-scale, concerted attacks from one end to the other of the two-thousand-mile-long frontier; or why she rejects any approach to settlement other than through bilateral negotiations in the context of military force; or why she has been conducting world-wide anti-Indian propaganda denouncing the whole range of India's policies and depicting India as a tool of reactionaries and imperialists.

The fact appears to be that China's anti-Indian policy flows from her general analysis of the international situation, and reflects the aims and assumptions underlying her foreign policy as a whole. This policy itself, while formally subscribing to such ideals as peace and coexistence—though in the special Chinese meaning of these terms—leaves no room for non-alignment. If the world is viewed as divided essentially between imperialists and Communists, between whom war not only is inevitable in the end, but between whom tension in some form must be kept alive and even intensified as opportunity occurs, then there is indeed no place in it for the non-aligned. The non-aligned nations must, in this context, seem to be occupying an unstable, anom-

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alous position from which, if they could be dislodged, either by cajolery or coercion, the result would be to accentuate the polarization of world forces. It is logical to conclude that China's multiple campaign against India is an exercise in *realpolitik* on these lines. India is such an outstanding member of the non-aligned community that her defection, whether voluntary or enforced, cannot fail to bring grave and far-reaching consequences in its train.

III

If this analysis is well-founded, the challenge from China, as it has revealed itself, is not only to our foreign policy, but to our domestic policy as well. Both are rooted in our needs and interests, and spring from the same cultural outlook and the same scale of moral values. Tolerance, friendliness, the protection of the rights and dignity of the individual, peaceful settlement of disputes, the persistent effort to reach agreement through compromise and persuasion—these are the values we have been trying to uphold, imperfectly no doubt, in the conduct of our internal affairs. They represent a way of life, if I may so put it, a way of life that is anathema to the ruling ideologists in Peking, with their faith in power and violence as the instruments of benevolent change.

We are far from being averse to change, we have embarked upon far-reaching changes and we propose to persevere with our plans and programs; but we are convinced that the methods by which changes are brought about are at least as important as the changes themselves. Means are more important than ends—this was the basic policy on which Mr. Gandhi laid constant stress. We believe that any change should come about through our own volition, as a result of our own experience, and that it should not be foisted on us through any kind of force or pressure. In the pursuit of change, we should seek to carry the mass of the people with us and win their support. This way of dealing with our problems may not result in as swift or spectacular transformation as we might wish, but at least the progress achieved will have a solid basis in the nation's consent and avoid a degree of dislocation and disorganization that we can ill afford.

It is in this spirit that we have set our hands to the task of developing, in this ancient land, a system combining political democracy and economic justice.

Can this enterprise survive the new strains and tensions? The

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question goes to the heart of the issues involved in the present conflict, and the answer lies only in part, though perhaps in large part, with us in India. I am confident in my own mind that we cannot let ourselves be panicked into abandoning either the goal or the methods of our policy as I have stated it. The attack from across the Himalayas undoubtedly gave us a severe jolt; it aroused anger and disgust at what we felt to be a wanton betrayal of friendship. The immediate reaction was a spontaneous wave of national unity submerging all other disputes and dissensions. Even if some of them are revived, they are bound to be heavily colored by the implications of China's policy for our security as well as for other aspects of our life.

In India there are groups which may be called Right and others which may be called Left. But the antithesis between Right and Left is not so clear-cut as in some other parts of the world, or as widely permeating in its intellectual and political language. To the vast mass of our people, the reality is a deeply felt but undoctrinaire demand for better economic and social conditions, to which has now been added a troubled awareness of the Chinese threat and of the paramount need for safeguarding the nation's independence and integrity. This is the basic situation that our policies are designed to meet. Undoubtedly, grave new problems have arisen which we did not previously anticipate and which could conceivably disturb our internal equilibrium. The diversion of resources to military preparedness may slow down to some extent the improvement in living conditions, and we will have to adapt ourselves, psychologically also, to the presence of a powerful and hostile neighbor. These are highly unwelcome and distasteful necessities, and their emergence has prompted an earnest reappraisal of the course we have been following these last 15 years. That reappraisal, however, has convinced us that the basic policies we pursued in earlier years should not be changed, but should only be adjusted in order to meet the new dangers that face us.

The central fact is that the impact of China, whether it again takes an acute military form or makes itself felt more insidiously, is forcing the pace of growth in India. Both the Right and the Left have been affected, and the nation as a whole is growing up. It is learning that in the world today it is not enough to be devoted to peace, or to mind one's own affairs, but that it is also necessary to have adequate armed strength, to adjust our relations with

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friendly countries in the light of the changing actualities of the international situation and, above all, to preserve and consolidate national unity.

There is an interplay of domestic and external factors here which no one can ignore; our responses will inevitably be affected by the policies that others adopt toward us. While uncertainties are inherent in the situation, the political ferment that has been at work in India during the past few months has confirmed for us the essential and continuing validity of the principles on which we have hitherto taken our stand. The defense of our freedom and the social progress to which we aspire can best be assured in our view by the flexible democratic structure that we have evolved for ourselves. This is not only in conformity with our larger interests, but also with the larger interests of the world.

The Right in India has become more clamorous, basing itself on an extreme form of nationalism; the Left, though also nationalistic, is to some extent weakened. The Communist Party of India is in disarray, and the great majority of it has condemned Chinese aggression and declared itself in favor of the national stand. There is much heart-searching even in the Congress Party. But, on the whole, the picture that is emerging confirms the domestic and international policies that we have pursued, subject always to a general agreement about the necessity for increasing our armed strength for defense. If the frontier situation should deteriorate, we would naturally consider it desirable to take measures to tighten up the central authority. That is something that is likely to happen in a crisis under any system of government. But, even so, the basic democratic structure will, I think, continue.

It is pertinent to note that the Soviet Union and the Communist states of Europe allied to it have not considered it necessary to change their friendly attitude toward India in spite of open Chinese hostility toward us. Indeed, they have continued their aid to India in various ways. This implies a recognition on their part that India and other non-aligned countries have a vital role in the existing balance of forces.

I have endeavored to give, above, some explanation of the basic policy which China appears to be following in regard to India. It may be that this policy is partly affected by the growing rift between the Soviet Union and China. This may have led China to demonstrate, by her attack on India, that non-alignment has no reality and that the Soviet policy toward the non-aligned

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countries is wrong; the only right course is to work for a polarization of forces in the world. This might, according to Chinese thinking, justify their ideological difference with the Soviet Union.

Whatever temporary military success the Chinese may have gained by their aggression on India, I think it would be correct to say that they have failed thus far in their main endeavor. Not only have they converted a friendly country like India into one basically hostile to them and united and determined against them, but the policy of non-alignment has not broken down and stands confirmed. China has lost the goodwill of most of the non-aligned countries and even of many of her Communist allies. She stands isolated today.

Ever since the cease-fire and the Colombo proposals, the immediate excitement of day-to-day fighting on the border has naturally toned down. But it is generally recognized that the menace from China is a continuing one, and we must therefore prepare to meet it, whatever developments might take place in the near future.

The future is uncertain. But it may be said with some confidence that, while India continues to strengthen herself for defense, she is anxious that her economic development should not be impeded because of the increased expenditure on armaments. There is an increasing realization that this double burden must be borne by our people. There is also the hope that our friends abroad will help us by sharing this burden to some extent. But we realize that in any event the people of India will have to carry the main load.

IV

Whatever happens in India or elsewhere will be governed to some extent by international developments. Happily, there have been indications recently that a new phase may well be opening in international relations. Cuba suddenly revealed to us the thermonuclear brink on which we are all poised; it also brought reassuring evidence of restraint and moderation in high places, without which we cannot be sure of surviving the dangerous days yet to come. It may be that the cold war and the East-West antagonism of the 1950s will be gradually softened and transformed by the new pressures that have emerged within each bloc, as well as by the insistent demand of the "uncommitted" countries for a systematic and world-wide assault on hunger, disease and

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ignorance. But war, and nuclear war at that, still remains the spectre which must be exorcized before mankind can breathe freely again. That is why disarmament, particularly the abolition of nuclear weapons, beginning with the cessation of all further tests, is of such supreme importance. The technology of the arms race is acquiring a fearful momentum of its own, and is rapidly reaching a point where, if it is not checked and reversed in time, it may well pose insuperable problems of organized, social control. The responsibility for this naturally rests, in the first place, with the principal nuclear powers, and we must hope that they will be equal to it.

Meanwhile, Indo-American relations have seldom been as close and cordial as they are now. The deep sympathy and practical support received from the United States in meeting the Chinese aggression has created a wealth of good feeling and, apart from that, there is much in common between us on essentials. President Kennedy's vision of a world of free and independent nations, freely coöperating so as to bring about a world-wide system of interdependence, is entirely in accord with our own ideas. It is in this spirit that we have endeavored to collaborate in peaceful and constructive work with the new Afro-Asian states, and with Britain and other Commonwealth countries with whom we have a long historical association. It is in this spirit also that we are doing our best to further the purposes of the United Nations as, most recently, in the Congo.

The United Nations admittedly has numerous shortcomings. The government of a country representing a large part of the world's population is still not subject to the discipline and the responsibilities that membership in the world organization would impose. Often, moreover, the judgment and activities of the United Nations have been swayed or inhibited by the passions and prejudices of the cold war. None the less, the United Nations is the chief repository of our hopes for ever closer and more effective international coöperation for security as well as welfare. It is dedicated to peace, freedom and justice—noble ideals which embody the aspirations of all mankind—and it may yet lead us out of this fear and strife-ridden age into a more settled future when the full potentialities of science and technology could be applied to the well-being of all peoples.

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SCIENTISTS, SEERS AND STRATEGY

By Albert Wohlstetter

THAT scientists today crucially affect decisions on national and international security—and therefore the fate of us all—will come as no news. After radar and jets and the A-bomb and the H-bomb and intercontinental rockets, the statement surely is obvious enough. But what does it mean? Like much else that is obvious, it is not very clear. Just how do the results of scientific research and the methods of science and the scientists themselves actually figure in decisions on arms and arms control? And how is the role of the scientist in such matters related to the more familiar functions of the politician, the military man and the ordinary citizen? Above all, what does "scientist" mean in such statements?

Even partial answers to these hard questions might help us deal with some others that are even harder and trouble us more. If by "science" is meant a difficult and specialized discipline currently accessible only to the few, a trained minority, what does this do to the democratic process? At the end of his term in office, President Eisenhower spoke of the danger that "public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological élite." On the other hand, scientists, it seems, might become the captives. When scientists are drawn into the pulling and hauling of "politics," what happens to the freedom and objectivity of science or scientists? Again, given the partially hostile world in which we live, defense decisions must sometimes be made in secret. Where scientists are involved in such decisions, what does this mean for the vital features of science as a fallible but open, verifiable and self-correcting enterprise?

Especially in the two years or so since Sir Charles Snow's Godkin Lectures, discussion of these and related issues has been intense, sometimes bitter, and I think on the whole useful. But the issues have provided matter for both of Sir Charles' renowned "Two Cultures": exciting literary material and a supply of blunt weapons for the factional quarrels and feuds among scientists. As a result, while there has been some light shed, there has also been much mystification.

EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is based on a longer monograph bearing the same title, presented at a conference of the Council of Atomic Age Studies at Columbia University, of which Mr. Christopher Wright is executive director.

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The Godkin Lectures, delivered at Harvard in the fall of 1960, begin with the dark words:

> One of the most bizarre features of any advanced industrial society in our time is that the cardinal choices have to be made by a handful of men: in secret: and, at least in legal form, by men who cannot have a first-hand knowledge of what those choices depend upon or what their results may be.
>
> When I say "advanced industrial society" I am thinking in the first place of the three in which I am most interested—the United States, the Soviet Union, and my own country. And when I say the "cardinal choices," I mean those which determine in the crudest sense whether we live or die.[1]

This opening sets C. P. Snow's major theme. He illustrated it, of course, with a dramatic story of the two English scientists, Sir Henry Tizard and F. A. Lindemann, Lord Cherwell, and their role in relation to the vital decisions on air defense and strategic bombing in England just before and during World War II.

If Sir Charles is right, the cardinal choices of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union can, it seems, be directly understood only by scientists and yet are and must be, "at least in legal form," made by non-scientists who are exposed to the advice of only a few. Sir Charles, who is at home in both the Scientific Culture and the Literary one, moves so easily from one to the other that we are never quite sure how to take lessons from what he calls his "cautionary" tales. Are they literally true? Or are they literature? The critical response to the Godkin Lectures by less partisan participants in the events they describe suggests that these stories may be fables. None the less, even a fable may contain a useful moral: the troubling questions remain.

In the limited sense of Snow's definition of "scientists," the cardinal choices referred to by Snow are not simply, as he suggests, a domain of "science." The decision at the start of World War II to develop a fission bomb, or the decision to use it against Japan, or the decision to develop an H-bomb, or to bomb German cities during World War II, called for much more than natural science and engineering. Such decisions have narrowly technological components, but they involve just as essentially a great many other elements: military operations and counter-operations by an enemy, the economics of industrial production, the social and political effects of bombing on populations, and many others. Some of these other factors are qualitative. Many are quantitative, and in this very broad sense "technical." (They involve

[1] C. P. Snow, "Science and Government: The Godkin Lectures at Harvard, 1960." Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961, p. 1.

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numbers and may be related in a numerical model.) However, even these do not fit into any of the traditional disciplines of natural science or engineering. They do not, for example, come under the head of electrical engineering or physical chemistry. And natural scientists and engineers do not normally acquire a professional acquaintance with subjects such as the cost of buying and operating a fighter bomber or the disaster behavior of urban populations. Nor do they ordinarily find these subjects essential in the course of engineering work in developing a bomb.

In fact, in addressing the complex cardinal choices, one of the inadequacies sometimes displayed by natural scientists is that they may ignore, or assume implicitly, or simply receive, or themselves casually estimate without enough study, the values of those variables that fall outside the traditional natural science disciplines. The cardinal choices, in Snow's sense, cannot be well made solely on estimates of the feasibility or infeasibility of some piece of hardware. They are political and military, strategic decisions. Technology is an important part, but very far from the whole of strategy.

Snow is not alone in creating this confusion. It is a very widespread practice among scientists concerned with public policy, and especially among those who direct urgent popular appeals. In the letter that Bertrand Russell sent in 1955 to heads of state enclosing a call for what later became the Pugwash Conferences, he began: "I enclose a statement, signed by some of the most eminent scientific authorities on nuclear warfare." The signers were indeed without exception eminent scientists, but among the ten physicists, chemists and a mathematical logician who were included, not one to my knowledge had done any empirical study of military operations likely in a nuclear war.

Similarly it is usual to find, at the head of petitions advocating some specific nuclear policy, sentences that run: "As scientists we have knowledge of the dangers involved," followed by the signatures of tens or even thousands of scientists, only a few of whom have examined the empirical evidence on more than one or two of the many alternative dangers involved in the policy choice. Simply as a scientist no one has a knowledge of these complex choices.

The bombing controversy in 1942, one of the "cardinal choices" recounted by Snow, was somewhat ill-defined, as is not unusual in such policy disputes. It had to do among other matters with

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the relative emphasis in air strategy on offense or defense—with how, for example, to allocate resources between the strategic bombing of German towns and the air defense of coastal shipping. This is hardly the sort of thing one would normally submit to a vote of the Fellows of the Royal Society, as Snow suggests, or to the "general population" of natural scientists and engineers. And not simply or in principle because of the difficulties of secrecy.

A good answer to the allocation question depended on a great many things, including, on the one hand, how rapidly bombers would be manufactured, how soon after manufacture they could be made an operational part of the military forces, losses that might be expected from enemy defenses, the expected number of sorties in the operational life of these bombers, the shape and population density of German cities, and the types of building in them, the efficiency of the German fire-fighting services, the reaction of populations to the stress of air raids; and, on the other hand, the effectiveness of these same bombers against enemy ships of war, the allied shipping and supplies likely to be saved, the military worth of these supplies, etc., etc. These are not matters found in physics textbooks. Nor could the Fellows of the Royal Society be expected to qualify for independent judgment on them in the course of a week.

Over a longer period, such questions are open to study, but—and this is a critical point—they are open to study and answer by a much wider group than engineers and natural scientists. And there is little evidence to suggest that at such study the technologists are signally best. Not only are some of the principal variables subject matter for the behavioral sciences rather than physics, but the appropriate methods of study also may be closer to the methods of some behavioral sciences. Blackett, writing in 1943, not long after the bombing controversy, pointed out that the mathematical methods he employed are in general use

> . . . in those branches of science whose subject matter has similar characteristics. These characteristics are that a limited amount of numerical data is ascertainable about phenomena of great complexity. The problems of analyzing war operations are almost all of this type and are therefore rather nearer, in general, to many problems, say, of biology or of economics, than to most problems of physics, where usually a great deal of numerical data is ascertainable about relatively simple phenomena.[2]

[2] "Operational Research," British Association for the Advancement of Science, Burlington House, Piccadilly, London. Reprinted from *The Advancement of Science*, v. 5, April 1948, p. 29. (Quarterly Journal of the British Association).

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Perhaps even more important, while the job of gathering and examining relevant empirical data might be very laborious, the gist of the methods for using the data is quite generally accessible. The methods are within the grasp of an intelligent administrator, and, *given time,* open to his skeptical questioning.

I have stressed the phrase "given time." Without time on these complex questions, a government official is not likely to have a full understanding and may make some poor choices. This is also true, however, of the technologist or the analyst of tactics or strategies. One of the principal differences between our present situation and the circumstances in which decisions had to be made in World War II is that today we frequently have time. It is a salient difference bearing on the question of how technologists, strategists, military and political men may figure in cardinal choices. For the major peacetime decisions are seldom final. In short, given time, the decision-maker without a degree in physics, mathematics, or for that matter, mathematical economics, is quite capable of having a "first-hand knowledge of what those choices depend upon and what their result might be."[3] And he often will *have* time.

II

In the view of some scientists, it would appear that judgment does not really require time or a great deal of grubby work. It is, according to Snow, more a matter of intuition, an attribute of a few gifted men, a kind of "prescience." This quality evidently is present especially in scientists, who "have something to give which our kind of existential society is desperately short of: so short of, that it fails to recognise of what it is starved. That is foresight."[4] Foresight is "not quite knowledge," but "much more an expectation of knowledge to come . . . something that a scientist, if he has this kind of sensitivity latent in him, picks up during his scientific experience."[5] Some men other than natural scientists have this gift but, we gather, much more rarely and in a lesser degree.

The popular fantasies relating the pursuits of science to sorcery and an almost superhuman thaumaturgy make such a view of prescience rather widely credible. Not only may the layman talk in these terms of the mysteries of science, but also statesmen; the

[3] "Science and Government," p. 1.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 81
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

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"Wizard War" Churchill called the technological race in World War II. We may not, as Mr. Eisenhower fears, become captive of a scientific élite, but it would seem that scientists, or at least the best scientists, may indeed be The Elect. And many of them have felt charged with a prodigious mission and a great moral urgency. Spurred by an apocalyptic vision of world annihilation, they urge a drastic transformation in the conduct of world affairs in the immediate future. They have been passionately sure that the choices are stark and clear: annihilation on the one hand or a paradise on earth. "Remember your humanity and forget the rest," read the invitation to the first Pugwash Conference. "If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death."

For many scientists there is very little time. C. P. Snow predicted at the end of 1960 that if events proceed on their present course, nuclear war is "a certainty . . . within at the most ten years."[6] Which does not leave much time. The clock on the cover of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* started so near twelve that a while ago it had to be set back.

In bringing about a new sort of world, the scientists feel that they have a special responsibility. They are free of the insincerities and dubious motives of the traditional actors on the political scene; they are interested only in clarification and truth. Furthermore the coöperative and potentially universal nature of the scientific enterprise is at hand as a model for a future world order, and the scientists can be vital agents in bringing that order about. "Scientists of the World, Unite!", the title of an article by a Princeton physicist appearing immediately after the war, sounds the right note.

This vision of the responsibility of the scientist—"a greater responsibility than is pressing on any other body of men,"[7] according to Snow—puts him in a very different role from the scientist as technologist or the scientist dealing by tentative and empirical methods with broader questions or cardinal choices. It is fortified, however, by the confusion between technologist and strategist and by the related notion of the scientist as specially endowed—a seer or prophet.

The notion bears a strange resemblance to that of the prophets

[6] "The Moral Un-Neutrality of Science," Address to the 1960 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, reprinted in *Science*, Jan. 27, 1961, v. 133, p. 259.

[7] *Ibid*, p. 259. I have discussed this and related predictions by scientists in "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N + 1 Country," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1961.

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in the chiliastic and apocalyptic movements that swept Europe centuries ago in times of great disorientation, anxiety and instability. It has some inspirational uses, but a great many disabilities. Like past eschatology, it encourages schismatics, and the feuds among the scientists have been intolerant and implicitly rather bloody. Snow's tale of Lindemann and Tizard unconsciously illustrates the point: Lindemann is the dark angel, sadistic and violent, without the gift of foresight. And Blackett, a passionate battler against the forces of darkness, uses the story in his innumerable present feuds.

But most important, this urgent, tense feeling of mission can sometimes bias the technological studies and, even more, tends to discourage the use of the patient and tentative method of science, as distinct from the *authority* of science, in assisting the cardinal choices of which Snow speaks. It has led in some cases to a rather surprising anti-rationalism.

III

Anyone who has searched diligently for a device, which in hostile hands might demolish what he had been building the previous year, is not likely to forget the sickening sensation of finding it. Yet that is the occupational hazard of a working strategist, a conscientious designer of what may be called "conflict-solving systems"—that is, systems for keeping the peace or fighting a war, where the opponents' countermeasures must be taken into account. Thus the honest strategist must wear two or more hats, and this can be something of a personal strain. It can actually lead to quarrels among friends and organizations. The inventor of an ingenious measure may come to regard the inventor of an even more ingenious countermeasure with some distaste or even detestation. Whose side does the fellow think he is on?

All of which is true enough for the design of some national or alliance weapon system for possible use in a war. The personal strain and the strain on friendship is likely to be even worse where the system to be designed is an international control system. For while with national defense measures the element of at least partial opposition by an enemy is, or always should be, as plain as can be, it is not so plain in the case of an international system. Here one has an agreement with an adversary, and it is tempting to believe that he will coöperate. A scientist who works on evasion schemes is almost certain to be regarded as a leper. Isn't he oppos-

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ing the agreement and ruining the possibility of international control? This is a nearly universal attitude. It was frequently voiced in protest against studies of possible ways to evade the test ban. Now it may be that some of the men who find it easiest to work on evasion schemes are those who oppose the agreement. None the less, anyone who is soberly in favor of an agreement with adequate safeguards should systematically and seriously wear both hats all the time. Two illustrations will suffice to show how, in the case of the test ban, each of the two principal factions has found it hard to deal with countermeasures, except where these support a point of view it is propounding anyway.

First, Edward Teller: Dr. Teller in my view has performed an important service in helping to develop a test ban with adequate controls, by thinking ingeniously about the possibilities of evading the various control systems that have been proposed. On the other hand, when it has come to supporting his views on the importance of testing, he has argued that we would lose more than the Russians would if we both stopped testing. As the defender, in contrast to the aggressor, we have a harder job. Therefore, he reasons, testing will enable us to develop the more sophisticated weapons we need for use in defense. However, in this argument he ignores the fact that the Russians will also be developing their weapons of aggression as counters to our defense, and there is no *a priori* reason for believing that they won't make more rapid strides in their "easier" job than we in our difficult one. In the past the development of nuclear weapons has favored the offense. In short, when it comes to the exploitation of tests in the development of weapons, Dr. Teller ignores countermeasures; they do not suit his argument. He has been extremely ingenious in considering enemy countermeasures to thwart control systems; these countermeasures do suit his argument.

Next, Hans Bethe: Dr. Bethe has been the symmetrical opposite of Dr. Teller on this matter as on others. As far as evasion schemes are concerned, he has said that he was embarrassed at presenting to the Russians the possibility conjured up by another American because it "implied that we considered the Russians capable of cheating on a massive scale. I think that they would have been quite justified if they had considered this an insult."[8] This suggests that it is all right to set up a police system, but not against potential crooks. His own energies in any case

[8] "The Case for Ending Nuclear Tests," *The Atlantic Monthly*, August 1960, p. 46.

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were devoted to the measures rather than the countermeasures. On the other hand, when it came to evaluating the military worth of weapons that might be developed with the aid of testing, such as anti-missile missiles, Dr. Bethe could frequently think of nothing except enemy countermeasures that would reduce their military worth nearly to zero. Dr. Bethe, like Blackett, is, without any extensive study, quite certain that enemy countermeasures like decoys would make a defense against ballistic missiles useless —or even harmful—in any reasonably likely contingency.

There are two points which emerge from this discussion of countermeasures. First, most physical scientists and engineers find it hard to deal with an enemy countermeasure, except where it spoils a system they themselves dislike on other grounds. This, I believe, is sometimes associated with an aversion to putting the fact of hostility in the center of their attention. Many of the articulate scientists, especially when considering arms-control agreements, prefer to think of harmony rather than conflict. The difficulty they have in contemplating countermeasures stems from hostility to the fact of hostility itself. In this way they slip more easily into the role of prophet and agent of a perfectly peaceful world.

The second point is that the evaluation of countermeasures in military conflict systems is likely to be very complicated, requiring painstaking analysis, seldom undertaken by the technologists themselves. It involves for one thing an extensive canvass of potential military operations on both sides and their possible interactions, and sometimes a consideration of allies and more than one adversary; I believe neither Dr. Teller nor Dr. Bethe has done this sort of systematic analysis of the military worth of the weapons they talk about. Both are experts in the basic technology of bomb design, but that is quite another matter.

Questions of military worth are broader than physics and in some ways harder. They of course are not purely military questions any more than they are purely technological. They may involve a forbidding nest of problems including political and economic, as well as military and technological, questions. However, on the questions that have called for systematic analysis, characteristically there has been no experience that was precisely relevant. For these questions relate to a near or distant future affected by novel techniques and political uncertainties. Experts are seldom "expert beyond experience," and analysis is needed, not to

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replace intuition, but to sharpen and supplement it, and to make it more public and verifiable.

The role of uncertainty in decision-making as well as in system studies to aid decision is so prominent that it is worth dwelling on, especially as it is related in several ways to some recent obscurantism. Attempts to prepare for anything other than the probable events are branded as "paranoid" by Erich Fromm. By this definition, all of us who live in normally fire-safe neighborhoods and houses and none the less take out fire insurance are paranoid. On the contrary, it would be simply irrational to stake everything on a "most likely" event where the uncertainties are so large and intrinsic. This would be true even if we were quite sure we knew which were the "most likely" events and could agree on what are useful objectives in these contingencies.

The scientists have been very far from agreement. In retrospect, their views since World War II on major strategic issues—the feasibility and usefulness, in deterring or fighting a war, of active or civil defense, of the ability to bomb enemy industry or cities or military forces, of tactical nuclear weapons, of restraint in nuclear war, and many others—show an extraordinary sequence of sudden and repeated reversals.[9] The principal factions of scientists have remained in opposition—sometimes, however, almost exactly changing place. Moreover, the thought devoted to defining these issues and the evidence gathered for resolving them in no case warranted the certainty with which opposing views were propounded. This is not to say, of course, that "the politicians and the generals," with whom the physical scientists are contrasted, have been right. It would be hard to show, however, that the scientists have been on the whole more realistic or more prescient. Moral certainty and feelings of prescience have been a pretty uncertain guide to the future—even to the immediately next future beliefs of the prophets.

The gift of prescience is not only hard to come by for oneself; it is difficult to identify in others. Snow, who should be a great connoisseur of prescience, has run into difficulties. He derides Lindemann for backing infrared detection: "This seemed wildly impracticable then. . . . It seems even more wildly impracticable now."[10] Chinese Communist pilots downed by Sidewinder missiles with infrared homing devices would disagree. This would appear to

[9] An account of this history is given in my monograph, previously referred to, which will be published in the fall.

[10] "Science and Government," *op. cit.*, p. 34.

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be a case, in short, where Lindemann's prescience exceeds Snow's present knowledge of what has long since happened. Snow—and Blackett—take much too literally one of the lessons Snow draws from his cautionary tale: "The prime importance, in any crisis of action, of being positive what you want to do. . . . It is not so relevant whether you are right or wrong."[11]

In fact, serious study of the large uncertainties in the major strategic choices we have had to make suggests the opposite. Bertrand Russell in a better day once said, perhaps overstating the matter a bit: "The opinions that are held with passion are always those for which no good ground exists; indeed the passion is the measure of the holder's lack of rational conviction."[12] Passionate assurance on these intrinsically uncertain matters is not justifiable on logical grounds. Some technologists who are most articulate on matters of public policy in the defense and arms-control field should worry us most in their moments of boundless conviction, when they assume the role of seers. The tentative and fallible methods they have used professionally seem even more appropriate in the complex and uncertain areas of cardinal choice.

Don Price, in a brilliant article, "The Scientific Establishment," has developed with admirable lucidity the difference between the role of the scientist in the United States and the picture that Snow attributes to the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.[13] In the United States the scientists have had unmatched opportunities for getting a direct political hearing for their ideas on policy. On every one of the cardinal choices cited by Snow, scientists have been heard, and by top decision-makers. On the other hand, I know of no clear evidence that in the Soviet Union scientists have affected the cardinal choices either on the basis of their prescience or on the basis of systematic study of major alternatives.

In the United States the problem of scientists and strategists is, I think, by and large not so much in being heard as in *saying* something, that is, saying something that is the result of thought and empirical study.

IV

It is high time that we recognized the extreme implausibility of the notion that war may become "impossible" in the next short

[11] *Ibid*, p. 73.
[12] Quoted by Charles Hussey in "Earl, Philosopher, Logician, Rebel," *New York Times Magazine*, May 13, 1962, p. 10.
[13] *Science*, June 29, 1962, p. 1099–1106.

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space of time. On the other hand, neither is nuclear war inevitable in the next ten years, or many more. Since reducing the likelihood of war will preoccupy us for many years to come, it is appropriate to think of the probable consequences of this persisting preoccupation, some of which are already visible.

Decision-makers are likely to acquire a deep familiarity with these problems in the course of time, and to grow in professional competence in the continuing work on their solution. This is happening today, for example, in the Department of Defense. A year ago *The New York Times* published a statement of the Secretary on the issues in the choice of strategic bombardment vehicles for the late 1960s and after.[14] Whether or not we agree with the specific choice it explains, the document is an impressive one. In its thoughtful treatment of the uncertainties and the essential technological as well as operational and economic problems, it compares very favorably in sophistication with the analyses done by scientists to aid decision during World War II. Moreover, anyone who follows the Congressional Hearings will be quite convinced that such statements are comprehensively understood by a good many current decision-makers. These cardinal strategic decisions in general *are* made by them.

There is a good deal of hocus-pocus in Snow's pronouncement that the decision-makers "cannot have a first-hand knowledge of what those choices depend upon."[15] There is, of course, a sense in which nobody can have first-hand knowledge of *all* the things such decisions depend upon. They depend upon a great many things besides technology, in many fields. However, the choices that Snow dwells on, for example in his cautionary tales, are not all that obscure, and a first-rate Cabinet officer or military man can master the essentials of much more complicated matters, especially if they keep coming up. And they do.

The other side of this picture is that the natural and behavioral scientists, who offer advice or do analyses to assist decision, may experience a growth of professional competence too. Offhand judgments of individuals and crash studies by committees will always be with us and should. But expertise and committee activities have limitations. An expert on the whole range of problems involved in even one of these complicated choices is hard to find, and if one is discovered, the way in which he reaches his

[14] *New York Times*, March 16, 1962, p. 1 and 12.
[15] "Science and Government," *op. cit.*, p. 1.

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conclusion may be difficult to reproduce and verify; this in turn affects whether his judgment will be subject to criticism by more than a "handful of men." Inexplicitness is likely to be even worse with committees, since they proceed frequently by bargaining rather than reason. But explicit statement of the way conclusions are reached and of the evidence is part of the normal method of science, and what I mean by "conflict-systems studies" is simply the application of the method of science to the analysis of political-military strategic alternatives.

This suggests a little of the answer to at least one of the large questions with which we began: Both the physical and the behavioral sciences have a role to play in component research on cardinal choices. And in the course of studying strategic alternatives the methods of science can be used to reach conclusions going beyond the skills of any of the individuals involved. The important point is that on these complex cardinal questions, answers are won precariously and intermittently, in the course of hard empirical inquiry into the major factors affecting choice. Intuition and intelligence help, but do not make superfluous the study not only of the vital technologies, but also of the behavior of men and nations using, and affected by the use of, such technologies. No one has the gift of reliable foresight on these cardinal choices. The primary thing, then, is *not* to be positive. The basic failure of the physical scientists and engineers in their turbulent history during the cold war is not their lack of prescience but their acting frequently as if they had it.

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ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS AND NUCLEAR PROBLEMS

A French View

By François de Rose

IF we look back at the year 1962 to see how it affected relations between the Atlantic powers, we find emphasis on a search for ways to put into more effective practice the spirit of partnership called for by President Kennedy in his speech of July 4. In this search, the obstacle over which both statesmen and writers have stumbled has nearly always been connected with nuclear problems and specifically with the sharing of responsibilities for the control and use of nuclear weapons.

Of the various attempts to find practical solutions to these problems, the two particularly worth mentioning are the offer of the United States to commit several Polaris submarines to the NATO Command and the proposals made at the Bahamas meeting. In the course of the past year, too, the doctrine that inspires United States policy has been more sharply defined than ever before—at President Kennedy's press conference of December 18, in Mr. McNamara's statements at the Athens meeting of NATO and at Ann Arbor, and in Mr. McGeorge Bundy's address to the Atlantic Treaty Association on September 27 at Copenhagen—all of them official statements containing official proposals. It would be impossible to list all the articles by private individuals who have dealt with the subject in the course of this year. For example, the first three articles of the January 1963 issue of *Foreign Affairs* were concerned with just this question—how to deal with nuclear problems in order to improve the Atlantic partnership.

It is always difficult to summarize without running the risk of distorting. However, it is probably fair to say that the United States Government sees no need for national nuclear forces in Europe and that it believes there is a danger of such forces being used in case of war in a way that might precipitate rather than ward off a nuclear catastrophe. Yet it recognizes two facts: namely, that two European nations have embarked on the national production of atomic weapons; and that there is a growing desire in Europe to share in the responsibility for deciding whether such weapons should be used or not. In consequence, it

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is felt that the United States could support the building of a multilateral nuclear force fully integrated into the American force, and that it could help in the procurement of national delivery systems under certain conditions.[1]

It is on these views about how to deal with nuclear problems and improve our partnership that we propose to comment here. This is not easy, because the application of atomic energy for military purposes has had contradictory effects on the relations between the United States and some of its allies. First and foremost, of course, the American nuclear effort gave Europe the guarantee of security which was the cornerstone of its political and economic reconstruction. On the other hand, the fact that the American effort was shrouded in secrecy, and that attempts by NATO allies to equip themselves with modern weapons were strongly opposed, was not very well received in Europe—the more so because the first results obtained in the United States were based on scientific achievements which came mostly from European laboratories. Similarly, the American effort to arrive at an agreement on the suspension of tests, sometimes described as an agreement between opponents against friends, was resented in at least some quarters of Europe. For its part, the United States has viewed with concern the nuclear policies of some European countries on the ground that they were useless by military and technological standards, wasteful of resources that could be better used elsewhere and misconceived politically in so far as they might be taken to indicate that the countries in question either wanted to be in a position to hold a match to the powder keg or hoped to equip themselves to follow a third-force policy in the neutralist sense.

The foregoing is probably enough to make plain that the military application of atomic energy has presented Western governments with problems, and that efforts to solve them have not always promoted the growth of the spirit of partnership. These problems will be discussed here in the clear recognition that difficulties exist on both sides and that no solution will work which suits the Europeans but not the Americans, or vice versa. We therefore shall not discuss this or that specific proposal but rather try to bring to light what seem to us the basic factors relevant to any proper appraisal of the whole issue.

The question that needs an answer is whether or not there is a

[1] At the time of writing, the exact relationship to be established between the British and American deterrent forces as a result of the Nassau Agreement is not fully clear.

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security problem which is peculiar to Europe. If it were generally agreed that the nuclear defense of all the members of the Alliance is completely indivisible, there would be no need to set up such complicated and costly machinery as a multilateral force, just for the sake of pretending that we are more equal partners. If, on the other hand, there is a security problem which is peculiar to Europe, then a solution must be found to meet it.

It is with some diffidence that a Frenchman embarks on this discussion. For reasons all too easy to understand, the American authorities and public are extremely sensitive to any argument that tends to dissociate the defense of Europe from that of the United States, or the problem of deterrence as it presents itself to Europe from the problem of deterrence as it presents itself to the United States. They jump to the conclusion that anyone who tries to discuss the matter questions the U.S. pledge, or forgets the hundreds of thousands of Americans permanently stationed in Europe and the vast number of atomic weapons deployed there and earmarked for use by European forces in case of war.

So our purpose is to try to show that the case for independent nuclear forces in Europe is separate from the answer to the question which Mr. Dean Acheson, writing in these pages, reported that Europeans were asking: "Could the United States be relied upon . . . in view of the possible consequences to itself, to use nuclear weapons unless the security of the United States itself was immediately in danger?" In spite of Mr. Herter's statement in April 1959,[2] in spite of the countless books and articles written by American soldiers, analysts and commentators who have expressed the view that in a state of atomic balance the credibility of the use of these weapons is inevitably diminishing, the attempts of European governments to build national deterrent forces need not be understood in America or justified in Europe by a mistrust of United States action if ever the chips were down. It is possible to have no doubt that the American pledges would be honored, to be convinced that the presence of six American divisions and the nuclear deployment now existing in Europe are the best guarantee of European security, and yet to fear that there may still be a small percentage of cases where the defense of the old and the new continents might not be one and the same thing. This contention

[2] As quoted by Mr. Acheson, Mr. Herter said, "I can't conceive of the President involving us in an all-out nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly that we are in danger of devastation ourselves . . . "

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will seem less controversial if we remember that geography has put 3,000 miles of ocean between Europe and America and that Western Europe can be attacked by land with a variety of means, while the United States and Canada can be attacked only with the full-scale nuclear panoply.

The reason why there is a security problem for Europe distinct from that of the United States has nothing to do with what the Americans would or would not do under particular circumstances, or with what Europeans think. It has unfortunately to do with what the Soviet leaders believe and will believe for many years to come. War by error or miscalculation is a possibility often debated in America. It is not abnormal, therefore, for Europeans to ponder that eventuality. Either we credit the Soviet leaders with infallible political and military judgment or we must admit that they can make mistakes. Since Cuba, that is an admission which many people will be ready to grant. If the Russian leaders believed that in certain circumstances the United States would not intervene in a conflict in Europe, this might well be an error of judgment. But it would be an error beyond the control of anyone in the West and would create a situation which American commitments toward Europe and American warnings would, *ex hypothesis,* be helpless to prevent. An efficient force deployed in Europe and not subject to an American veto would serve as a warning that whatever might be expected from the United States there was another nuclear force that could strike at the Soviet Union. We say emphatically that such a force must be efficient and shall explain later what that means. But we claim that the existence of such a force would add to the deterrent posture of the whole West, and that by diminishing the danger of war by miscalculation we increase the security of all of us, including the United States. This is not to challenge the opinion that the security of the West is indivisible.

In order to be quite clear, it should perhaps be stressed that this description of the European security problem implies no criticism of the present deployment of nuclear weapons on the Continent. Nothing in our reasoning is meant to say that this should be altered or that better security could be bought by replacing the nuclear weapons now there with European ones. Nor do we think that such weapons as may be produced in Britain and France are a substitute for conventional forces. It can be said that present dispositions cover at least 90 percent of our security risks, and that the mission of national nuclear forces is to

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give us all a few additional percent. From this it follows that we would be correspondingly alarmed by any serious thinning out of the nuclear forces now in Europe, or any major shift of nuclear missions from SACEUR to the U.S. Strategic Air Command.

So much for the justification of national nuclear forces under the heading of deterrence. There is another duty, however, which they are expected to perform. In a very fair analysis of European views on these problems, Professor Henry A. Kissinger defined it when he wrote: "They [the national nuclear forces] are a device to gain an influence on our [the U.S.] planning."[3]

An example taken from the last war will show what the stakes are in this matter. In June 1940 the British Government refused to throw the R.A.F. fighter forces into the battle of France in spite of French demands and although remnants of British forces were still fighting on the Continent. It is not inconceivable that a somewhat similar situation might develop in the future between Washington on the one hand and European governments on the other.[4] In that case the problem would be how the battle of Europe was to be conducted; whether nuclear weapons were to be used and, if so, what sort; and what to do if Europe were confronted by the choice between Soviet occupation or nuclear devastation. Good coördination between the various nuclear forces should help to make such decisions less unilateral responsibilities. For although it may be argued that the Soviet civilian population is a hostage to the U.S. strategic forces, there is more than a slight difference between the conditions of a potential (and therefore spared) hostage and that of an occupied country.

Perhaps this explanation will help make clear that if one speaks of a defense or a security problem for Europe which is different from that of the United States, it is not through mistrust. As was pointed out by Mr. McGeorge Bundy in his Copenhagen speech, "The problem of defense in the nuclear age is as much psychological as military."

II

It is not clear whether in the minds of American officials a multi-

[3] "Strains on the Alliance," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1963, p. 278.

[4] It may also be recalled that in the early days of January 1945 the German offensive caused General Eisenhower to call for the evacuation of Alsace. General de Gaulle, for political reasons, forbade the First French Army to obey this order and give up Strasbourg. He was thereby able to cause a reversal of the strategic movement originally planned. This incident is probably not without relation to the situation discussed here and to the whole problem of integration.

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lateral force deployed in Europe would be the only strike force remaining there after the change has been made from fighter bombers to rockets. Before discussing the pros and cons of such a multilateral force we should perhaps make clear that, in our mind, there is no question but that medium-range rockets ought to be deployed in Europe. Yet it seems that American defense authorities do not see a pressing military need for this, since the long-range rockets stationed in America or deployed at sea are able to do the job just as well.

This is a point which raises a big question mark in the minds of many Europeans. Knowing as they do that they are threatened by hundreds of medium-range Soviet missiles stationed a few hundred miles from the Iron Curtain, they wonder how the counterforce blows delivered by rockets several thousand miles away would come in time. They are also inclined to believe that the longer the range of a rocket the higher the explosive yield that is required to offset greater inaccuracies in aim. And although in any nuclear battle the devastation of the Continent might be crippling for scores of years, there still is a case for fighting with kiloton rather than megaton weapons.[5]

There are some, too, who think that the Cuban affair has to a certain extent vindicated their argument for M.R.B.M.s in Europe. Since the installation of some 40 Russian medium-range rockets close to the American territory was considered a threat to the defense posture of the United States, they are tempted to infer that the same would apply to the threat from the Communist bloc to Europe. With one difference, however: while the threat to America was a new thing, in Europe the new factor would be the lifting of the close-range threat to the Soviet rockets and airfields. For the air forces of SACEUR are deployed to neutralize the offensive power of the potential enemy, while the shifting of this mission to forces deployed outside Europe would seem to work exactly in the opposite direction from that in the Russian attempt to establish bases in Cuba. In our opinion, therefore, the missions now earmarked for planes deployed in Europe should be entrusted to rockets similarly deployed in Europe. It is not our claim that these rockets should be under a different system than that which now exists and which, as we have said, takes care of

[5] This raises also the question whether such a shift increases or decreases the deterrence position of the West and whether it does not increase the danger of unleashing full-scale atomic war. These questions, important as they are, are not specifically linked to the security problem of Europe and therefore will not be enlarged upon here.

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the great majority of European defense problems. The only new formula we seek is to take care of those few additional problems which we believe are not covered by present arrangements.

In this context, the multilateral-force solution should attract those who are more concerned with the political than with the military aspects of defense, in relation to the problem of European political unity. The hope may even be entertained that the creation of a multilateral or rather multinational force might help to promote such unity. In favor of the scheme one should also mention that it is the only one that could open the field of nuclear responsibility to those nations which are not engaged in a nuclear effort of their own, either for political reasons or because they think it would overtax their resources.

It therefore is not to be denied that such a proposal has some merits. On the other hand, the idea that it would solve the security problem mentioned earlier is questionable. For if the force is genuinely multilateral the question arises as to how the decision to use it is to be made.

There are only two answers. Either the governments make the decision in advance as to when and under what circumstances the button should be pressed; or they reserve decision until the last moment. In the first case, one comes up against the problem of the delegation of power. The military can put forward many good technical reasons for suggesting that their governments should, in certain well defined circumstances, delegate power to them in order that the reply to an attack can be delivered in time and effectively. Yet this view has never been pressed very hard, let alone accepted; the supreme civilian authorities in all our countries believe that this decision is theirs to make and theirs alone.

The alternative is therefore for the allied governments to make the decision at the moment when it is needed. It is the old problem of several fingers on one trigger. In the absence of a solution, it is not likely that the deterrent value of such a multilateral force would be very high. And once actual fighting has begun, it is not easy to imagine how consultation among several capitals can be made really workable. No doubt this is well recognized, which explains why no one has proposed a solution although several governments have said they were open to suggestions from others.

Another aspect of Washington's proposal is that the multilateral force should be effectively integrated with American forces. The implications of this proviso have not been elaborated upon.

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But if it means that the force cannot be used without American concurrence, then it would not solve the problem of European security which, we believe, is not entirely covered by the mutual pledges of the nations on both sides of the ocean. And it would diminish the political advantages which we admitted earlier; for there would be no real sense of responsibility on the part of the European owners of the force if its multilateral character were limited to its financing and manning, and if integration meant that it could not be used unless all the forces with which it was integrated were also ordered into action. This is probably the most important factor on which the future of this proposal will depend.

III

If there is a particular European security problem, and if the proposal to create an integrated multilateral rocket force does not provide a complete answer, there remains to be considered how the national nuclear forces of Britain and France come into the picture.

These national forces stand in great disrepute in America. Ineffective, useless, dangerous—these are the tags generally given them. Since the Nassau meeting these disparaging adjectives are reserved to us. Why that is may depend on the content of the agreements between Washington and London that will implement the idea of integration. But the fact that a force is small does not mean that it necessarily is ineffective, as the Cuban affair has shown. Furthermore, it is not because it is national that it is useless; one hardly believes that if the rockets deployed in Cuba had belonged to Fidel Castro's government Washington would have considered them harmless. So what happened in the Caribbean in late October 1962 is not likely to lead the French and British governments to believe that their nuclear efforts are doomed to absolute futility.

The answer will of course be that the Soviet weapons in Cuba were of an advanced type and therefore had a military value that European forces might never achieve. But this is precisely where the discussion seems ill-grounded. In American eyes, the European programs are bound to be abortive, because of the magnitude of the technical and financial efforts involved. Our contention is that the problem is not whether the European countries can manufacture an efficient force but whether there is a need for a non-American deterrent in Europe. We would agree that inefficient

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forces are useless. But this would not diminish the need for efficient forces. And if efficient forces are needed it is as much a problem for Americans as for Europeans.

In any case it seems against logic to disagree about the merits or demerits of national versus multilateral forces before discussing whether the need for them exists. But any study must lead to the conclusion that whatever solution is suggested must be militarily efficient and politically acceptable to most of the governments concerned.

A force that would meet Europe's special security problem need not be large. It is not designed to take over the missions assigned to American weapons in the United States or deployed at sea and in Europe, nor to match the Soviet forces. Its purpose should be to serve notice that no war can be started in Europe without running the risk of bringing into play either the forces of America or the European forces which, even though limited, would none the less be capable of inflicting unacceptable destruction. Let us be more explicit. If these European nuclear weapons (whether national or multilateral) can be used independently, and if they are so effective as to be capable of inflicting damage that would seriously handicap the Soviet Union in its over-all competition with the United States, the additional risk they represent does cover our problem. As military instruments their value is only relative and depends upon the competition between the two super-states in the political, economic and military fields. But we assume that this rivalry will go on and for the Soviet Union will be the paramount political factor.

Obviously, of course, should one of the two achieve a breakthrough in the technological field and establish an unquestioned military supremacy, the forces which we are talking about here would no longer be useful or needed. But in that case the whole fabric of present international relations would be altered and the entire security of the West would be profoundly changed one way or the other. As long as the present situation remains, we assume that the Soviet Union will continue to try to match the United States in the economic field some time after 1970; that it will be bent on winning the space race; and that it will have to give some help to the underdeveloped countries. By purely military standards the non-American forces deployed in Europe might look puny. But if they potentially can delay or frustrate the fulfillment of these Soviet goals, they are not negligible. Therefore they add

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to the deterrent posture of Europe and of the whole Alliance.

Certain consequences follow from the tasks which such forces would have to perform. First, they must have strategic capability. The deployment in Europe of tactical nuclear forces is an obvious necessity, but it does not meet the problem we are discussing here. Neither does a system of weapons entirely devoted to an anti-force strategy. A natural objection to the concept of a limited force with strategic capability is that it might create an additional danger of triggering off a full-scale nuclear war. But one fails to see why anyone in Europe would be trigger-happy with such a limited force when the retaliation would be devastating. The possession of atomic weapons does not necessarily develop a taste for suicide.

This is so true that some writers use it as an argument against national deterrents. They say that the smaller country could not be credibly expected to use its nuclear weapons because it would risk utter destruction while inflicting only limited damage on the bigger one. Such reasoning may have very dangerous consequences. For it may mean that the threat to use these weapons will be taken seriously only if one's own people are not thereby endangered. This brings fuel to those who contend that in a state of atomic stalemate a big country cannot protect or defend a smaller one. And it would force one to a rather gruesome form of accounting, by which one could accept nuclear war involving up to a certain number of millions of prospective dead, but not over that number. The risks involved in nuclear war will always be fearful. If one wants both friends and foes to believe that those risks are accepted, one must not doubt the determination of others to do so.

Another argument sometimes advanced is that Europe's possession of weapons with strategic capability would or might invite Soviet preëmptive action. This is understandable coming from French or British opponents of their countries' nuclear policy. To everybody else such action on the part of the Soviet Union would appear to be a deliberate act of aggression that United States commitments toward their allies would forbid.

Another consequence is that, although the actual use of national strike forces could—and in most cases would—be coördinated with that of the other forces of the Alliance, the additional deterrence which is sought can be secured only if they are not integrated with those of the United States—that is, if the decision to use them does not depend upon the concurrence of Washington. In

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other words, the potential aggressor should know that in those cases where he might misjudge the determination of the United States to use its nuclear weapons the Europeans would be at liberty to use theirs (whether national or multinational) and that they could use them for strategic missions.

It goes without saying that in all other cases, all the nuclear forces should be used according to the plans which, as was said earlier, would have been discussed and agreed on in advance. Thus there would be no need to fear a conflict between two strategies. The European forces (national and multilateral if these are independent of the United States) would be designed primarily to perform the additional deterrent mission which we have described.

If deterrence fails and an attack is launched against Europe, the question would then be whether the aggressor was right in thinking that the U.S. forces would not be brought into operation. If he was wrong, the defense plans of the Alliance would be implemented, and this would involve the national forces. If he was right, it would mean that American atomic weapons would not be fired. In neither case do we see a possibility that the non-integrated nuclear forces might split the strategic operations of the West. To be sure, we are sometimes told that we do not understand the intricacies involved in the use of atomic weapons. This may be so, though probably through no fault of ours. Yet it is not so much our knowledge upon which doubt is cast as the sanity of our judgment; indeed, it is our instinct for self-preservation which is called in question when critics say that we might disregard previously agreed plans and childishly throw a few nuclear bombs all over the place precisely when those plans are to be put into effect.

IV

It is difficult in the present circumstances to expect a meeting of minds on these problems. Misunderstandings have reached the point where motives are being questioned. Probably, then, the least said about the latest developments the better. But if, forgetting present difficulties, we try to look into the future, we need not be too gloomy—that is, if we assume that the progress of Europe toward unification is still our common objective. For it would not be realistic to assume that European nations (whether they are six as of today or more) will unite their econ-

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omies, coöperate more closely in the political field and leave out defense matters altogether.

No one can know how things will evolve in Europe between now and the time when the commitments of the Atlantic Alliance will have to be reconfirmed for another period. Perhaps political unification will have developed to the point where we shall have a confederate or even a federal government to deal with defense matters. In that case, the problem of several fingers on one trigger would be solved. Any multilateral force that might be created would easily fit into such a pattern. Perhaps things will not be so far advanced. National strike forces will then continue to make a positive contribution to the security of the West as a whole.

These questions must, inevitably, be left unanswered, and the best we can do is to look after the defense problem of our own time in such a way as to prepare for, or at least leave open, tomorrow's solution. Maybe this is what, in spite of our disagreement, we are doing.

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THE HISTORIAN AND HISTORY

By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

THE word "historian" is a relatively unambiguous word. It means simply a man who tries to write history. But the word "history" is thoroughly ambiguous. It may refer to events which have taken place in the past; or it may refer to the written record of those events. The historian therefore has a double relationship—to the actual experience, and to the subsequent record of the experience. The problem to which I address myself here is the interaction between history, in both senses, and the historian.

Let us look first at the unambiguous factor in the equation. In our time, the historian tends to be a professional. He is a man trained in his craft, a product of methodical discipline, a member of a guild. His is a quasi-priestly vocation, supposed to liberate him from the passions of his day, to assure him a serenity of perspective and to consecrate him to the historian's classical ideal of objectivity. His creed has been well stated by Walter Lippmann, who once observed that no crisis in human affairs was unique or ultimate:

> The world will go on somehow, and more crises will follow. It will go on best, however, if among us there are men who have stood apart, who refused to be anxious or too much concerned, who were cool and inquiring and had their eyes on a longer past and a longer future. By their example they can remind us that the passing moment is only a moment; by their loyalty they will have cherished those things which only the disinterested mind can use.

The phrase "the disinterested mind" suggests the essence of the professional historian's vow. His commitment is to history-as-record, not to history-as-experience, to writing history rather than making it.

It should be noted that this professionalization of the historical craft—this isolation from actual events—is a recent development. In earlier times, there was by no means so rigorous a bar against the chronicler's being also a participant. "The captain of Hampshire Grenadiers," wrote Gibbon, "was not useless to the historian of the Roman Empire." Indeed, until the last half of the nineteenth century, the great historians were, in one way or another, captains of Hampshire Grenadiers. Macaulay, Bancroft, Guizot, Carlyle, Parkman, Henry Adams—all were men for whom the history they wrote was a derivation from the experiences they enjoyed or endured. Latterly we have come to fear that such ex-

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perience is incompatible with the ideal of "the disinterested mind." This question seems to be worth reëxamination.

Historians ought always to make their presuppositions as explicit as possible; and I am bound therefore to declare my own interest. I write as one who, after many years of writing history, has recently had the opportunity to watch history in the making. I have often asked myself whether this experience is likely to strengthen or to corrupt one's purpose as an historian—whether exposure to history-as-experience will improve one's ability to produce history-as-record, or whether it will sever one irrevocably from the ideal of "the disinterested mind." I am by no means sure of the answer to this question—and would only submit now some tentative observations.

The dangers of involvement are self-evident. To act is, in many cases, to give hostages—to parties, to policies, to persons. Participation spins a web of commitments which may imprison the chronicler in invisible fetters. Macaulay was forever a Whig, Bancroft a Jacksonian, Adams an Adams; and their histories became the servant of their loyalties. It is only a partial answer to say that the historian is thus imprisoned in any case; that visible commitment serves at least to alert the reader, while the ostensibly uncommitted historian is left free to shoot from ambush. For the process of involvement does tend to systematize what might otherwise be only vague and fitful inclinations.

Yet involvement has its benefits—and many of these also are self-evident. To take part in public affairs, to smell the dust and sweat of battle, is surely to stimulate and amplify the historical imagination. I have often wondered at those who strive to write about great historical crises like the American Civil War on the assumption that the burning emotions of the day were invalid (though, to be fair to the Civil War revisionists, they condemn mainly the emotions of those who regarded slavery as an evil to be abolished, while cheerfully accepting the validity of the emotions of the slaveholder). Participation in the actuality of history leaves the historian no doubt that mass emotions are realities with which he no less than the statesman must deal. Far from being gratuitous and artificial, as the revisionist historians once tried to tell us, the way people feel is an organic part of the stuff of history.

Involvement also increases the historian's knowledge of the operational problems of public policy. The observer who once witnesses the making of decisions under pressure is unlikely ever

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to write the same disdainful way about the agonizing of Madison in 1812 or Lincoln in 1861 or Wilson in 1917 or Roosevelt in 1941. It is not a particularly difficult trick to say what ought to have been done when you know how the story came out; but, despite E. H. Carr, hindsight is not the safest principle on which to base the writing of history. And involvement not only makes the historian understand a good deal more about the trauma of choice; it also teaches him to distrust a good deal of the evidence on which the historian's reconstruction of that choice is likely to rest.

Nothing in my own recent experience has been more chastening than the attempt to penetrate into the process of decision. I shudder a little when I think how confidently I have analyzed decisions in the ages of Jackson and Roosevelt, traced influences, assigned motives, evaluated roles, allocated responsibilities and, in short, transformed a dishevelled and murky evolution into a tidy and ordered transaction. The sad fact is that, in many cases, the basic evidence for the historian's reconstruction of the really hard cases does not exist—and the evidence that does exist is often incomplete, misleading or erroneous.

Memoranda pro and con cannot necessarily be relied on for an adequate description of the dynamics of decision—or sometimes even for an adequate definition of the genuine issues. Diaries are *ex parte* evidence, designed, consciously or not, to dignify the diarist, and to dish his opponents. Memory is all too often hopelessly treacherous. As for newspaper or magazine accounts, they are sometimes worse than useless when they purport to give the inside history of decisions; their relation to reality is often considerably less than the shadows in Plato's cave. I have too often seen the most conscientious reporters attribute to government officials views the exact opposite of which the officials are advocating within the government to make it possible for me to take the testimony of journalism in such matters seriously again.

For historians of the twentieth century, the problem is compounded by the technological revolution—in particular, by the invention of the typewriter and the telephone. In the good old days, statesmen, quill pen in hand, could write only a limited number of letters. When they had something of significance to communicate, paper was the only means—save face-to-face conversation—of communication. In our time, the typewriter has vastly increased the flow of paper, while the telephone has vastly reduced its importance. Far more documents are produced—and

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there is far less in them. If a statesman in the twentieth century has something of significance to communicate, if speed and secrecy are of the essence, he will confide his message, not to a letter, but to the telephone. Electronic waves, alas, leave few traces.

But, though the technological revolution complicates the historian's problem of finding out what actually occurred, it does not create that problem. The certitude with which historians are accustomed to pin down the past often results, I suspect, from the convenient fact that there are no survivors to challenge our reconstruction. The historian of the past is, in a sense, little more than the contemporary historian whose witnesses are dead—and who therefore can write without fear of rebuttal. It is not only, as historians like to think, that the passage of time produces more evidence or greater objectivity. It may be too that the passage of time buries those who might otherwise be able to correct or refute the historian out of personal experience.

Sir Walter Raleigh combined as few men have the roles of chronicler and participant; few historians have had to suffer the ultimate criticism of the executioner's ax. I now understand more poignantly than ever before Raleigh's warning in the preface to "The History of the World." The historian, Raleigh suggested, is dedicated to truth; "there is no mistress or guide that hath led her followers and servants into greater miseries." The historian of antiquity, pursuing truth too far off, "loseth her sight, and loseth himself; and he that walks after [truth] at a middle distance, I know not whether I should call that kind of course temper or baseness. . . . [But] whosoever, in writing a modern history, shall follow truth too near the heels, it may haply strike out his teeth."

Only when truth can no longer rise and strike out the historian's teeth is the historian safe—and only then can he remold the past into the desired shape of crystalline lucidity. The passion for tidiness is the historian's occupational disease. Yet the really hard cases tend to be inherently untidy. A case is hard when it confronts men with difficult choices; and choices are difficult when no preconceived solution applies. At such times, those most responsible must of necessity look at the problem from all sides —and often first from one side, then from another. They engage in a collective exercise of thinking aloud, out of which, with luck and leadership, a consensus may emerge. General Marshall used to say that battlefield decisions are taken in conditions of "chronic obscurity"—that is, under undue pressure and on the basis of inadequate information. This is probably the character of most

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critical decisions in the field of public policy. The historian who comes along later revolts against "chronic obscurity" and tries to tidy everything up. In this way, he often imputes pattern and design to a process which, in its nature, is organic and not mechanical. Historians presumably reject the conspiratorial interpretation of history; but, in a benign way, they often become its unconscious proponents, ascribing to premeditation what belongs to fortuity and to purpose what belongs to chance.

I do not mean to counsel defeatism in this matter. Tendencies can of course be discerned and identified; and a sequence of decisions may supply the evidence for a clear delineation of conflicting programs and policies. But I do doubt whether specific historical episodes can always be reconstructed with the glib exactitude to which historians are sometimes professionally addicted—and I write as one who has sinned more than most.

This recital does not directly answer the question whether involvement in public affairs will corrupt "the disinterested mind." It does perhaps suggest that too rigorous non-involvement may tempt the historian into imposing an excessively rational order on the contingency and obscurity of historical reality. It suggests too that systematic non-involvement may deny the historian clues and insights which could enrich his understanding of the historical process. Involvement may prompt him to ask new questions which open up fertile new possibilities for the profession to explore. I think of Leonard D. White's notable series on the administrative history of the American government as an example—a series produced in answer to a question which had not occurred to several generations of American historians but which did occur to a former member of the Civil Service Commission: How did the thing actually work? And obviously the early economic history of the United States needs to be rewritten in terms of questions arising from our contemporary knowledge of the processes of economic and social development. Historians, in any case, deal more appropriately in questions than in answers. One remembers the dying Gertrude Stein asking her friend, "What is the answer?" and, when she received no reply, saying, "In that case, what is the question?" This should be the historian's creed.

In short, if involvement has its hazards, it also offers its compensations. It may well be more likely than non-involvement to convince the historian of the precariousness of his calling and to bring him to a proper humility before the welter of the past. "The disinterested mind," in any case, is an ideal, not an actuality—

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and, as the case of Thucydides suggests, it may be more a consequence of temperament than of a preference for the ivory tower over the barricades.

The brush with history-as-experience has therefore given this particular historian a greater skepticism about the feasibility of history-as-record. At the same time, I must add that it has also given me a greater confidence in the utility of the writing of history for the making of history. For there is a two-way relationship between the two forms of history. One must consider not only the impact of history-as-experience on the chronicler but the impact of history-as-record on the participant.

Here my recent experience has given me a strong and unclouded view. I have always been among those who believe that history should be studied for its own sake, not as a guide to the present or a blueprint for the future. I have always questioned the instrumentalist view of history—the notion that knowledge of the past guarantees superior wisdom in making present and future choices. I still am quite sure that the historian is not inherently better qualified than anyone else to offer counsel in the field of public policy. But I have no doubt at all that the significant statesman must have a knowledge of history, an instinct for the grand tendencies, a feeling for the direction in which the world is moving—he must have his own conception of the nature of the historical process.

His sense of history may be voluntarist or determinist, optimistic or pessimistic, plausible or absurd; but it must exist. He must be possessed by some vision which connects the past and the future and gives his decisions a setting and a point. Surely the great leaders of our own time have had a sense of history. For some, that sense of history has been malign—as in Hitler's nightmare vision of an implacable evolution toward the world of the Master Race; or in Lenin's iron prophecy of a world moving through predestined stages to the predestined conclusion of a universal, monolithic Communist society. For others, the sense of history has been classic—as in de Gaulle's magnificent faith against all temptations of ideology or international organization in the ultimate reality of the nation-state; or in Churchill's chivalrous view of a world where gallant captains battle to keep alive the values of decency and honor.

For our great American leaders, I think, the sense of history has been characteristically flexible and generous, tolerant of diversity

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and discord, contemptuous of dogma and ideology, skeptical of determinism, delighted by the idea of a changing world in an unfinished universe, yet committed to the abiding purposes of freedom and justice enunciated in the basic charters of our republic. This was the vision which animated Theodore Roosevelt, with his conviction that America must rise to the challenges of industrial and international power—Woodrow Wilson, with his hope for a world community—Franklin Roosevelt, with his conception of a mixed society, combining individual freedom and social responsibility, in an interdependent world. Our President today is fully in this tradition—a practicing historian, like Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson, endowed, like Franklin Roosevelt, with a strong and spacious instinct for the future. I have no doubt that his sense of the character and direction of history—his conviction that the world is moving, not toward some preordained and unitary future, but, if we will it so, toward a diversity of national systems bound together by social progress, respect for the rights of others and loyalty to the international community—strengthens his purpose and fortifies his resolve in his moments of hard decision.

The conclusion is twofold. If exposure to history-as-experience may lead the historian to doubt a little the precision of history-as-record, it also persuades him that history-as-record forms a basic part of the intellectual climate which shapes the actual unfolding of history in the future—that a sense of history is the indispensable underpinning of statesmanship.

It further persuades this historian that monistic and deterministic visions of history are, except in some broad and trivial sense, wrong—that the sense of history possessed by the great American leadership of our century, based on the belief in the reality of choice and the plurality of existence, is much more in the grain of the turning world; and that William James was right in saying:

> The great point is that the possibilities are really *here*. Whether it be we who solve them, or He working through us, at those soul-trying moments when fate's scales seem to quiver and good snatches the victory from evil or shrinks nerveless from the fight, is of small account, so long as we admit that the issue is decided nowhere else than *here* and *now*. *That* is what gives the palpitating reality to our moral life and makes it tingle . . . with so strange and elaborate an excitement. This reality, this excitement, are what the determinisms, hard and soft alike, suppress by their denial that *anything* is decided here and now, and their dogma that all things were foredoomed and settled long ago.
>
> If it be so, may you and I then have been foredoomed to the error of continuing to believe in liberty.

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ECONOMIC CONTROVERSY IN THE SOVIET UNION

By Marshall I. Goldman

> Be able if necessary to learn from the capitalists. Adopt whatever they have that is sensible and advantageous.—Lenin

THE resurrection of these words of Lenin's by Khrushchev at the November Plenum of the Communist Party in 1962 surprised many Western observers. Against the backdrop of recent Soviet economic growth, it may appear somewhat anomalous to see the Soviets contemplating the adoption of some of our basic economic methods.

Especially intriguing is the suggestion by some Russian economists that profits in Soviet industry should be given a more functional role. Actually, upgrading the significance of profits and acknowledging shortcomings in their system of economic planning is nothing new for Soviet economists; in their candid moments, they often raise both issues. What is new is that some specific proposals related to these matters have been singled out for national consideration.

With Khrushchev's approval, the suggestions of E. Liberman, Professor at the Kharkov Engineering and Economics Institute, have become the focus of one of the most provocative and far-reaching discussions in Soviet economic thought.[1] The current dispute is second in intellectual vigor only to the debates of the 1920s which preceded the decision to industrialize. Unlike other recent economic disagreements, this one is marked by freedom and openness. Absent is the use of doctrinal citation and flag-waving. In contrast to the average Soviet economic discussion, almost no appeal is made to Marx, Lenin or even Khrushchev for ideological justification. Paeans to the superiority of the Soviet Union over the United States, a prerequisite in almost all past debates, have suddenly disappeared. In what appears to be an attempt to probe the essence of the problem, ideas are left to stand or fall on their own merit.

While the tone of the debate is itself significant, of even greater importance are the implications of the proposals being made and the reasons why they are being raised at this time. Before we ex-

[1] *Pravda,* November 20, 1962, p. 5.

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amine these matters let us outline the general goals of Liberman's economic reforms and his specific proposals.

II

Professor Liberman wants to make more effective use of his country's economic resources. In fact, this is the general theme of the debate. There is virtually unanimous recognition by Soviet economists, including Liberman's principal critics, that improvements must be made in planning efficiency and operating incentives. As with motherhood and virtue, everyone is in favor of a more perfect economic system.

Liberman outlines three specific goals for Soviet economic reform and implies several others.[2] First, he wants to stimulate Soviet enterprises and firms to seek higher output targets for themselves. At present, plan targets for the firm are sent down from superior administrative organizations. Since the firm and its personnel are rewarded according to the degree of plan fulfillment, every manager battles to have the plan targets set as low as possible. The lower the targets, the greater the likelihood of fulfillment or overfulfillment, which means bonuses and rewards. As Liberman points out, the easiest way to succeed in such a situation is not to work effectively but to seek low targets. In addition, if a manager agrees to higher goals he not only must work hard this year, but next year also. Since the yearly plan is based on previous performance, efficient work leads to higher future targets. Unintentionally, this encourages the manager to hold back and do less than his best.

Liberman's second goal is to encourage the introduction of new technology and new products. At the present time the manager is usually opposed to all changes in his existing pattern of production. Change means uncertainty and a possible hazard to goal fulfillment. Innovation also requires authorization from superior officials who are subject to the same type of pressures.

The third aim of reform as seen by Liberman is to improve the quality of production. Since incentives are tied to quantity of production, there is no material reason for anyone to worry about

[2] Liberman's first article on the subject appeared as early as July 1956 in "O Planirovanii Promyshlennogo Proizvodstva i Material'nykh Stimulakh ego Razvitiia," *Kommunist,* no. 10, July 1956, p. 75. His most famous article appeared in *Pravda,* September 9, 1962, p. 3. Reprinted in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter *C.D.*), November 3, 1962, p. 13. His other articles include "Planirovanie Proizvodstva i Normativy Dlitel'nogo Deistviia," *Voprosy Ekonomiki,* August 1962, p. 104; *Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta* (hereafter *E.G.*), November 10, 1962, p. 11 (reprinted in *C.D.,* December 5, 1962, p. 17).

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quality. The establishment of quality standards often hampers plan fulfillment of quantitative targets. This leads to corner-cutting elsewhere. When targets are related to production costs, there are further complications. The use of a better grade of raw materials in order to improve quality is often discouraged because it makes it difficult to meet the plan's production-cost figures.

Although Liberman does not enumerate all his aims in any systematic fashion, he hints at some others. The system of concentrating on gross value of output—now partially replaced by other criteria—should be completely eliminated because it causes factory managers to concentrate exclusively on targets of physical output assigned long in advance of actual production. Not only does this hamper the alteration of output goals and lead to the deterioration of quality, but it may also encourage the waste of inputs. To boost the gross value of their products, some factory managers use needlessly expensive raw materials, just the reverse of what was described in the paragraph above. Where this results in improved quality there is no objection, but expensive parts do not always assure the best product.

Liberman also seeks to eliminate what he calls "petty tutelage." This is taken to mean undue and excessive interference in the firm's operations by superior agencies. The senior authorities spell out everything in detail and in advance so there is no room for manœuvre by factory officials. Liberman cites an instance in which some metal parts had been mixed in with some scrap. A request was made for extra women workers to sort the scrap in order to recover the parts. The request was denied because the wage fund "would not stand it."[3] As a result, 2,000 rubles in wages was saved but 10,000 rubles in metal parts was lost.

Also of concern at present is the absence of effective control over capital construction and investment. Khrushchev himself indicated his awareness of the problem at the 22nd Party Congress when he suggested with some seriousness that a moratorium on all new capital construction be called for a year. Enterprises and organizations were over-spending and over-committing themselves. As a consequence, too many projects were being undertaken at one time. There are many who feel it is imperative that capital investment be controlled and that more effective criteria for capital allocation be developed.[4]

[3] *E.G.*, November 10, 1962, p. 10; *C.D.*, December 5, 1962, p. 17.
[4] L. Gatovskii, *E.G.*, November 3, 1962, p. 36.

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Before elaborating the various arguments in the debate, it is necessary to warn the reader that some aspects of the controversy will appear rather unsophisticated. There is a tendency among some Soviet economists, Liberman included, to denounce shortcomings and suggest remedies without tracing through all the ramifications of the various suggestions. For the most part, this is because Soviet economists have had little experience with equilibrium economics. Equilibrium analysis requires consideration of not just the immediate effect of certain actions, but the secondary and tertiary effects as well. As the debate evolves, it will be seen that only a few of the participants have this over-all view. Liberman may have it, but he seems to temper it with what may be the political facts of life.

III

Liberman's proposals represent the response of the more liberal faction of economists to shortcomings in the Soviet economy. Basically, these economists call for less reliance on planned targets and greater use of the profit incentive. Their hope is that in this way there will be more freedom for the plant manager, more intelligent use of resources and accordingly more efficiency.

Specifically, Liberman's plan would eliminate all existing goals that are centrally planned except for targets of quantitative production, product assortment and destination and date of delivery. To a Westerner, this may hardly seem like much of an improvement. What kind of flexibility is this? It should be pointed out, however, that Liberman does propose to eliminate seven or more other targets which heretofore have also been handed down from above. He particularly mentions the plans for labor productivity, number of workers, wages, production costs, capital saving, capital investment and new technology. Although these targets will still be assigned to the regional economic council (*sovnarkhoz*), they will no longer be subdivided and passed down the chain of command to the individual factory. He considers these seven targets to be subordinate to the factory's main goal of production of quality goods. These indices were originally imposed as a means to the end, that is, production. Liberman, however, feels that the plant managers frequently confuse the means and the ends. In order to fulfill these subordinate targets, the factory manager is often unable to fulfill the main goal of production as well as he might have. He argues that the simplification of the

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tasks assigned the plant manager will reduce the likelihood of contradictory targets. The plant manager, he suggests, should be permitted to draw up his own targets for these seven or more activities, relying on his own knowledge of the plant's capabilities. This will prevent outsiders from telling the insiders what to do. Consequently, although the *sovnarkhoz* will continue to receive targets for all the indices of efficiency and production, the plant manager will be assigned only the three planning targets related to physical production itself.

Through such a reform, Liberman hopes to simplify the planning and producing tasks. In the process, he has removed some of the forces which have compelled the factory manager to follow the dictates of the central government. To provide a more positive stimulus, Liberman wants to introduce a new measure, the "profitability rate." This is something more than the concept of profit (revenue minus costs) which the Russians have long used. The "profitability rate" he defines as the total profit of the firm in relation to its stock of fixed and working capital. Its importance to the manager will be assured since the "profitability rate" will be the sole determinant of the size of the bonus fund awarded the firm and its employees.

The plant manager can earn a higher "profitability rate" by affecting either or both of the two elements of the ratio. First, he can increase absolute profits. This can be done by using current inputs like labor, raw materials and other resources more efficiently. Second, he can reduce his fixed and working-capital base. He can do this by requesting less capital and conserving what he already has.

The "profitability rate" of the particular firm will then be measured against a "profitability norm" which will be established for different industries and firms. The bonuses awarded to the firm will be determined by its "profitability rate" in relation to its particular "norm." An attempt will be made to match comparable firms against one another. "Norms" will also be varied according to the proportion of new products the firm is trying to introduce. Since the introduction of new products usually entails initial costs and unforeseen problems, the "profitability norms" against which the firm is being measured will be lowered when new products are being introduced. If no new products are being introduced, the "norms" will be raised. The presumption is that this will induce firms to develop new products and methods. To prevent poor

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quality and the overstocking of warehouses, profits will be calculated only on goods actually consumed. Returned and stored merchandise will be subtracted from total revenues received.

Liberman's aim is to create a system that will induce all units of the factory to exert themselves and raise their level of aspiration. If the firm plans for a higher "profitability rate" than that actually achieved, there will be no penalty. The firm's "profitability rate" will be that which is actually earned. However, if the firm sets its targets too low, then the "profitability rate" will only be the average between the lower goal originally conceived and the higher "profitability rate" actually earned. It is also anticipated that the relevant "profitability norm" against which the firm is being judged will be spelled out for a considerable time in advance. By establishing "profitability norms" for two, three or five years in the future, there need be no fear that the targets will be ratcheted upward if the firm does unusually well in one year. Since good work will not be penalized with higher "profitability norms" the following year, the firm will have every incentive to raise its sights and no reason to hold back on its productive efforts.

To insure a united effort in the profit drive, Liberman proposes to make the firm's bonuses solely dependent on the level of the "profitability rate." Presently there are many bonus funds for various categories of work. Liberman feels this leads to conflict and contradiction. He wants to give as much power as possible to the plant manager and allow him to use the bonus fund to stimulate production in the most expedient manner. It may be used for salary bonuses, new housing or new machinery. Liberman's only reservation is that the three planned targets must be fulfilled before the bonus is determined.

While Liberman acknowledges that there may be some flaws in his plan, his main concern is with the reforms he hopes his proposals will make possible. Factory managers will no longer have any reason to battle for lower plan targets. At the same time, they will have every stimulus to reduce costs and conserve capital. Since the "profitability rate" will be dependent on both costs and capital, the factory for the first time will have a definite interest in economizing on both elements.

IV

As might be expected, there was something less than unanimous endorsement of a plan that promised to undermine the basic na-

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ture of the Soviet economy. Most of the criticisms were concerned with the implications of Liberman's greater reliance on profits. Other critics concentrated on the internal inconsistencies in Liberman's proposals. The great debate centered on these two issues.

While exercising remarkable restraint, many argued that Liberman's suggestions were too radical and that his reliance on profit in relation to capital would be tantamount to capitalism. The statement by Liberman and some of his supporters that "What is good for the Soviet firm is good for the Soviet Union" was perhaps too reminiscent of Charles E. Wilson for good Communists to endure.[5] To some, this meant that the economy would be placed at the mercy of the market and the planned operation of the society would be abandoned and turned over to plant officials. Furthermore, they feared the economy would be exposed to unemployment of manpower and resources and cyclical fluctuations in prices.[6]

From the traditionalist's interpretation of Liberman's plan, it was inevitable that there would be such dire consequences. They warned that the factory managers would begin to think of nothing but the maximization of profits (something even American factory managers do not always do). This would cause plant directors to shift wherever possible to the production of goods with higher profit margins. Simultaneously they would squabble to see who could push up their prices fastest. Prices on consumer goods and heavy industrial products would shift radically. Even if a satisfactory price reform of the magnitude necessary could be designed, it could not be carried out overnight. The result would be confusion and profiteering by certain sectors of industry, at least during the interim. In all probability, there would be sudden inflation and psychological if not actual chaos.

The emphasis on profitable operations, the critics pointed out, would put an end to government subsidy for heavy industry. In the past, profit was not an important determinant of capital investment and development. If the government felt something was socially or economically necessary for the long-term welfare of the Soviet Union, that was enough. An insistence on profit would affect not only the future allocation of resources, but also present

[5] The Russian original reads: "To chto vygodno predpriiatiiu, dolzhno byt' vygodno i obshchestvu v tselom." (*Pravda,* September 9, 1962, p. 3; September 21, 1962, p. 3.) See also M. Bor, *E.G.,* November 10, 1962, p. 12.

[6] Sh. Turetskii, *E.G.,* November 3, 1962, p. 43; N. Spiridonova, "Istochniki i Sistemy Premirovaniia," *Voprosy Ekonomiki,* November 1962, p. 123.

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operations. For example, subsidized projects such as dam construction or the development of Siberian resources would be abandoned. Consequently, future needs would be forsaken for projects that promised immediate profit. Since over 20 percent of Soviet industry presently requires a subsidy to maintain its operations, there would be considerable dislocation and many "worthy" projects would have to be scrapped. Instead, plant managers would switch to the production of consumer goods wherever possible to satisfy the pent-up demand of more than four decades of abstinence. This would mean resources would move to the consumption sectors and out of heavy industry, heretofore the keystone of Soviet economic growth. This would indeed spell the end of the planned centralized economy.

In addition to the major problems, there were also some idealists who questioned the whole stress on bonuses. These "puritans" complained that everyone seemed to be interested only in higher incentives. No one speaks about "obligations" any more.[7] Today nobody asks what he can do for the state—only what the state can do for him!

Such complaints did not deter Liberman and his supporters. The existence of artificial supports in the economy only emphasized the need for corrective changes. They frankly admitted that Liberman's proposals would require a fundamental price reform. While there were hazards involved, they insisted that the risks were not as important as the advantages to be gained from bringing prices into line with actual costs. Furthermore, the consequences of price reform had been exaggerated. Prices of consumer goods have always been high because of the imposition of a large turnover or sales tax. To some extent, demand pressures would now substitute for the tax and there would not be that much over-all change in consumer prices. If the withdrawal of subsidies from large industry tended to raise industrial prices, this would be resisted by factory purchasers who needed low prices on materials in order to make their own profits. And if certain firms have a higher than average "profitability rate," so much the better. This means they are efficient or produce goods desired by consumers and therefore they deserve to expand. If other producers are unable to make a profit, this probably indicates some shortcoming. They should either quit or raise the price of their goods.

[7] L. Al'ter, "Sviazat' Stimulirovanie s Perspektivnym Planirovaniem Predpriiatiia," *Voprosy Ekonomiki,* November 1962, p. 116.

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Some of the more outspoken economists went even further. They asserted that if prices were ever to approach more realistic levels, an outright charge must be made for the use of capital. Although they did not call it interest, that is what they seemed to be seeking. Most of them recognized that Liberman's "profitability rate" was an implicit capital charge because it had the effect of discouraging the use of capital. But this was not enough. There were a few who demanded a direct capital charge. At the extreme, V. Kotkin and E. Slastenko asked for a flat 10 percent charge on all capital.[8]

The response of Liberman's defenders only confirmed the worst fears of the conservatives, who were simply not prepared to decentralize the allocation of capital and allow prices to move freely. If capital resources were being used ineffectively, tighter controls were needed. As the Soviet economist, K. Plotnikov, put it, if the decision-making powers were turned over to the plant manager, capital would inevitably be further squandered regardless of Liberman's denials and promises of continued investment control. Capital can be conserved only by rationing it carefully from the center.[9] Shortcomings in planning and pricing could be overcome more effectively with increased use of input-output and linear programming methods rather than through basic changes in the Soviet economy. Although such critics conceded that there may be too many indices for even the computer to handle, they suggested that the planners should simply be more selective. In short, they urged a more moderate approach.

There was another category of criticisms which arose not because of the impact of the Liberman plan on the present nature of the Soviet economy, but because of some internal inconsistencies in the proposals themselves. First, there were flaws in the mechanical operation of the "profitability norms." It turned out that it was possible for a firm to expand its capital stock and win an unintended increase in its bonus fund even if its profits remained the same.[10] The most serious inconsistency, however, stemmed from Liberman's decision that state-assigned planning targets for quantity of production, assortment of product and date of delivery should continue to be handed down to the firm from above. Fulfillment of these targets by the firm would make it difficult to earn the highest "profitability rate" possible. This would mean

[8] *Pravda,* September 21, 1962, p. 3; October 12, 1962, p. 3.
[9] *E.G.,* November 3, 1962, p. 37–38.
[10] *Pravda,* September 18, 1962, p. 3; October 19, 1962, p. 4.

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the continuance of contradictions and conflicts. Furthermore, unless the planned targets were fulfilled, no bonuses would be paid, regardless of the magnitude of the "profitability rate." Naturally, this dual standard diminished the role of profits. It also suggested that the input quotas would not in fact be abandoned, as it was initially thought. The existence of delivery and production targets for the industrial producer implied the use of input and consumption schedules by the industrial consumer.

The assignment to the firm of the three physical planning targets was also inconsistent for another reason. It will be remembered that Liberman argued that insiders were better equipped than outsiders to determine the firm's potentialities. Yet, Gosplan or some other planning agency would continue to have the power to determine the three most basic decisions the firm has to make. This hardly eliminated the role of the outsider. Further, it would be unrealistic to assume that the regional *sovnarkhoz* would refrain from interfering in the firm's activities even if the other seven targets were not directly spelled out. Although no specific assignments were to be made on a firm-by-firm basis, the *sovnarkhoz* would still, as before, have assigned to it the seven specific indices for the whole area. While it would supposedly be prohibited from interfering with the firm, it is logical to assume that some *sovnarkhozy* would violate this rule, especially if their regions failed to meet the targets.

Thus it seems clear that the economic reforms embodied in Liberman's plan would not eliminate administrative interference and red tape. Furthermore, it is safe to assume that there would be juggling to win favorable "profitability norms." If these "norms" were to be flexible so that they would allow for adjustments in size, location, comparability and share of new products, there would be considerable room for administrative discretion and bargaining. Nor would pressures for the reduction of norms be eliminated. As before, it would be in the interest of the plant manager to seek lower assignments. His attention would not be solely on production targets, but also on the "norm of profitability." The bonus fund could be increased not only by expanding production and efficiency, but also by pleading that the firm's capabilities were less than they actually were. By winning a more favorable "norm" schedule, the plant manager could obtain his bonus just as if he earned it by improving production.

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V

While undoubtedly Liberman's proposals would mean some improvement in the present system, the net effect of his contradictory proposals is much less than it first appeared and short of his initial aim. In light of this, why has this debate generated such excitement? The answer is that Liberman has obviously touched upon several pressing problems. In brief, the Soviet Union has outgrown its technology of planning and control. What was once eminently suitable for the purposes of Soviet planners and officials is no longer functional. The economy's needs have changed. Quantitative changes have turned into qualitative changes. Techniques which were designed for implementing one set of needs have now become inadequate and outdated in the context of a new set of conditions.

The late 1920s saw a fundamental change in the operation and direction of the Soviet economy. The decision was taken to complete an industrialized base in as short a time as possible. In the full-scale debate that preceded and accompanied this decision, it was decided that something like a capitalist form of primitive accumulation, as Marx would have called it, was necessary. As described by Alexander Erlich, the proponents of industrialization realized that immense quantities of capital would have to be mobilized and that major structural changes would have to be made.[11] Major readjustments were essential if there were to be the economies of scale deemed so important for industrialization. This would necessitate the diversion of a significant share of the country's resources into heavy industry. It was decided that the only way this could be accomplished was by arbitrary decree and pressure by the state. Reliance solely on market forces would take too much time and would create undesirable profit-making. Therefore, a system of physical planning embodied in a series of yearly and five-year plans was adopted. By administrative decree, periodic campaigns were instituted for priority projects.

Given all this arbitrary planning, the pressures of the market had to be rendered inoperative. In some instances this was impossible, but at least the market forces could be diverted. Prices and profit incentives were reshaped to encourage the creation of heavy industry and discourage the growth of light industry. On

[11] "The Soviet Industrialization Debate: 1924–1928." Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

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the one hand, prices of consumer goods were doubled through the imposition of the turnover tax; this simultaneously curtailed consumer demand and provided a source of revenue for the state. On the other hand, prices of heavy industrial products were held down. This was accomplished by providing operating subsidies and by the absence of an interest rate. Although the abolition of the interest charge was primarily the result of Marxist injunction, it had the important effect of making capital-intensive tasks appear less burdensome financially. While the market pressures were never completely stifled, such measures did foster the reshaping of the economy. To a considerable degree, heavy industry as reflected in the market was encouraged and stimulated at the expense of light industry. This furthered the use of heavy industrial products and the growth of large-scale activity which was the goal of the administrative planners.

Naturally these procedures also led to waste, imbalance, low standards of living and inefficiency in many sectors, especially in the short run. But the Soviets did not have a short-range time horizon and they were not especially concerned with human costs or consumer wants. Even if there were negative returns on some major projects, they could be more than offset by economies of scale elsewhere. The productivity of capital was so high that even if the best project was not selected, a high rate of return was generally assured. If there was not a 30 percent return, there was 20 percent. The main goal was capital accumulation and the generation of internal and external economies of scale.

Such was the economic nature of Stalin's era. Many economists have convincingly argued that other less draconic and traumatic alternatives to industrialization could have been adopted. In any event, by the mid-1950s the basic industrial structure of the Soviet Union had been erected. Subsequently there were signs that in a maturing economy, centralized planning and arbitrary decision-making were no longer as conducive to economic growth.

A moment's reflection suggests that in fact this may have been the main factor behind the current debate. As already noted, it is the first full-blown economic debate since the industrialization discussions of the 1920s, and it offers a fascinating historical parallel. Then the debate was precipitated by the need to alter the existing methods of guiding the economy. Now there seems to be a somewhat similar stimulus.

The Soviet economy again appears to be at a turning point. It

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is clear, as the debate shows, that it is becoming more and more difficult to plan *everything* centrally. The Soviet economy has grown not only in size, but in sophistication and concern for the consumer. As a result, campaigns and storming can no longer solve all the problems that arise. There are simply too many sectors which need attention. They cannot all be manipulated from the center. It has been estimated that, if the economy continues its present growth, by 1980 the planning force will have to be 36 times its present size.[12] Furthermore, a campaign to correct one imbalance inevitably denies attention to other matters and is likely to create other problems in its wake.

Khrushchev himself has recognized that the sophistication of certain sectors of the economy, like chemicals, electronics and consumer goods, are not conducive to centralized planning. When told to expand the economy, the planners simply add another open hearth furnace and increase the output of steel. If it so happens that not steel, but specialized plastic and electronic products are needed, the planners still concentrate on steel because it is easiest for central planners to plan increases in the production of steel. As Khrushchev put it:

> The production of steel is like a well-traveled road with deep ruts; here even blind horses will not turn off because the wheels will break. Similarly some officials have put on steel blinkers; they do everything as they were taught in their day. A material appears which is superior to steel and is cheaper but they keep on shouting "Steel, steel."[13]

It may also be that today administrative decision-making no longer assures the greatest growth. Throughout Liberman's exposition, there is the implication that decision-making should rely more on economic and less on administrative criteria. This seems to be valid for decisions taken both at the center which involve major projects and at the fringes which affect some experimental and smaller operations.

As the economy has grown, the marginal productivity of capital has diminished. This means the return on new investment is not as high as it once was. Now if the rate of economic growth is to be maintained, major projects must be undertaken with more care by the center. Therefore, decision-making tools must be improved so that resources can be utilized with the most effectiveness. This means increasing output with existing capacity and selecting the

[12] M. Fedorovich, *E.G.*, November 3, 1962, p. 39.
[13] *Pravda,* November 20, 1962, p. 4; *New York Times,* November 21, 1962, p. 13.

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most efficient capital investments. This inevitably leads to the use of scarcity prices and interest, the economic criteria referred to above.

The problems at the fringes of the economy (light industry, some electronics, services, new products) are even more complex. These sectors are the least amenable to centralized planning and yet they are becoming increasingly important in Soviet life. Here flexibility is required. If conditions change or new opportunities develop, the manager of the fringe industries must be able to respond without checking with Moscow. Normally the planners in Moscow are aware only of problems that have attained proportions large enough to warrant their attention. Minor difficulties and pregnant opportunities sometimes pass unnoticed. This hampers innovation at the fringe and on other non-priority activities. Spontaneous and experimental projects are generally frustrated by the Soviet system. Unless officially sponsored by a planner, funds, materials and labor are unobtainable. While this does not by any means put a stop to innovation in large industry and in the technical institutes, it virtually precludes the situation in which a man with an idea and a garage suddenly finds himself with a successful product and a going concern. This can be an important added source of growth in a sophisticated economy.

The centralized planning system is also poorly suited to handle the consumer sector. As long as the consumer was neglected and confined to something resembling the subsistence level, there were few problems. Goods were in short supply and whatever was produced was immediately grabbed off the shelves. Now, as the standard of living has improved, conditions have radically changed and the consumer is much choosier. Much to the shock of Soviet planners, some goods are piling up on the warehouse shelves. While there are still major shortages and the standard of living is far below that of most West European countries, inventories of consumer goods now total 20 billion rubles (over $20 billion). Of this sum, almost 3 billion rubles are considered to be excessive.[14] The aircraft designer, O. Antonov, in analyzing this spectacle, says that it is caused by an absence of "feedback," or give and take between producers and consumers.[15] Since most Soviet producers must answer to the plan, not to the consumer, the factory and store managers have long disregarded consumer tastes.

[14] *Narodnoe Khoziastvo SSSR v 1961 godu.* Gosstatizdat, Moscow, 1962, p. 629; *E.G.*, October 10, 1962, p. 33.

[15] *Izvestiia,* May 25, 1962, p. 3; *C.D.*, June 20, 1962, p. 14–15.

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The results are mounting surpluses and inadequate quality alongside unfulfilled demands. Clearly the magnitude of the problem will grow unless some improvements in planning production and rewarding performance are made.

VI

This, then, is the dilemma of the Soviet economy and of an economic reformer like Liberman. There are urgent reasons for altering the existing system of Soviet planning and control. However, any basic reform that would require complete reliance on profits as a source of incentives, and necessitate a fundamental price reform, would produce such serious shocks and shifts that it is hard to predict what would follow. Because of almost 45 years of imbalance, the pressures and price adjustments that the unleashing of pent-up demand would create could have dire psychological if not political effects. For this reason alone it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union will rely completely on Liberman's "profitability rate."

Furthermore, the adoption of something like the "profitability rate" might merely substitute one set of difficulties for another. Liberman's recognition of this may explain why his proposals contain so many inconsistencies. He has two contradictory purposes in mind: (1) to improve efficiency; (2) to insure production of specific goods arbitrarily assigned according to a centrally issued plan. At this stage of Soviet economic development, the first without the second would be politically unacceptable. The Soviet government is not ready to allow profit alone to provide what is needed for the economy. Greater emphasis on profits might improve efficiency, but it most likely would mean the sacrifice both of administrative control and of the production of certain socially necessary goods. While there is a need to stimulate activity at the fringe of the economy, there are still major tasks, such as dam building, completion of the transportation network and expansion into Siberia, which can be undertaken only at the center. The challenge is to retain power enough at the center to undertake the major projects which still promise economies of scale without sacrificing the flexibility needed at the fringe. Professor Liberman has made a valiant attempt to satisfy what appear to be mutually inconsistent aims. None the less, it is likely that there will be many other reformers, reforms and debates before this present Soviet dilemma is resolved.

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THREAT AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE COMMUNIST SCHISM

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

IN ten short years since Joseph Stalin's death a once potent revolutionary force has disintegrated into two mutually hostile phalanxes linked only by ritualistic proclamations of unity: an orthodox international Communism headed by Mao Tse-tung, and a revisionist international Communism led by Nikita Khrushchev. There is no coöperation between the Soviet and the Chinese leaders; no collaboration in actual policies; no coördination of a general outlook. The alliance as an active political force is dead.

The failure of international Communism to prevent the schism appears to be rooted in certain generic peculiarities of Communism itself. First of all, the importance attached by Communists to ideology means that there must always be a "general line" guiding the tactics and the strategy of the movement. Setting the line was an easy matter when Stalin was alive. Today, it involves dealings among many parties and régimes, while the preoccupation of Communists with their alleged monoply on the only "true" and "scientific" understanding of reality results in the quick transformation of differences into matters of principle, with mutual accusations of "dogmatism" or "revisionism" inevitably following. In addition, commitment to the ideology resulted in a general delusion that, by definition, there could be no conflict among Communist states. Thus there was no predisposition to develop the tradition of agreeing to disagree or the institutions for collective decision-making.

Second, the common emphasis on the Marxist-Leninist ideology became a liability when the movement expanded to embrace some 40 percent of the world's population. A single doctrine simply could not encompass the complex, highly diverse and rapidly changing world-wide processes of change. This was especially so since that doctrine was derived from an early stage of industrial development and later adjusted to rural societies experiencing the first impact of industrialization and nationalism. Thus the ideology was particularly inadequate to cope with the problems both of the leading Communist state, the Soviet Union, and of the Communist parties of the more developed societies. Irresis-

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tible pressures toward doctrinal innovation (*i.e.* "revisionism") were created, and these in turn provoked a fundamentalist reaction from those parties whose conditions were still adequately served by orthodox Marxism-Leninism.

Thirdly, the nationalism of the Communist rulers prevented effective "deviation-control." This was not the conventional nationalism of nineteenth-century Europe, but Communism interpreted in terms of the interests of the state power wielded by particular Communist régimes, *i.e.* national Communism. The so-called international Communism of Stalin was based on one leader (Stalin), on the primacy of one Party (the C.P.S.U.), and on the acceptance of one program (the Soviet). In effect, it meant the supremacy of Soviet national Communism. Neither Stalin nor his successors ever adjusted to the requirements of an international Communist community; nor have they been willing to subordinate Soviet interests to it. They mechanically identified the interests of international Communism with those of the U.S.S.R. That worked only as long as the C.P.S.U. was the effective leader. But the eventual emergence of independent or semi-independent Communist régimes, especially in China, gave rise to demands that their interests also be considered, with the Chinese even suggesting (very much in the Leninist tradition) that only their interpretation was the correct one. It should be remembered that nationalism is a phenomenon of early development, and most Communist élites reflect the peculiar self-righteousness which comes with it. This made compromise and adjustment difficult, indeed eventually prevented it altogether.

Moreover, the polarization of the Communist parties throughout the world into either the orthodox or the revisionist fronts is taking place in part on the basis of racial differences, pitting the occidentals against the Afro-Asians, and in part on the basis of differences in stages of development. In a true Marxist these considerations should prompt some unhappy reflections, refuting Khrushchev's claim that only "subjective" differences are involved.

In many parties factional conflicts are now in progress. Irrespective of how they are resolved, they contribute to further hostility between the two sides. At the same time, the appeal of Communism as the only scientific guide for our age has been badly discredited, and its claim to absolute truth undermined. The Chinese assertion that they are the only true "Marxists-Leninists" is certainly not helped by the fact that most parties have

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sided with the Soviets. On the other hand, the Soviets, in their efforts to gain support, have watered down considerably the binding tenets of the doctrine, and now accept many models of "socialism" and more diversity in the relations among Communist states. As Khrushchev put it in a speech last December 12:

> Different interpretations of concrete questions of socialist construction, a different approach to various problems, are not excluded. This is what happens in practice, and it apparently will happen in the future when other peoples take the road to socialism. That is why it would be incorrect to evolve a certain model and to adhere to it in mutual relations with other socialist countries. It would be an error to condemn as renegades all those who do not fit that model.

This means the relativization of the doctrine, the erosion of its binding force. But old habits die hard, and the Soviets have not been able to overcome entirely their traditional conviction that only they are right. Hence in that very same speech, a mere few sentences later, the Soviet leader charged the Albanians with pursuing "errors" and declared that they are not Marxists-Leninists. Thus even within revisionist Communism the conflict between the doctrinal and the pragmatic approach is far from resolved; it contributes to further tensions and eventually new dissensions, and all the while eroding the unifying bonds of the ideology.

In the present phase of the schism, it is likely that there will be a further strengthening of ties between the Soviet Union and its allies on the one hand, and China and its supporters on the other. One sees evidence of that in the growing importance of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CEMA) and in the much more frequent consultations between Soviet and East European leaders. Similarly, the Chinese will probably try to rally more closely the revolutionary parties and eliminate from them the vestiges of Soviet influence. The long-run trend, however, points toward even further diversification: revolutionary parties, as both the Jugoslavs and the Chinese taught the Soviets earlier, are extremely difficult to control and it is unlikely that the Chinese hegemony can be effectively maintained, especially in view of the relatively limited Chinese resources; similarly, the ruling Communist parties in Eastern Europe are likely to press gradually for a greater margin of autonomy, and the Soviet wooing of Jugoslavia is bound to intensify these pressures. The Italian party has already asserted its autonomy. Thus both the orthodox and revisionist wings are likely to see further erosion of central power.

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In the meantime, the two Communisms will be pursuing openly and often competitively different strategies against the West. The Chinese have recently spelled theirs out at length. Their statements, particularly the one of December 16, 1962, make it clear that the general line of revolutionary Communism rests on "slighting imperialism strategically" and on "respecting it tactically":

> On the question of how to deal with imperialism and all reactionaries, the Chinese Communist Party has always maintained that one should slight them strategically but deal seriously with them tactically. That is to say, on the one hand, strategically, from a long-term point of view and taken as a whole, imperialism and all reactionaries, in the final analysis, are doomed to failure and the masses of the people will certainly triumph. Without this understanding it would not be possible to encourage the masses of people to wage with full confidence resolute revolutionary struggles against imperialism and all reactionaries, nor would it be possible to lead the revolution to victory. On the other hand, from the tactical point of view, on each immediate, specific issue, it is necessary to deal with imperialism and all reactionaries seriously, to proceed with care and caution and to pay attention to the art of the struggle. . . .

This means basically a policy of encouraging insurgency, of stimulating popular unrest, of subordinating the national bourgeois governments, and of intense propaganda warfare against the West, particularly the United States, but all that without precipitating a direct showdown.

The Chinese have made it clear that they regard Khrushchev's Cuba misadventure as a negative confirmation of the soundness of their line. In their view, because he overestimates the importance of nuclear weapons and assumes that they have a decisive importance, he recklessly involved himself in the export of nuclear weapons to Cuba, *i.e.* he was tactically an adventurist. And again, because he attaches such importance to these weapons, he then allowed himself to be intimidated by U.S. nuclear power; he pulled back and settled for a "compromise," *i.e.* he was strategically a "capitulationist." In other words, Khrushchev's short-range gambles are reckless, while his long-range policy involves the abandonment of revolutionary struggles by the masses.

In contrast the Chinese presumably see their recent policy toward India as a positive confirmation of their strategy. By exercising restraint in capitalizing on their military advantage, they prevented direct Western involvement on India's behalf, thereby displaying "tactical" respect for imperialism. At the same time,

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the long-range effect of their military victory over India in their view showed the other nations of Asia that China is the number-one power in the region, that it cannot be defied effectively, that it has the ability "to slight imperialism strategically." As the revolutionary Communism gains in strength, the Chinese may eventually expect to be able to "slight" imperialism tactically as well, thereby precipitating a major threat to peace.

The policy of Moscow's revisionist Communism is much more ambivalent. On the one hand, Soviet criticisms of the Chinese are in many ways reminiscent of the criticisms voiced in the early 1920s by the Social Democratic leaders of the Second International against Lenin's Third International. The emphasis on peace, the assertion that "peaceful coexistence" is a reflection of optimism in the victory of Communism whereas the Chinese are nothing but prophets of doom, the glowing praise for Soviet achievements—all are a repetition of earlier Socialist criticisms of Communist revolutionary strategy. The European Socialist leaders argued that socialism could be achieved by modifying democratically the bourgeois society, that Bolshevik reliance on revolution was sheer pessimism, that the workers had already achieved too much to risk an open clash with the entrenched but gradually yielding bourgeoisie. As the Socialist-Communist argument mounted, the gap between them widened, and eventually the Socialists participated in coalition governments and adjusted themselves to the notion of very gradual reform. Indeed, by the time of the Communist revolution in Russia many of the Western Socialist parties were already in a post-revolutionary mood. Their argument with the Communists enabled them to shed the remaining revolutionary myths.

This, too, could happen to the Soviet Union and its allies, none of which any longer believes basically in the feasibility of the "old-fashioned" revolution. They are certainly not ready to make heavy sacrifices for it, even though they still pay lip service to it.

But that is only one side of the picture. What makes the Soviet policy ambivalent and supplies the "on the other hand" of the argument is that the global ambitions of Communist ideology have now been harnessed to a new sense of national self-assertion, intensified by power and achievement. That combination drives the Soviet Union toward global primacy. It would be a mistake to consider the Soviet leaders simply as nationalists, cynically manipulating Communist slogans to gain support. In all prob-

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ability, they believe themselves to be true Communist internationalists, but they interpret that internationalism in terms of Soviet interests and purposes. Thus they will use foreign revolutions, such as Cuba, in their struggle against the United States, and they will even back Cuba with their nuclear weapons; but, again as Cuba showed, in moments of crisis they will be ready to sacrifice the foreign revolution for the sake of the U.S.S.R.

It has been suggested that the Soviet leaders may now concentrate on domestic development, since it is hopeless to surpass America in military power, and push in the direction of a general disarmament which will eventually equalize American and Soviet power. This argument is not entirely convincing. Psychologically, it is hard to see the Soviet leaders accepting passively the idea of prolonged American predominance, and it would certainly be difficult for them to abandon their external aspirations without intensifying domestic pressures for greater freedom. The recent ideological debate in the arts shows clearly the need for an enemy if the ruling élite is to justify its power. Ideology, nationalism and the interests of power thus merge, and the competition with America is their natural expression. Moreover, given the Soviet image of America, the very least the Russian leaders will have to do is to keep up with American military development, lest in their view some future "right-wing" American government be tempted to impose its will on a much weaker Soviet Union.

The Soviet leaders are thus likely to continue pressing forward with their military development, hoping perhaps for a "breakthrough" in weapons development or relying on such military spectaculars as spaceships armed with rockets for military and psychological effect. This will provide them with the necessary minimum for probing for Western weak spots, in Berlin and elsewhere, for backing revolutions where the danger of a direct showdown is not too high, and to deter Western moves affecting Soviet interests. In all probability, however, this will not be a crash program of military development, which sacrifices domestic aspirations altogether, or even largely. In fact, the Soviet leaders are probably quite sincere and serious when they argue that in the long run it is the pace of Soviet economic development that will be decisive in tipping the scales of history. An economically dominant Soviet Union could then effectively assert its primacy among the developing nations, while surpassing the United States militarily. The tension between the desire to take advantage of

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immediate opportunities to give history a push and the longer-range reliance on economic development creates the dangerous ambivalence in Soviet policy.

II

In the short run, then, the revisionist Communism is the more dangerous because it is based primarily on Soviet power, reflects intense Soviet national ambitions, and is backed by a nuclear rocket force. As the Cuban adventure showed, the Soviet leadership is willing to brandish this destructive power in order to assert its interests. However, the gradual decline in the revolutionary orientation of the Soviet leaders, their growing recognition that a nuclear war would not bring about a Communist victory, and their increasing stress on economic competition leave room for some optimism concerning a future adjustment with the West. The orthodox Communism, because of its military impotence, is less of an immediate danger, but it represents the greater long-range threat to peace. One may presume that its Chinese leaders will strive to promote international instability, not only in order to promote revolutionary situations but also to embroil Moscow's revisionist Communism in a more direct conflict with the West.

Our policy in the years to come must accordingly be based on a recognition of these differences in terms of both their short-range and long-range implications. Basically, our task is to eliminate the ambivalence in Soviet policy and to encourage the Soviet Union toward a grand reconciliation with the Western world. For the foreseeable future, it is therefore absolutely essential to maintain American military superiority over the Soviet Union, since even parity could tempt the Soviet leaders to engage in brinkmanship on the assumption that our society would be more likely to yield to nuclear blackmail. Similarly, it would be dangerous to make concessions to Khrushchev on the grounds that obstinacy on such issues as Berlin (or Cuba) plays into the hands of the more militant elements. Quite the contrary, anything less than military superiority and firmness actually rekindles the increasingly dormant revolutionary tendencies in the Soviet Union and sets back the process described above. In this connection, it is certainly high time to bury the fashionable notion, assiduously disseminated by Jugoslav and Polish diplomats and eagerly repeated by Western journalists, that Khrushchev's fall would be a major setback for peace. In the unlikely event that he were to fall because of West-

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ern firmness, it is almost certain that his successor would be anxious not to get into a similar difficulty until such time as the Soviet Union was stronger than the West.

This effective American counterweight to Soviet power prevents (to use Chinese parlance) Soviet "tactical adventurism" and consolidates Soviet "strategic capitulationism." Gradually, the U.S.S.R. might come to accept international stability; that is, acceptance of the status quo might eventually seem preferable to maintaining the costs of armament at present or higher levels. For this reason, disarmament should be pursued cautiously. It is only logical to assume that as long as political enmity exists between the West and the U.S.S.R., it is in the interest of the weaker side to use disarmament to obtain, first, greater equality in power and, second, perhaps even the opportunity surreptitiously to change the balance of power. Furthermore, the premature elimination of the mutual nuclear restraint could result in new complications, given the persisting tensions between the two sides and the continued challenge from the orthodox Communist forces.

The maintenance of American military superiority over the Soviet Union would also make possible the political steps designed gradually to attract and absorb the revisionist Communism into the Western world. In Europe this would involve a peaceful engagement in the affairs of the several Communist states for the purpose of increasing their margin of autonomy and eventually achieving their return to the European fold. Whenever forces for moderation emerge, such as those in Poland and more recently in Hungary, they should be encouraged with aid and closer contacts. At the same time, the territorial security of such states as Poland and Czechoslovakia should in some form be guaranteed by the West. West Germany could well be advised to abandon the Hallstein doctrine so as to permit closer contacts between East Europe and the new and democratic Germany. (The doctrine could still be applied toward states that exercise a real freedom of choice in their foreign policy, and be backed by economic sanctions which, in the final analysis, provide the real deterrent to a recognition of East Germany by many neutral states.) All of these measures would help the trend toward more autonomy and moderation in Eastern Europe. They would also further isolate the East German régime, which, lacking a national base, is unable to moderate itself. Hence, it would become an isolated political anachronism in Eastern Europe, and a burden to the U.S.S.R.

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In this connection, a word should be said about the special and changing role of Jugoslavia. As long as the Communist world was united and hierarchical, a Jugoslavia outside it was a definite asset to the free world. But today the situation is quite different. The return of Jugoslavia into the revisionist Communist camp has helped to outrage the more orthodox parties, while within Eastern Europe the participation of the independent Jugoslavs (who certainly are not Soviet-controlled) helps to undermine Soviet supremacy. We should, therefore, not worry too much about Jugoslav friendship for Moscow and the decline in its sympathies for the West. Its "subjective" friendship is far less important than the "objectively" disruptive character of its participation in the revisionist Communist community.

In promoting the evolution of Eastern Europe, an essential role will inevitably be played by Western Europe. As de Gaulle has unintentionally demonstrated, the concept of European unity is perhaps the most potent force on the Continent today, and it is gradually beginning to be felt in Russia also. Western Europe is not likely to remain satisfied with the artificial division of Europe into two halves. It can be assumed that pressures toward "a Europe to the Urals" (de Gaulle's phrase) will increase as Western European power grows. The inevitable acquisition of a nuclear force in some form will give the West Europeans a new sense of power and will create the basis for a foreign policy preoccupied primarily with Europe. By linking itself with the effort to break down the present division of Europe, America can both strengthen its momentum and also exercise a restraining influence on those West European powers that may have strong emotional and geographical reasons for challenging Russian domination more forcefully than the United States might think prudent. A joint European atomic force, backed by the United States, would have an entirely different political complexion and would offer a far less dangerous—but more powerful—front to the East than a series of national nuclear powers, including eventually Germany. It is not too far-fetched to postulate the possibility of a Europe, dominated by France and Germany, becoming to America what China has become to Russia, unless the United States now takes the lead both in shaping a militarily united Europe and in defining common affirmative—and not merely defensive—goals for all Europe.

The Common Market can be a powerful vehicle for attracting Eastern Europe and eventually Russia, but in the short run there

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is danger that it will actually intensify the political and economic integration of the Soviet part of the Communist world. By making trade with the West more difficult, it has already forced some of the East European states into greater economic dependence on the Soviet Union. It is for this reason important to consider ways in which an economically united and increasingly powerful Europe could eventually extend the hand of coöperation to the states united in CEMA. A new European-based version of the Marshall Plan could be envisaged as a step toward the unification of all of Europe. Thus Eastern Europe as a unit, now more industrialized and increasingly integrated in CEMA, could be encouraged to relate itself step by step to an all-European economic development, at first in very loose form, later in a more binding fashion. Over several decades the open wound on the Elbe might be healed.

To attempt a disengagement in Central Europe at a time of tensions between East and West is both useless and dangerous. But in time it may become both possible and useful as a way of bridging the gap between Western Europe (and indirectly America) and the revisionist Communist world. Rather than press for the immediate reabsorption of East Germany into the Federal Republic, one might consider a transitional status, perhaps under United Nations auspices, which would offer reassurance that drawing together with Western Europe does not mean the political ascendancy of the West, nor the immediate deprival of East German industrial resources to the countries of CEMA.

Even more important is the possibility that the present integration of Eastern Europe with the Soviet Union may make Russia increasingly susceptible to the attraction of Europe. Eastern Europe can serve as a transmission belt reaching ever wider circles of Soviet society, especially the intelligentsia. And as China increasingly repels, it gradually pushes Russia toward Europe and sets the stage for perhaps an entirely new historical relationship. This is not to suggest that the Soviet Union will be transformed into a social democracy or that its internal institutions will soon come to resemble those of the West. But a Russia deprived first of its revolutionary zeal and then of its global Communist ambitions may eventually find a more fruitful place for itself in the European confraternity, provided its way to aggression is first blocked by America and the way to reconciliation with it gradually paved by both Europe and America.

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III

As in the case of the revisionist Communism, the response to the orthodox Communism also must be based on the distinction between the immediate threat and the long-range problem. Communist China is our most immediate concern, while the conditions of underdevelopment and socio-economic crisis in Asia, Africa and Latin America which nourish revolutionary Communism pose the more enduring challenge. Basically, we must combine a policy of repulsing and isolating Communist China with a policy of regionally inspired and not only U.S.-managed economic development.

China is now on the way to establishing itself as the number-one power in Asia. It has successfully humiliated India, and anyone who has recently travelled in Asia comes to be very impressed with the political isolation of India, achieved in large measure by China's skillful combination of diplomacy (*e.g.* toward Nepal and Burma) and military power. In effect, Burma has already become China's Finland, and Cambodia, Ceylon and Nepal are not far behind. The success of the Chinese policy was well demonstrated by the Colombo powers' negotiations to achieve a settlement of the border war: of the six powers present, only the non-Asian U.A.R. squarely backed the Indian cause. The view that the United States is not willing to engage itself actively in a conflict with China is widespread in Southeast Asia; one highly placed neutralist spokesman remarked to the writer that Laos (as contrasted with Cuba) made it clear that Asian countries have little choice but to seek their accommodation with China. Whether or not Laos is a fair barometer, the foregoing view is less widespread among Indians, but unfortunately there is still uncertainty as to the degree of American willingness to aid threatened nations.

Therefore, the first and most urgent response should involve the building up of Indian power, especially in the military sphere. The coming generation of Indian political leaders seems to be quite realistic in its assessment of international politics; it has been deeply impressed by the fact that China has not dared to attack a single SEATO power, and it is prepared to seek large-scale Western economic and military aid in order to challenge China's regional primacy. This leadership will soon dominate India's political scene, especially as Nehru's power to impose his own successor has been weakened by recent events.

It would be illusory, however, to expect India to join a collec-

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tive security pact such as SEATO. Too much of an emotional investment has been made in "non-alignment" for even the post-Nehru leadership to reverse it. What is important, however, is not the form of the new Indian-American relationship but its substance. It is more than likely that in the long run India will show greater understanding of American interests elsewhere, as for example in Berlin and Cuba, and may be in a position to use its influence to restrain more extremist Russian action. The West should not hesitate to make clear to India how it defines its own interests, just as the Indian leadership is not hesitant in making its needs known.

In addition, responsible Indian public opinion seems by and large far more willing than the present leadership to seek some adjustment on the Kashmir issue. There is the short-run danger that the anti-Western left (as well as the Soviet government) will use the Kashmir issue to stimulate a new wave of anti-Westernism (and even perhaps justify a temporary acceptance of the Chinese conditions on the grounds that the alternative is submission to Western blackmail on Kashmir), but here again the longer-range perspective, both in terms of Indian domestic politics as well as the defense needs of the Indian subcontinent, dictates a more affirmative and bolder Western course, which could also reduce Pakistan's embitterment.

Until such time as India's military power is adequate to neutralize the present Chinese capacity to intimidate India's neighbors, the primary responsibility for preserving the security of Southeast Asia will rest with the United States. Sooner or later this may require carrying counter-insurgency actions into North Viet Nam, in order to force Ho Chi Minh either to desist in the south or to obtain more direct Chinese assistance, thereby exposing Viet Nam to Chinese control, a prospect which few Communist Vietnamese would relish. Such measures would also reassure Thailand, badly shaken by events in Laos, fearful of present trends in Cambodia and Burma, and increasingly subject to Communist insurgency in its own northeast. Hopefully, India will adopt a more understanding attitude in these matters, while its diplomacy could be helpful in obtaining Soviet "neutrality" in the West's purely defensive operations against revolutionary Communism.

Offensive operations against the China Mainland would not be opportune. They might precipitate Soviet aid and diminish the

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schism. But by the same token, it would also be unwise to rush into a political and diplomatic, or economic, courtship of China. For the time being, the continued isolation and repulsion of China is the best policy calculated to keep internal dissension within the Communist world and to prolong the fundamental economic weakness of China.

In the meantime, it is to be hoped that efforts to accelerate the development of the new nations will gradually begin to bear fruit. In this connection, it is desirable to encourage more regional leadership of economic and political development by countries other than the United States, thus depriving the Communists of their anti-American appeal. For example, much more can be done in Asia by Japan, apart from actual aid and trade, by providing a model for economic development under conditions of raw-materials scarcity and over-population. Till now, the Japanese have been reticent to project themselves as a model for economic development in Asia, but perhaps the growing power of China, including its eventual acquisition of nuclear weapons, will force Japan to assume a more active role in Asia, not only economically but in a broader sense providing some of the inspiration and direction. This would also have the effect of deflecting Japan from its present preoccupation with trade with China. While eventually such trade might become desirable as a means to provide China with an opening to the West and an inducement to follow more moderate policies, at present it would merely serve to strengthen its capacity for pursuing revolutionary policies. Japanese resentment against the United States for impeding trade with China might be overcome if gradually there emerges in Japan a greater consciousness of its regional responsibility for guiding and inspiring the development of Asia.

There are those few moments in history that can rightfully be described as turning points. The Communist schism is one of them. International Communism has lost its momentum and the rhythm of Communist policy has been disrupted. Gloating over it is not enough, and to pursue policies which were developed during the time of a unified Communist threat could be self-defeating. Our task is to perceive the implications of the schism and to readjust accordingly both our perspectives and policies.

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BRAZIL: WHAT KIND OF REVOLUTION?

By Celso Furtado

BRAZILIANS are now widely conscious that their country is on the march toward transformations in its economic and social structure. They want to understand what is happening so that they can take intelligent positions on the issues involved. Those who must make decisions of major importance therefore owe it to the public to define their aims clearly and disclose the methods to be used in achieving them. What follows is an attempt to satisfy this requirement.

The first question often raised concerns the disproportionate social costs of the notable economic development that has been taking place in Brazil over the past several years. Economic analysis deals exclusively with the cold description of reality. We know that this development of which we are so proud has brought about no change at all in the living conditions of three-fourths of the country's population. Its main feature has been a growing concentration of income, both socially and geographically. The large mass of people who toil in the fields and constitute the majority of the Brazilian population have reaped no benefit. Worse than that, the masses have witnessed a relative decline in their standard of living as compared to those engaged in commerce and other services. As for the industrial workers, who represent a sort of middle class in the Brazilian social framework, they have grown both in absolute and relative terms, without having improved their standard of living to any large extent. They, too, have suffered a relative worsening of their economic position as compared to higher income groups employed in urban services.

It is not only in the concentration of income that economic development has produced social results of an extremely negative character. Because of the anachronistic structure of Brazilian agriculture, it has led in many regions to a relative increase in the rent from land, thus rewarding parasitic groups. Similarly, in the absence of a conscious policy designed to further the social purposes of state action, a variety of subsidies have been improvised, which—in the name of development—have very often put a premium on investments which either were superfluous or fostered a still greater concentration of income in the hands of privileged

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groups. Through capital contributions, such as subsidized exchange and credit, large amounts of social wealth have been transferred to a few hands.

In political and administrative fields the distortions are still more glaring. The expansion and diversification of state functions—both as cause and effect of the development—have not been followed up by the necessary basic reforms within the state structure, and as a result waste in public administration has enormously increased. This, combined with the state's increased role in the field of investments, has created ideal conditions for the illicit acquisition of capital at the people's expense. Big contracts for public works have become the current source for amassing fortunes both within and without the government.

The resulting popular indignation, especially among the young, is easily understood. People see their supposed representatives being elected through the influence of contract-mongers for public works; they see an alliance between operators of the feudal machine and those who make budgetary appropriations resulting in the election to Congress of legislators who know they will survive politically only if they remain docile stooges in the hands of their financial patrons.

Some might object that things were much worse before; elections then were a mere formality, since an oligarchy decided for itself what would be called the will of the people. But the objection is no longer valid. If we know where the failings of the system lie—and we do— then we are able to change them; if we do not try to do so, we will be conniving with them.

There is also the other side—the positive gains of development. It has provided the country with the instruments to make decisions, given it the ability to exercise choice and, by making the people conscious of their destiny, has made them responsible for their own failings. The root cause of the present state of uneasiness in Brazil is this simple truth: we know where the errors of our development lie, and we know that it is within our power to eradicate or minimize them.

II

The second point which I would like to elaborate is the need for a philosophy to guide our action. Many people both in Brazil and abroad have asked me why Marxism has permeated Brazilian youth so deeply. The reason is simple: Marxism, in any of its

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varieties, affords a diagnosis of the social reality and a guide to action. We must approach this subject with absolute frankness if we are to maintain an effective dialogue with the idealistic and active youth of our time. What does their Marxism consist of?

It may be summed up by describing a few of their attitudes. They maintain: (1) that the present social order is based to a great extent on the exploitation of man by man, which favors the well-being of a class sheltering many a parasite and idler and leaves the great majority in poverty; (2) that the social reality is *historical* and thus in permanent change; therefore the present order must be superseded by another; and (3) that it is possible to identify the strategic factors which affect the social process; this in turn opens the way to a conscious policy of social reconstruction.

If we go deep into the core of this philosophy, we shall find on the one hand the wish to liberate man from all chains that socially enslave him, allowing him to fulfill his potentialities; and on the other hand an optimistic attitude concerning the capacity of human communities for self-determination. In the last analysis, what we find is a higher stage of humanism, for while it places man in the center of its concerns, it recognizes that full individual development can be attained only through a rational guidance of social relations.

Whatever name we choose to give this conception, it is impossible to object to it openly, for it is inspired by the most profound longings of modern man. It has its roots in the humanism of the Renaissance, which taught man that he could affect his own destiny; and its inherent optimism emanates from the Industrial Revolution, which gave man the power to affect his own environment.

In our dialogue with the new generation we must reach agreement as to what is really fundamental. We should relegate to the background all things that are merely instrumental or subordinate to the ends pursued. For example, it would not be possible to ascribe more than an instrumental character to the private ownership of means of production—in short, to private enterprise. We are all agreed that private enterprise is merely a decentralized form of organizing production which must be ruled by social criteria. Whenever there is a conflict between the social aims of production and its organization as a private concern, measures have to be taken to preserve the social interest. On the other hand,

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as a greater abundance in the supply of goods is reached, that is to say, in the higher stages of development, the actual organization of production becomes less important while the control of political power increases in importance. It is the latter, finally, that dictates the patterns of distribution and utilization of social income, in the form of either public or private consumption.

We may well ask, therefore, what are the fundamental aims on which we can unite? Should these aims be considered as ends in themselves and related to our own conception of life? It is of the highest importance, I believe, that we define these objectives clearly. Otherwise we shall not distinguish means from ends and will risk treating what others consider merely means as though they were ends. We have the right to take a stand as to the ultimate ends we are trying to attain without reference to the issue of Russian or American preëminence on the world stage. To subordinate the future of our culture to the tactical conveniences of either of the two great centers of military power would mean to give up the struggle before it is joined. We must consider the Russian-American stalemate as a given fact of the present day. By doing this we admit that it is not in our power to change the balance of forces to any significant degree. Our very helplessness regarding the world conflict gives us a wider margin of liberty to establish our own aims. And, as often happens, greater freedom gives rise to greater awareness of responsibility.

It is against this background that we must establish irrevocable aims of political action. I believe that they can be described as humanism and optimism concerning the material development of society. Or, to use more current terms, liberty and economic development.

I have used the word humanism because liberty can also be understood in terms of nineteenth-century individualism, which often saw the individual as opposed to society. There is not the slightest doubt that aspirations of our present-day youth center about authentic humanism. What makes them angry is the inhuman aspect of our development—the growing contrast between wasteful wealth and abject poverty. They see peasants living in the country but unable to grow enough food and suffering hunger almost every day of the year. They see state capitals where 10 percent of the population are listed in hospital registries as suffering from tuberculosis. And we know that all this can be remedied, indeed has already disappeared from a large portion of the

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world. We can see then that what worries youth is man and his degradation, and the consciousness that we are also responsible for it.

III

Once we have defined our aims, the question is how to pull ourselves together to achieve them. How can we prevent the struggle for intermediate or secondary objectives from making us forget our authentic ends? It is an extremely difficult problem, especially as the historical experience of recent decades has suggested that the underdeveloped countries must make a choice between individual liberty and rapid material development. This false dilemma is posed both by the champions of liberty and by the promoters of mass welfare.

It is now clear that the rapid material development of the Soviet Union, until recently an underdeveloped country, was achieved partly by the use of inhuman methods. The requisitioning of agricultural surpluses in order to finance industrial development was accomplished by the use of armed force, through compulsory collectivization and the violent suppression of all resistance. In order to justify these drastic methods, the "theory" was put forward that the peasant was fundamentally an individualist and that the only way to overcome such "individualism" was by enforced collectivization. This is the theory of salvation through punishment. To achieve administrative efficiency an enormous price was paid in human lives. But even if we put aside the painful Soviet experience, account must be taken of the evidence that the rapid economic development of the Communist countries has been achieved under forms of socio-political organization in which individual liberty was restricted beyond the limits which we would consider tolerable.

It must be recognized, however, that the masses in the underdeveloped countries have not generally put the same high valuation on individual liberty that we do. Since they have not had access to the better things of life, they obviously cannot grasp the full meaning of the supposed dilemma between liberty and quick development. Also, if we were to assert that rapid economic development of socialist countries was achieved only at the price of restricting civil liberties, we must then accept the corollary that the liberty enjoyed by the minority in our society is paid for by a delay in general economic development, hence is at the expense of the welfare of the great majority.

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Even less effective with the peasant is the argument that the development of the socialist countries is being obtained at an enormous human cost, including forms of semi-slave labor. The fact is that the underdeveloped peoples are quite prepared to pay a price, even a very heavy one, for their development. They know by hard experience the extremely high price they pay for remaining underdeveloped. How many millions of lives are sacrificed every year in a country like Brazil by underdevelopment? How many millions of lives are lost through hunger and physical exhaustion? How many millions of human beings live without access to primary education, or any opportunity of sharing in secondary and higher education? Very few of us have sufficient awareness of these deeply inhuman characteristics of underdevelopment. When we do become fully aware, we understand why the masses are prepared for any sacrifice in order to overcome it. If the price of liberty for the few had to be the poverty of the many, we can be quite certain that the probability of preserving freedom would be practically nil.

Insistence on false alternatives nevertheless goes on, elaborated in different forms by opposing champions. The self-appointed defenders of liberty argue that the structural changes in the social order necessary for the rapid acceleration of economic development have always been associated with the suppression of fundamental human liberties. Those who take the opposite side argue from the historical fact that the only effective method for introducing the social changes necessary for rapid development has been a revolution of the Marxist-Leninist type, which by its own nature requires the setting up of a rigid dictatorship. So both sides acknowledge that social change is the effective instrument for accelerating material development in underdeveloped countries.

The discussion of this very important point has been bedevilled by a great confusion of ideas, either unconscious or deliberate. We should not forget that the method of Marxism-Leninism was created and perfected in the struggle for the overthrow of an entirely rigid socio-political structure—that of tsarism. The historical experience of the last decades has shown that such a revolutionary technique applied against other rigid structures—Nationalist China, Japanese-occupied China and Batista's Cuba are obvious examples—can be highly effective where accompanied by a Spartan discipline in the rank and file and the daring of an Alexander in the leadership.

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The same does not apply, however, to "open" societies. The example of Western Europe seems conclusive: Huge party machines guided by Marxism-Leninism found themselves bewildered by an ever changing socio-political reality. This was because Marxism-Leninism sees in the state—which it defines as "a special repressive force"—the dictatorship of a class, the bourgeoisie. From the moment the state ceases to be the mere dictatorship of a class to become a composite system, though under the aegis of a certain class, the unity of revolutionary action is weakened by an inability any longer to define the party's aims. The need to discriminate between good and bad policies of the state requires a capacity for adaptation that a monolithic revolutionary party cannot have.

We cannot, then, ignore the historical fact that the Marxist-Leninist techniques have been proved ineffective in dealing with open societies. Nor can we escape the following conclusions: (1) that dictatorships were not created by the acceleration of development but preceded it; (2) that the acceleration took place only in structures which were previously rigid (dictatorships); and (3) that the techniques which have so far been used for the rapid transformation of social structures have been effective only in rigid societies (dictatorships).

So the fundamental problem we face is to develop techniques which will make rapid social transformations possible, while retaining the pattern of an open society.

Before turning to specifically Brazilian questions, I will indulge in one more observation on revolutionary methods: Since Marxism-Leninism is based on the substitution of the dictatorship of one class for that of another class, it would be politically retrogressive to apply it to societies which have attained more complex social forms—that is, modern open societies. It would mean, in the last resort, a sacrifice of the very objectives previously described as essential. While it is true that economic development means a fuller life for man, it is no less true that the pattern of social and political organization is the warp that sustains the woof of a fuller and richer life. Although it is probable that in the future material abundance will coexist with forms of socio-political organization which permit the full realization of authentic human values, that does not necessarily occur at the present historical stage. To have attained higher forms of social and political organization is at least as great an achievement as that of high standards of material development.

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Historical experience has demonstrated that whenever a revolution of the Marxist-Leninist type has been imposed on a complex social structure—as in the case of certain European countries—socialism as a form of humanism becomes perverted. As there is no possibility of converting an open society into a dictatorship without creating a climate of frustration, there is a deterioration of social values. Since the dictatorial régime does not permit the individual to play his proper part in society, a series of social myths is put forward in order to replace genuine human values. Thus, material development can take place at the same time that the dictatorship is consolidating itself upon principles which are the antithesis of humanistic revolutionary ideals.

IV

Let us now face up to the Brazilian problem. The fact is that our society is an "open" one to the industrial workers, but not to the peasants. It is therefore not hard to explain why the peasant is much more susceptible to revolutionary techniques of the Marxist-Leninist type than is the industrial working class, although from the orthodox Marxist point of view the latter should be the vanguard of the revolutionary movement. But our political system allows the urban workers to organize themselves in order to press their claims, within the rules of the democratic game, whereas the situation of the peasants is altogether different. Since they have no rights, they cannot have legal claims. If they organize themselves, the inference is that they do so for subversive purposes. The necessary conclusion we must draw is that Brazilian society is rigid at least in that large sector composed of agricultural laborers. As regards this sector, we have to accept the fact that the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary techniques are effective.

We come now to a conclusion of great importance in Brazil. To the extent that we live in an open society, the attainment of higher social aims tends to assume the form of gradualism. To the extent that we live in a rigid society, those objectives will tend to be attained by cataclysmic disruption. Thus there is a duality within the Brazilian revolutionary process.

What is the likelihood of an effective Brazilian revolution through Marxist-Leninist methods? I believe there are two ways in which this might occur. As suggested above, the first one is connected with the land problem. We must not forget that over

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half of the Brazilian population gets its living from the land. If this sector maintains its present rigidity, every peasant movement will tend rapidly to adopt revolutionary techniques of the Marxist-Leninist type. Thus we have an important segment of the population with a Marxist-Leninist bias which, given certain conditions, might be able to take the lead in the Brazilian revolutionary process. The practical results would be the predominance of the least developed sector of our society. The real objectives of our development, as previously defined in terms of humanism, would thus be partially frustrated at the very start.

The second way in which a revolution of the Marxist-Leninist type might be carried out would be as a result of social and political retrogression. We have observed that a revolution of this type is hardly likely in an open society, unless it is imposed from without, as happened in some countries of Central Europe. Nevertheless, the possibility of "putting the clock back" must not be excluded. The imposition of a right-wing dictatorship, making the whole political structure rigid, would create favorable conditions for an effective revolution of the Marxist-Leninist type. But even in this case, the agrarian sector would be likely to predominate. In the absence of conditions resulting from political retrogression, the only possibility of a Marxist-Leninist revolution lies in the persistence of an archaic agrarian structure.

In order to achieve a high rate of economic development, in accordance with truly social criteria, we shall have to bring about some important changes in our basic structures. Because we have not been prepared for such changes, anxiety has grown from day to day. We have come to live in what may properly be termed a pre-revolutionary period, in which drastic change is a political necessity. Thus techniques of social transformation and revolutionary methods are in the forefront of present-day political concern. If we are to avoid dictatorial régimes, whether of a social class or ideological group or rigid party machine, we must: (a) prevent all forms of retrogression in our social and political systems; and (b) create conditions for fast and effective change in the country's archaic agrarian structure.

These general directives must be elaborated into specific lines of action. Political retrogression will not come haphazardly, but as a reflection of panic among some privileged groups confronted with growing social pressure. Where structures are rigid, preventing gradual adaptations, these pressures may create cataclysmic

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situations, leading to emergency solutions or preventive coups. Thus, the first task is to give more flexibility to the existing structures. We have to tread boldly the path of constitutional change which will permit agrarian reform and a radical change of government administration of the fiscal system and the banking structure. We have to subordinate state action to a clear definition of the aims of economic and social development. The Congress has the right to draw up directives, but local politicians must be deprived of the power to allocate public moneys. We have to give the government effective means to punish those who embezzle public funds, to control extravagant consumption and to dignify the function of civil servants. We must have legal statutes to subordinate the action of foreign capital to the aims of economic development and to the requirements of political independence. The recent law affecting the remittance of profits constitutes a clear indication that, even in a legislature where conservative views prevail, there is an awareness of a need for such discipline. Passed at a moment of serious political tension, the law contains ambiguities and, therefore, ought to be improved. It is taken for granted that the coöperation of foreign capital is indispensable for the development of any underdeveloped country; but in the absence of regulation, conflicts of economic interest may become conflicts of a political nature, harmful to international coöperation. Also, the government must have thorough knowledge of the sources of all investment in means of mass communications. And above all we must have a plan for economic and social development compatible with our own possibilities and in conformity with the aspirations of the people.

What must we do to translate into action all these objectives? I believe that the most immediate task is to organize public opinion so that it can express itself. It is up to the students, workers, entrepreneurs, intellectuals and perhaps even the peasants, through their incipient organizations, to start a frank debate about what they expect from their government. The more complex problems must be given systematic study by groups of specialists, and their conclusions must be publicly debated. Brazil is mature enough to start thinking about its own destiny. From general debates and from expressions of public opinion must emerge programs that will serve as a basis for the renewal of popular representation.

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LATIN AMERICA'S TROUBLED CITIES

By Charles M. Haar

OF all our foreign aid programs, the one which probably excites the greatest concern currently is the Alliance for Progress, that enterprise dedicated to promoting economic and social progress in Latin America. Agricultural land reform and improvement in the conditions of rural life are prominent among the measures advocated by the Alliance. Through these it is hoped that revolutionary ferment can be channeled into evolutionary development. At this time, when the direction of the Alliance is under review, we should consider whether these measures are the ones most suitable to achieve the stated goals, or whether other measures, presently subordinated, hold greater promise for success.

A starting point for this reëvaluation could be a questioning of the relative emphasis placed on the rural and urban problems of the Latin American nations, both in the original framework of the Alliance and in the policies of those who now direct its work. The strategy of Latin American development demands that efforts be directed toward improving both sectors of national life —but which should be given priority? So far the emphasis has been on agricultural land reform and other rural improvements. To deal realistically with the economic and social problems of Latin American countries, we must critically examine the position of their cities—their relative importance to the country, rate of growth and intensity of problems—to see if they are being neglected in the formulation of Alliance policy.

In the years preceding the Alliance, Latin American nations did not come to grips with the massive problem of providing a suitable environment for their city dwellers. Very little by way of urban reform was carried out in terms of what was needed. In Bolivia, where the current urban housing shortage is estimated at 100,000, the national agency set up to build workers' homes completed only 1,000 dwellings from 1956 to 1961. In Venezuela, with an urban housing shortage of 250,000 units, the *Banco Obrero,* established to build housing for low- and middle-income families in the cities, from 1946 to 1960 built only 40,966 homes, many of which sold for upwards of $6,500. Brazil reports an

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Stephen Lefkowitz, Research Fellow at the Harvard Law School, has assisted in the preparation of this article.

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urban housing shortage of between two and three million units; in Argentina, half a million houses are presently needed in the cities, and by 1970 it is estimated that an additional one million will be needed; 550,000 new urban homes are needed in Chile; and in Mexico the urban housing shortage is growing by 100,000 each year.

What appears to be a failure to give due recognition to the urban problems of Latin America in part can be attributed to the theory of economic development that prevailed until quite recently. This thinking too often emphasized industrial development, credits and skills to the detriment of housing and municipal planning and facilities. Economic planning took precedence over physical planning; research and international loans were directed primarily toward industrial development. One reason given for this policy was that providing an adequate social infrastructure poses enormous problems and requires expenditures of commensurate size. Another was that those reforms most needed in the cities bring small annual returns in proportion to their costs. In countries that look to rapid growth through reinvestment of returns—as all underdeveloped countries do—investment in urban reform seemed too cumbersome and slow; it must wait until industry advanced. This policy was especially noticeable in the Latin American countries where "terms-of-trade" economics was dominant and led them to concentrate on developing domestic industry so that imports of manufactured goods could be reduced.

More recently, however, economists have begun to argue that economic change does not precede social change, but that both must develop together and in support of one another. This thinking has come to dominate the planning and administration of the Alliance for Progress, in which social reform receives equal place with economic reform and social progress is put on a par with industrial growth. But in redressing the prior imbalance, the Alliance may be heading toward a new and equally inadequate development policy. For while the non-economic factors of economic growth receive ample recognition, rural reform most often has claimed the high priorities—especially programs of land distribution and reforms in rural land tenure. Again urban land reform is being forced to wait.

Failure to emphasize the need for urban progress can be perceived not only in the terms of the Charter, but also in the first

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national development plans so far submitted as prerequisites to Alliance aid. In these three plans, prepared by Bolivia, Colombia and Chile, the problems of urban areas are either ignored or are treated as less urgent and secondary, to be solved in later, perhaps far distant, development plans. In spite of Bolivia's urban housing shortage of 100,000 units, its National Development Plan barely mentions programs designed to meet this shortage or to provide much-needed municipal facilities and planning. Colombia's plan calls for the construction of 187,000 new housing units in the period 1962–65, including both urban and rural housing; yet the country has an urban housing shortage of 280,000 with 60,000 new units needed each year just to cover expected population growth. The Ad Hoc Committee chosen to review Colombia's plan for the Alliance suggests that, "in view of the urgency of other problems," the figure for urban and administrative development be reduced. The reason given is: "Unquestionably they [urban and administrative reforms] should be carried out in line with the general progress of the country, but no basic harm will be caused by postponing some of them during the period when the program is getting under way." And, although the Chilean plan calls for a large fixed investment in housing during the period 1961–70, the expenditure will suffice only to curb the deterioration in lower-class housing that has occurred in the past few decades. No housing is planned for the many thousands of rural workers who are expected to swarm into the cities of Chile in the next decade. Instead, the Ad Hoc Committee recommends that a greater proportion of the budgeted housing investment be made in the rural sector. Admittedly, the evidence is inconclusive —only three of the many plans to be submitted have been released to the public—but already one can perceive a tendency to channel the greatest resources, at the earliest time, toward solutions for rural problems.

One underlying reason for this attitude may be the belief that rural land reform is a precondition to economic growth and that a more equal distribution of agricultural land must be made before the Latin American nations can hope to progress economically. Although this may be a plausible thesis, it is not supported by all relevant historical examples. In both England and Prussia economic development was preceded by a period in which the large landowners expropriated the holdings of peasant farmers, turning the latter into agricultural laborers. In Russia, the rapid

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industrialization of the last 40 years has been accompanied by an agricultural policy of consolidating small individual holdings into large collective farms. A comparison of prewar Bulgaria and Hungary—where agricultural conditions are similar—is also revealing, for the former had carried out extensive rural land reform, distributing small holdings equally, while the latter's agriculture was carried on to a great extent on very large estates. Agricultural production per acre and per unit of labor expended was higher in Hungary by some 30 percent, and, unlike Bulgaria where there was little industrial investment, profits were used by the great landowners to finance new industries which in turn absorbed surplus agricultural labor.

Much more dubious is the second major premise of those who would emphasize rural land reform: that the greatest threat to orderly development within a democratic framework is the discontent of rural, landless workers. Today the discontent of the urban masses, made less patient by the immediacy of a better life and more powerful by their concentration, holds the greater potential for plunging democratic governments into totalitarianisms of the right or of the left.

II

Perhaps the real cause for this misplaced emphasis stems from the belief that Latin America, like most of the underdeveloped regions of the world, is primarily a rural area. This approach is inadequate, because it ignores the facts in many Latin American nations and because it treats the problems of economic backwardness as if they were uniform throughout the world. Unlike Ghana, where perhaps 10 percent of the population is urban, or Ceylon, where the corresponding figure is 15.3 percent, the complexion of many of the more advanced Latin American countries is decidedly urban. Forty-six percent of Latin America's population lives in cities, with 25 percent concentrated in ten metropolitan areas of over one million. There is a striking urban predominance in some Latin American nations: in Argentina 67 percent of the population lives in cities (the same figure for the United States is 64 percent), with 40 percent of that nation's people located in eight cities of over 100,000; in Chile, over two-thirds; in Venezuela, over 60 percent; and in Colombia 48 percent of the population is urban. About 40 percent of the population of Uruguay lives in the capital city of Montevideo, and the metropolitan areas

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of Venezuela's two largest cities hold one-quarter of its people. Forty-five percent of Mexico's population is urban, and Mexico City, with over 4,800,000 people, is the second largest city in the Western Hemisphere.

The steadily increasing number of city dwellers is the most striking feature of Latin American growth; the rate of urbanization is higher than that of any other underdeveloped region in the world. While the projected figures for the Latin American countries as a whole indicate an annual increase in population of from 2.5 to 2.8 percent for the next 15 years, it is estimated that, during the same period, Latin American cities will add some 4.2 to 5 percent to their population each year. This is only an average; in some nations the urban growth rate is even faster. Venezuelan cities are growing by 7 percent annually; they will practically double their population within a decade. The disparity between the rates of growth in the cities and in the rural areas is also striking: in Chile, where between 1952 and 1960 Santiago increased its size by 38, and Valparaiso by 23 percent, there is a 3.4 percent annual increase in the cities and a 0.5 percent increase in the countryside; in Colombia, the net annual increase in rural population is 1 percent, while the urban population is growing by 5 percent, and in some large cities by 7 percent; Brazil's over-all growth rate during the 1950s was 2.7, while that of her cities was 6 percent. The character of the Latin American nations is becoming an urban one, as already populous cities grow at a dizzying pace.

The reasons for this rapid urbanization may be briefly summarized: rural poverty and the lure of the city. Latin American land tenure systems and the stagnation of the rural sector of the economy have made it difficult to acquire land, to enlarge small holdings, and to mount the rural social and economic ladder. In the last few decades the Latin American nations developed a number of consumer industries, which, being located near the centers of consumption, created new jobs in the cities. Since urban workers average three times the income of agricultural workers, landless peasants stream into the cities seeking new jobs. The increasing role of the state in Latin America as a redistributor of income through the provision of public services has made it desirable to be close to the source of distribution—the city.

It will be said that the solution is to improve conditions in the countryside. If life on the farm is made more tolerable and reward-

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ing, the argument goes, the need to migrate to the cities diminishes, and with it urban problems. If this were true, giving highest priorities to agricultural reform in Latin America might be justified. But the city, notwithstanding its often appalling conditions, holds an irresistible attraction for the young. It excites their imaginations to such an extent that neither rural inducements nor controls could stem the tide. As transportation and communication facilities in the rural hinterland improve with national development, the pull to the cities will inevitably increase.

The Mexican experience demonstrates the futility of hoping to solve urban problems through rural solutions. Despite 40 years of vigorous land reform during which millions of acres have been turned over to landless peasants, and despite the fact that temporary work in the United States has absorbed a great deal of surplus agricultural labor, Mexico's cities have continued to grow at a dazzling speed. Between 1951 and 1960, the population of Mexico City itself rose by 58 percent, and that of 54 other urban centers by 78 percent. Attempts to end migration, moreover, will not achieve the long-run goal of a general rise in the conditions of life for the country as a whole. Prosperity and industrialization today do go hand in hand, and urbanization is an inevitable concomitant of industrialization. As the development of Latin American countries accelerates, so will their cities increase in predominance over the rural areas. Economic development changes the structure of production, and the stress on industrialization will mean a reduction in the relative importance of agriculture, both in terms of the contribution to total national product and of the percentage of the labor force employed. The experience of the last few decades will be continued, and even intensified. Although improvement of the conditions of rural life may provide a partial solution, remedies for relieving Latin America's troubled cities must be sought in the cities themselves.

III

The problems created by the rapid urbanization of Latin America are of enormous proportions. Most critical is the lack of housing to shelter many millions of city dwellers. It is estimated that fully one-half of the population of Latin America is either homeless or living in inadequate or grossly overcrowded housing. Families live under conditions where sheer numbers and filth breed sickness and despair; often their homes are without the barest

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minimum of sewage facilities, water supplies or utilities. A recent study in Bolivia shows that 48 percent of the urban homes lack water, and 54 percent lack sanitation; in Chile the corresponding figures are 40 and 60 percent; and in Venezuela, 43 and 67 percent. In Ecuador, only 7 percent of the population has sewerage service. While families sleep six and ten to a room, children are left to play amid mud and offal. In Mexico City, families are forced to live in abandoned mines and caves; in Lima, the bare earth serves as a floor, and tin, cardboard or rags serve as construction materials.

Many of Latin America's urban families do not even have security in their shelters, for they are squatters on public land, on private land or on plots for newly planned developments. As illegal users of the land, theoretically they may at a moment's notice be forced to seek another plot of ground on which to live. And under such transitory circumstances it is often impracticable to furnish the necessary municipal services. An aggravating factor is that these conditions feed upon themselves; the very fact of squatting at once prevents the cure. Although without legal rights to the land they occupy, the squatters in some cities cannot be moved, for, as in the "City of God" in Lima, their numbers and concentration make them a powerful political force. In Caracas, a public housing project taken over by squatters even before completion looms on a hill high above the Presidential Palace, and serves as a warning of the fate of democratic institutions in a nation that cannot shelter its homeless. The squatters often make up such a great part of the urban population—35 percent in Caracas, 50 percent in Maracaibo—and are so discontented that their mere presence threatens political and social stability.

The numbers of squatters and slum-dwellers of Latin America are daily being swollen by agricultural workers who migrate to the cities in search of new jobs for themselves and their families. In Mexico City, whole families of *peones* newly arrived from the villages stream daily from the buses at Chapultepec Park. Most of the newcomers are unprepared for the city, unskilled, often illiterate. They have broken their ties with the village, the community and the family but can find nothing in the city to replace them. Welfare and health services are inadequate; there is a critical lack of educational and recreational services and of community centers. Even commercial and marketing services often do not begin to meet their needs. As arrivals to a new way of life,

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the migrants may be preyed upon by unscrupulous merchants, employers, landlords and even police. Many remain jobless or without permanent employment. Out of these appalling conditions are growing increased problems of juvenile delinquency, alcoholism and mental disease.

Less obvious but equally detrimental, this process of rapid urbanization frustrates the orderly, rational growth of cities, and thereby hampers Latin American development in general. Cities mushroom across the countryside wherever there is room and license to set up a shack. The best land is seized, and planned developments and communities are forced out into the surrounding areas where they cannot always be supplied with essential services; and severe strains are placed on already overtaxed transit systems. Meanwhile, land costs within the city rise sharply as owners hoard land and speculate on the city's growth. Public and private projects are forced still further from the city center, accelerating the pace of urban sprawl. Rising rents speed upwards in inflationary spirals, while the building booms sporadically enjoyed by many cities concentrate on luxury housing.

Most of the cities have planning departments whose job it is to guide urban growth along the most efficient and beneficial lines, but municipal officials often have insufficient resources, manpower and technical skills to deal with the problems of very rapid urbanization. In some cases it is simply a matter of money: the proliferation of slums and faulty or ill-administered tax systems keep municipal revenues low. In other cases it is a matter of power: too many and conflicting municipal jurisdictions—17 in the Lima metropolitan area, 16 in Santiago—make it difficult to plan adequately for the city as a whole. Orderly development is impossible; investment in land is discouraged, while speculation is made profitable; lack of planning and the acceleration of blight now pose problems of enormous magnitude for the future; the result is chaos and a frustration of the social and economic goals set for Latin America under the Alliance for Progress.

In a positive sense, too, Latin American cities demand our attention. Adequate marketing facilities and transit within the cities that constitute a nation's great markets are vital to the growth of a nation's commerce. Industry depends for its growth on the existence of a stable labor supply, skilled, healthy and relatively content. A vigorous construction industry, often considered in the United States the bellwether of the nation's eco-

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nomic fortunes, can help to stimulate investment, provide jobs for some of the excess urban labor force, and have a decisive effect on over-all economic health. Land hoarding and speculation in the cities can drastically slow the growth of this industry. Profiteering land activities, along with concomitant spiraling rents, can also frustrate attempts to check national inflation and institute sound fiscal policy. Thus Bolivia's great difficulty in controlling inflation has been in part due to the failure to control rent levels in La Paz, which between June 1958 and June 1959 increased by 96 percent. Controls on land use are essential to any effort to check the inflation that has been one of Latin America's most troublesome and persistent problems.

In some cities, industrial sites are already scarce due to lack of utilities and transit services; thus faulty physical planning retards economic development. Where rational land-use planning can operate, prime sites for commercial and residential construction can be laid out without danger of conflicting land uses or deficient municipal services; with such sites investment will become more attractive. This can be achieved only through a massive effort at providing low-cost housing which will eliminate the need for squatting. Also home-building programs will introduce and encourage the habit of saving; indeed, certain potential sources of savings could not be tapped in any other way.

Against the argument of some economists that housing investments pay low returns, it must be remembered that returns come not merely from a particular structure but from the whole community, as values of neighboring properties are raised by new construction. Home-ownership is likely to stimulate consumption demands that foster economic development. And, through public spending in housing and urban services, a redistribution of income can be effected that will spur demands for consumer goods and help create the domestic market frequently lacking in underdeveloped nations. Nor are the returns fully measurable in economic terms, for housing can provide at once the incentives and the tangible rewards that are necessary to the success of a development program. Finally, the foreign investment so heavily counted on to spur Latin American development will come only after many reforms in the urban life and environment. As long as social and economic unrest continue—and they will so long as present urban conditions persist—foreign capital will be wary of Latin American opportunities.

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The Alliance should not abandon its attempts to improve rural life, nor land reform as one of its primary goals. But the problems of Latin America's sprawling and teeming cities should command more attention from those who determine where reform is to begin and where money is to be spent. National economic planning must include physical planning for cities. Creating a sound environment in the cities is a job of critical importance—in terms of the cost of rehabilitation once urban rot has cut too deeply, and in terms of the political and social instability currently being generated. Workers' homes, schools, urban transit, sewage and water-supply systems will provide tangible evidence to great numbers of people, and to people whose influence and good will are important, of United States support and of the benefits of the Alliance. These jobs must be started immediately, for daily the rapid growth of the cities makes their problems more acute.

IV

There seems no end to the cataloguing of urban problems. What of possible solutions, even at this early date when little experience has been sifted?

It is not always the poverty of the people that is the cause of slums and squatters' shacks; slum houses filled to bursting with furniture and appliances often indicate the ability to pay for decent shelter. There simply is no decent housing available at moderate costs. Generally the difficulty lies with the lack of adequate credit facilities—for the contractor to obtain money to put up an apartment building, or for the individual to obtain a purchase money mortgage at reasonable rates. In many Latin American countries mortgages are either unknown or prohibitively expensive, with "equity" or down payments amounting to as much as 50 percent of the cost, and interest payments running between 12 and 30 percent per annum over an amortization period of only 15 years. What is needed is a credit system whereby capital for construction or purchase can be made available at rates and on terms that contractors and individuals can afford.

Outside capital must be solicited and, when invested, must be made secure. This might be done through the creation of an international mortgage insurance agency that can sell bonds in the United States and other capital-exporting countries and funnel the proceeds into mortgages in the Latin American nations.

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Puerto Rico's success in the housing field shows the value of financing in the United States and the ready market that exists for secure housing investments.

In addition to securing credit through an international agency, other techniques to finance urban reform in Latin America should be investigated. Stimulation of savings and loan associations—a policy presently followed by the Alliance administrators—can be helpful, but it is only one alternative. As economic growth makes it possible for an ever-increasing number of Latin Americans to afford decent housing, it becomes all the more important to draw on a whole range of solutions to their financing problems. There is great potential in the use of pension and credit-union funds for housing. Devices can be found for encouraging industrial housing for workers by granting tax relief and other incentives to participating firms. In some countries progress can be made through the creation of coöperative associations, not only for credit purposes, but for the construction of self-help housing as well. In others, laws that forbid banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions to invest their capital in housing must be amended.

Many of the Latin American nations have already begun to take steps to increase the volume of savings flowing into housing. In Argentina, under a law passed in October 1961, insurance companies must invest up to 50 percent of their reserves and deposits in housing bonds to finance programs carried out by the new Federal Housing Administration. In Chile a new savings and loan system was introduced in 1961 based on mutual and coöperative associations, with a Central Savings and Loan Fund insuring mortgages granted by the private associations. In Peru the People's Savings and Loan Association, established in March 1961, is eligible for credit up to three times its savings from the Home Loan Bank of Peru, which in turn has received a loan of $7,500,000 from the Alliance for Progress. Within a year, the Association's membership grew from 25 to 2,590 and it granted first-mortgage and home-improvement loans of some $60,000,000, while lowering the prevailing Peruvian interest rate from 12 to 10.8 percent simple interest and also paying a 6 percent dividend.

Whether or not these attempts to channel private savings into housing investments will succeed depends in large part on how secure and how liquid these investments can be made. One of the main deterrents to providing low-cost housing through private

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capital in Latin America is the unattractiveness of fixed-income investments in countries where money steadily loses its value due to inflation. This is one of the issues so truly central to the entire nature of the economy and its political stability that only the sharpening of experience can indicate the success of the technique. Protection against an unstable monetary system can be gained by tying repayment provisions to price indices or to other more stable currencies, as is done with savings deposits in Chile, or through government insurance against loss through inflation. Both security and liquidity of investment can be aided by revising antiquated forms of security documents and inefficient procedures for collection or foreclosure.

More generally, an appropriate system of land tenure must be created in order to make possible the conditions necessary to a modern economy—where land serves as a commodity that can be securely held, easily transferred and prudently invested in. This will demand suitable documents of title, mortgage and transfer, and a system whereby the interests in property are clearly defined and easily ascertainable. It will also demand administrative and judicial systems that will facilitate all arrangements in land and will provide quick solutions to all disputes. Archaic legalisms that inhibit the free alienation of land must be weeded out; time-consuming formalities and outmoded procedures must be reformed. These steps will have to be taken before the needed investment capital can be attracted to provide remedies to pressing urban problems.

The replacement of slums and shantytowns by decent structures will mean new sources of property-tax revenue for municipalities; this will enable them to provide some of the desperately needed services. Development can easily be choked unless planners take a critical look at the growth of the larger metropolitan areas, for some of them are growing too large. Soon it will be uneconomical to supply essential services, and precious resources poured into this effort will be wasted. It is time to explore the possibilities of decentralization, of new towns and satellite towns to open up new areas of settlement or to take advantage of natural resources, as has already been done in Brazil and Venezuela. The importance of early control of urban growth must be stressed, for once land-use patterns have been set, they can be altered only with enormous difficulty and expense.

Similarly, attention must be paid to the potential uses of tax

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policy in meeting the problems caused by urbanization. Adequate taxation of property would counteract the tendency to hoard land. Profits in Latin American countries are often put into land holdings which are not used to best advantage; the result is a rise in land prices. When land prices are high, the problem of providing adequate shelter becomes the more difficult to solve. The property tax should be high enough to force owners to obtain an economic return from their land, or else sell it to individuals who would make the investment necessary to such a return. In addition, undeveloped land can be taxed more heavily than that which is improved; this would encourage sale or development of land now held for speculative purposes and also stimulate construction. Tax penalties can be levied to discourage unsuitable building, and tax incentives granted to promote desirable improvements. Finally, reforms in the structure and administration of real-property taxes can bring the added revenues so urgently needed.

The use of all these devices to promote urban reform in Latin America ought to be investigated—realizing that they will depend on the necessary legal mechanisms to carry them out and suitably trained personnel to administer them. Administrative agencies and procedures need to be reviewed and made better equipped for carrying out new tasks. Legislation must be prepared to grant the necessary operational powers, for the best plans are doomed to failure unless there is legal latitude to implement them. Programs to train qualified Latin Americans in legal, planning and administrative techniques for these new positions must be stressed, for the lack of skilled manpower, already a serious concern, can frustrate all efforts to spur development.

The major task is to assure that the administrative agencies or national planning bodies perform within a democratic context. Institutional devices should allow for appeal from adverse decisions, impartial judicial review, and due process in legal proceedings concerning the use of land, or some substitutes which will promote certainty and confidence. A challenge lies in the problem of finding some means by which the consensus of the people is obtained during the period when plans for urban land reform are being formulated. It will be equally important to create a means by which plans can be adapted to changing circumstances and to the changing wishes of the people. If the social and economic progress is achieved through a perversion of democratic institu-

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tions, one of the major goals of the Alliance for Progress will have been frustrated.

Failure to plan adequately for urban reform cannot be excused by pointing out the cost involved nor the striking need for reform in the agricultural sector. It is true that a balance must be struck between investment in housing and municipal services and in industry; too great an allocation of resources to the former could slow the pace of economic development. It is also true that improvement of conditions of rural life must receive a high priority, not only to increase productivity and make social gains in the agricultural sector, but also because it may slow down the urban migrations and help take the pressure off the cities. Creating new sources of rural employment, promoting local industries and new towns, along with the basic agricultural reforms, should all be attempted.

Cities exert an influence proportionally greater even than the numbers of people they hold. A metropolis is the center of its nation's government, commerce, communications and thought; it is in the city that new ideas are evolved, and it is there that they are most quickly and easily caught up by vast numbers of people. The city is the source and destination of much of a nation's capital; it is there that the great bulk of goods are produced, marketed and consumed. Government policies are created in the city; they draw the quickest and strongest reaction there. And the city is the home of the nation's intellectuals, its universities and its students. In Buenos Aires, in Santiago, in Rio de Janeiro, in Mexico City live most of the nations' middle class—those people who are at once most influential and who are most amenable to change. If the Alliance for Progress is to succeed, it must succeed in the great cities where its accomplishments will be manifest to the greatest number of people and to those people who will lead and direct Latin American development. In these cities the struggle to provide a better life and greater opportunity for millions of Latin Americans, within the framework of a democratic society, will be won or lost.

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LAW AND THE QUARANTINE OF CUBA

By Abram Chayes

THE Soviet missiles in Cuba were a threat to the security of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. As such they endangered the peace of the world. The action undertaken against this threat carried its own dangers. But as President Kennedy said on October 22, "the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing."

The course on which he then embarked was successful in securing the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. This success was due, in the first instance, to the ability and will of this country to enforce the quarantine and to the mobilization of allies and others throughout the world in our support.

The confrontation was not in the courtroom and, in a world destructible by man, a legal position was obviously not the sole ingredient of effective action. We were armed, necessarily, with something more substantial than a lawyer's brief. But though it would not have been enough merely to have the law on our side, it is not irrelevant which side the law was on. The effective deployment of force, the appeal for world support, to say nothing of the ultimate judgment of history, all depend in significant degree on the reality and coherence of the case in law for our action. It is worthwhile, I think, to set out that legal case and to examine some of its implications.

II

The blunt fact of the quarantine is that it involved the use of naval force to interfere with shipping on the high seas, though, to be sure, the carriage of offensive weapons, against which it was directed, was something other than ordinary maritime commerce. Historically, the United States, as a great maritime power, has resisted interference with the freedom of the seas. In 1793, when France and England, struggling for the mastery of Europe, seized and blockaded United States shipping, Jefferson wrote:

> . . . those who choose to live in peace retain their natural right . . . to carry the produce of their industry, for exchange, to all nations, belligerent or neutral, as usual; to go and come freely, without injury or molestation; and, in short, that the war among others shall be, for them, as if it did not exist.

A few years later, British blockades, in defiance of our bitter pro-

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tests, were one of the causes of the War of 1812, although Britain went far beyond mere blockading. Her warships often stopped American vessels on the high seas, declared without proof that certain crewmen were British deserters, and carried them off in irons. During the undeclared war against France, Joseph Story, then a Harvard student but later to become a Supreme Court Justice and one of our great admiralty lawyers, wrote with perhaps more ardor than poetry:

> Shall Gallia's clan our coast invade,
> With hellish outrage scourge the main,
> Insult our nation's neutral trade,
> And we not dare our rights maintain?

Less hoary examples could be cited.

When our own wartime necessities were involved, however, we took a different view of the matter. In the Civil War, over strident British objections, President Lincoln declared a blockade of 3,000 miles of southern coast line and sought to prevent any contraband from reaching Confederate hands. On the outbreak of World War II, the same 21 American nations that now make up the Organization of American States, meeting in the first Pan American ministerial conference, identified a zone in the high seas ranging from 300 to 1,200 miles wide which they said was of "primary concern and direct utility in their relations." They declared their right to patrol the zone and keep it free from "the commission of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation."

The thrust and counter-thrust of nineteenth-century practice was codified with somewhat illusory precision in the Declarations of Paris in 1856 and London in 1909, dealing with the law of blockade and contraband. As a result, the legal textbooks have a satisfyingly categorical ring. They tell us that a blockade must be declared through competent authority, must be limited to enemy coasts and ports, and must be impartially applied. Most important, the blockade must be effective: the blockading country must have and use the power to enforce it. Similarly, traditional rules of contraband require a proclamation, after which neutral ships can be prevented from aiding the enemy by carrying "objectionable" goods, a category which, if not overly precise, surely includes weapons.

The rules were designed to minimize disruption of neutral commerce, primarily by limiting the scope of sanctioned interference and by notifying ships and sailors so that they could stay out of

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harm's way. *Mutatis mutandis* these aspects of the classical rules were complied with, to like purpose and effect, in the Cuban quarantine.

But there was a further over-riding limitation in the traditional rules: they were part of the Law of War which says that only a belligerent in wartime can invoke the right to blockade or search for contraband. Unless nations were at war, there could be no justification for any interference at all with ordinary maritime commerce. Thus some have maintained that everything done in the October crisis would have been "legal" if only the United States had declared war on Cuba. This may be attractive as a syllogism, but it doesn't have very much to do with law.

The rules of blockade and contraband evolved, like most law, out of the interaction between moral precept, experience and changing practical necessity. And they reflect rather accurately the shape of the international system—as well as the weapons technology—that prevailed in the last century. Relations between nations were episodic and largely bilateral. When force was applied, it was—at least in theory—a bilateral affair, or at most something between small and temporary groupings of nations on each side. The age of total war was only beginning and there was no general stricture in international law against the use of force as an instrument of state policy.

Resort to force was common enough, however, and was always dangerous enough to provoke rudimentary efforts at regulation. Thus evolved the Law of War, a separate legal régime establishing—probably with a good deal more precision and coherence in retrospect than at the time—the rights and obligations of belligerents and neutrals. The declaration of war invoked this special régime. Its legal signification was that the declaring state was prepared to accept its obligations and claim its rights under the Law of War. Thereupon, application of force within those confines was legitimate.

III

International law addresses different problems today and there is different legal machinery to deal with them. The over-riding object of international law is not to regulate the conduct of war, but to keep and defend the peace. It is no longer possible for any nation to treat war, in Jefferson's words, "as if it did not exist." If non-alignment continues to be a goal for some countries, non-in-

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volvement has become a luxury beyond price. A threat to the peace of any nation is a threat to the peace of all nations, and maintenance of peace has therefore become a collective responsibility. The first quarantine speech, President Franklin Roosevelt's call to "protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease," marked an early recognition of this collective responsibility.

The enduring monument of World War II is the United Nations Charter. It records the judgment of all nations that international law can no longer regard the use of force with benevolent neutrality. In Article 2 of the Charter, Members pledge that they will

> . . . refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

States living under the régime of that Charter can no longer find justification for the use of force in their mere unilateral declaration.

Declarations against war had been known before, but the Charter records also the judgment that, if these declarations are to be more than empty promises, collective machinery and processes of enforcement are needed. The United Nations Organization was the primary instrument designed for preserving the peace. Regional organizations, like the O.A.S., arose to perform the same functions within the area of their competence. These organizations are clothed by their charters with the authority to act collectively against aggression and threats to the peace. Through these collective agencies, world-wide or more restricted in scope, we have hoped to give reality to the pledge to maintain the peace.

The Soviet threat in Cuba was made and answered in the context of this international system. The United States response must be judged and justified within that same context. It is wrong, therefore, to view the Cuban crisis as though it were a nineteenth-century contest between two nations, the United States and Cuba, to be regulated by the traditional rules of blockade and contraband. And it is wrong to view the quarantine as a unilateral use of force by the United States in the course of such a contest.

IV

The Charter obligation to refrain from the use of force is not absolute. Article 51, of course, affirms that nothing in the Charter

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impairs "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense." The quarantine was defensive in character and was directed against a threat to the peace. But neither the President in his speech nor the O.A.S. in its resolution invoked Article 51.

Obviously, the United Nations itself can sanction the use of force to deal with a threat to the peace. So it did in Korea and in the Congo. But no United Nations organ ordered the quarantine of Cuba.

The quarantine action falls within a third category: action by regional organizations to preserve the peace. The Charter assigns an important role to regional organizations in carrying out the purposes of the U.N. Article 52(1) prescribes the use of "regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of national peace and security as are appropriate for regional action. . . ." Regional organizations are referred to throughout the Charter, and all of Chapter VIII is devoted to their peace-keeping functions. These provisions were written into the Charter with the Inter-American system specifically in mind. Alberto Lleras Camargo, later to be President of Colombia, was chief protagonist in early 1945 of the Act of Chapultepec, which foreshadowed the Rio Treaty, and was head of the committee at San Francisco which dealt with regional organizations a few months later.

The Charter reflects the judgment of the world community that collective action is to be preferred to the unrestricted use of force by individual nations. Why? First, members of an organization, in signing its charter, have assented to its powers and procedures. Second, decisions are made by political processes involving checks and balances and giving assurance that the outcome will reflect considered judgment and broad consensus. These principles can be seen in operation in the Inter-American system. The assent of the parties to the Rio Treaty is real and significant. Though the present government of Cuba is now and has been for some time the object of sanctions by the O.A.S., and has been suspended from participation in its agencies, Cuba as a state has remained a party to the treaties and a member of the Inter-American system, as, in a like case, did the Dominican Republic. The political processes in the Organization of American States are also real. It is not a rubber stamp, despite the disproportion of power between the United States and its neighbors to the south. Not until the danger was clear and present was the necessary majority mustered for

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the use of force. But when that time came, the vote was unanimous.

The quarantine action was authorized under the Rio Treaty of 1947, whose primary purpose was to organize law-abiding states for collective action against threats to the peace. This Treaty, together with related agreements, forms the legal framework of the Inter-American system.

The Treaty provides for collective action not only in the case of armed attack but also "if the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected . . . by any . . . fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America. . . ." In such cases, a special body, the Organ of Consultation, is to "meet immediately in order to agree on the measures . . . which must be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent." The Organ of Consultation acts only by a two-thirds vote. The Treaty is explicit as to the measures which may be taken "for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent." The "use of armed force" is specifically authorized, though "no State shall be required to use armed force without its consent."

On October 23, the Organ of Consultation met, in accordance with the Treaty procedures, and considered the evidence of the secret introduction of Soviet strategic nuclear missiles into Cuba. It found that a situation existed which endangered the peace of America. It recommended that Member States "take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies. . . ." The quarantine was imposed in accordance with this recommendation. Indeed, the operative language of the O.A.S. resolution is recited in the President's proclamation, "Interdicting the Carriage of Offensive Weapons to Cuba."

V

Some have asked whether we should not first have gone to the United Nations Security Council, before taking other action to meet the Soviet threat in Cuba. Perhaps in the original conception at San Francisco it was intended that the Security Council would be the agency for dealing with situations of this kind unless it

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chose to delegate its responsibility. This much may be implicit in Article 53, which states: "No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." The drafters of the Charter demonstrated their wisdom, however, by making Security Council responsibility for dealing with threats to the peace "primary" and not "exclusive." Events since 1945 have demonstrated that the Council, like our own electoral college, was not a wholly viable institution. The veto has largely disabled it from fulfilling its intended role in keeping the peace.

This paralysis of the Security Council has led to a reliance on alternative peace-keeping institutions. In the United Nations itself, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General have stepped into the gap. Less dramatically, so has the O.A.S., pursuant to the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter on "Regional Arrangements."

A technical part of this evolution, if a quiet one, has been the construction of Article 53 so as to limit its scope. Security Council discussion of sanctions imposed by the O.A.S. against the Dominican Republic and Cuba, as well as the opinion of the International Court of Justice in the *United Nations Assessment Case,* have treated "enforcement action" as a rigorously narrow category. Perhaps more important, the debates in the Security Council in the case of the Dominican Republic revealed a widespread readiness to conclude that the requirement of "authorization" does not import prior approval, but would be satisfied by subsequent action of the Council, or even by a mere "taking note" of the acts of the regional organization. In this context, it is important that the Security Council met in emergency session before the quarantine of Cuba went into effect. The Soviet Union introduced a resolution of disapproval, but by general consent it was not brought to a vote.

This narrowing process of interpretation may be resisted by those who seek the comforting certainty of "plain meaning" in words—forgetting that they are, in Holmes' phrase, the skin of living thought. But surely it is no more surprising to say that failure of the Security Council to disapprove regional action amounts to authorization within the meaning of Article 53 than it was to say that the abstention and even the absence of a permanent member of the Security Council met the requirement of Article 27(3) for "the concurring votes of the permanent members...."

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This interpretation does no violence to the notion of the United Nations as the paramount organization. Regional organizations continue subordinate to the United Nations by the terms of the Charter, and, in the case of the O.A.S., by the terms of the relevant Inter-American treaties themselves. Like an individual state, the O.A.S. can be called to account for its action in an appropriate agency of the more encompassing organization. In recognition of this relationship, the President ordered that the Cuban case be put immediately before the Security Council. The United Nations, through the Council and the Secretary-General, became actively involved in the effort to develop a permanent solution to the threat to the peace represented by the Soviet nuclear capability in Cuba.

Since World War II, each of the actions to keep the peace—in Korea, in the Middle East, in Lebanon, in the Congo and now in Cuba—has taken a different operational form. But each of them reflects our conviction that a breach of the peace involves us all and that we must meet it together, through institutions of collective security established for that purpose.

The quarantine, seen in this framework, is a significant addition to the developing body of postwar experience with collective responsibility and collective action to preserve the peace.

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THE ARAB REFUGEES: A CHANGING PROBLEM

By Don Peretz

THE Arab refugee problem is no longer the principal obstacle to peace between Israel and the Arab states. This was indicated in the recent United Nations Palestine debate. Concern of most Arab speakers about the refugees was secondary to their fear of the Zionist enclave in the Arab "heartland."

Nevertheless, the United States and the United Nations continue to regard the refugee problem as the key to peace in the 15-year-old conflict. The appointment of Joseph Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as Special Representative of the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine to devise ways of giving the refugees a "free choice" about their future homes, was based on the premise that the refugee problem is central in the Palestine conflict. After several rounds of parleys with both Israelis and Arabs, Dr. Johnson put forward a series of still unpublished proposals which neither side has accepted. These envisage a scheme in which the refugees would be given an opportunity to make known whether they desire to settle in Israel, in the Arab host countries or elsewhere. The process by which they would indicate their preferences would be administered by the United Nations. Israel would not be committed to accept all those desiring to return, but it would be expected to accept a limited number who could be absorbed without jeopardizing its economic or military security. Dr. Johnson's plan is based on the belief that, although few refugees would want to live in the Jewish state, the opportunity to do so would give them a certain psychological satisfaction. With such a "free choice" they would, it was hoped, subsequently abandon their resistance to rehabilitation in permanent homes and jobs outside of Palestine.

This view of the refugee problem depends on assumptions which no longer seem relevant. Since 1948 the conditions in the Middle East have altered considerably. Why has policy of the United Nations and the United States lagged behind the changing realities?

The most obvious reason is the continued physical presence of the refugees in the host countries. Their encampments in the large

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urban centers are a constant reminder of the Arab defeat and loss of Palestine. These visual reminders are an embarrassment to the United Nations and to Western policy in the Middle East. Because of the pressing humanitarian needs of the refugees, because their plight has been the issue most frequently raised in the acrimonious public debates between Israel and the Arab states, and because on many occasions border flare-ups along the 1949 armistice demarcation lines can be traced to their dislocation, the refugees have continued to command world attention. Each year the General Assembly recommends continued emergency relief measures like those initiated when the problem was first brought to its attention nearly 15 years ago.

However, during this period the Middle East has undergone great economic, social and political changes which have altered considerably both the nature and significance of the refugee problem. Before the United States and the United Nations continue their annual grants of funds and outpouring of energy in the effort to find a solution, it would be wise to examine these altered conditions.

The most basic change is that the problem is no longer primarily one of emergency relief, of providing food, shelter and clothing for hundreds of thousands of people in immediate danger of famine and epidemic. More sophisticated measures are required today than simple emergency relief. The greatest need is for more economic security and social acceptance for the refugees than they have yet attained despite the great material improvements in their life since they arrived as indigents.

More and more of the refugees now scattered through the Arab world bear little resemblance to the people who had lived in Palestine until 1948. These were largely peasants with many characteristics of underdeveloped people, even though the Palestine Arab, generally speaking, was advanced in education, health and social progress compared to other peasant peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Since 1948 the original 725,000 have grown by over 400,000 through natural increase; thus nearly 40 percent of those now classified as refugees have never been in their homeland. They, and those who were infants and now have little if any first-hand recollection of Palestine, compose more than half the refugee population; and their number is being increased by an additional 30,000 to 40,000 births each year. Soon a whole new generation of

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Palestinians will have grown up in the Arab "diaspora" without having had anything more than second-hand knowledge of Palestine. Nevertheless, their attachment to Palestine is no less intense than that of their parents. They are constantly reminded—by their families, by their U.N. schools and by the host governments and people—that they are Palestinians.

Yet this new generation differs from its elders. Superficially it differs as do all new generations throughout the East; its speech, dress, social mannerisms and outlook on life are not the same. Most significant are its attitudes toward the future.

Adults who fled from Palestine suffered a trauma from which few recovered. Loss of homes, jobs and economic security and the complete uprooting of the familiar social structure engendered deep bitterness against all those responsible for the catastrophe; it expressed itself in absolute refusal to coöperate in transplanting their community to new soil. The older generation made known its fierce determination to return home by rejecting permanent housing, employment and all other assistance which would further its relocation. They were, until recently, abetted in their opposition by the host countries. This obstinate refusal to accept rehabilitation aid gave birth to the view in the West that the refugees would more willingly accept rehabilitation assistance if given a "free choice" about their future.

The younger generation is no less bitter about its refugee status, no less resentful toward those responsible, and no less determined to regain its homeland, but its reactions are less self-destructive. The youth realize that only through strength can they attain their ultimate objective, and that strength will be created through self-improvement, not self-destruction. Consequently they not only are willing to accept opportunities for education, vocational training and employment, but eagerly search them out. Having appraised realistically the chances of an early return to Palestine, they seek normal lives now. They want to marry, raise children and enter the mainstream of national life until the day of their return—or their children's, or their grandchildren's.

The Palestine refugee now benefits from a relatively advanced system of social security which provides excellent care for infants and nursing mothers, and a moderately good program of youth services. The basic ration given by UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency) is 1,500 calories a day. This is just barely enough to prevent serious malnutrition, but most refugees

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supplement it with food acquired from part-time earnings. Since the United Nations began its program, there have been no epidemics or famines, although many suffer from a protein deficiency in their diet, causing lassitude and undermining efficiency.

The Palestine youths of today are far better educated than their elders; indeed, the new generation may have a higher literacy rate than that in most host countries. Soon there will be almost no illiterate males and many fewer illiterate females. Better education and the rapid development of inexpensive communications have made the new generation more wise in the ways of the world, politically more sophisticated and intellectually more developed than the former peasants of rural Palestine.

Improved conditions have altered even the appearance of refugee settlements. In UNRWA camps the refugees no longer live in tents. The camps, once the symbol of degradation, have developed in many instances into permanent quarters of the towns and cities onto which they were grafted. Although in more cases than not, refugee homes seem jammed to capacity, the housing is now at least livable. The schools, social welfare stations, clinics and feeding centers are often constructed according to the latest architectural models. Indeed, the Palestinians live far better than refugees in India, Pakistan or Hong Kong.

This progress has occurred against a background of almost revolutionary change in the host countries. Large urban centers, such as Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo, Amman and Jerusalem, where most refugee camps are located, have grown dramatically into modern cities. Fundamental social forces are in motion. There is talk of, and frequently creative activity leading to, development of new trades and industries and the expansion of agriculture. Revolutionary doctrines have either undermined, or are in the process of undermining, the older generation of political conservatives. Socialism, republicanism and democracy have become accepted slogans.

Development of agriculture, industry and trade has facilitated the economic absorption of most employable refugees in Syria and of many in Lebanon, so that they are no longer a financial burden on these countries. Indeed, between 20 and 25 percent of the refugees never received any UNRWA assistance because they found ready opportunities to use their training in law, medicine, business or other skills in the expanding economies of the host countries. Those who were farmers or unskilled found difficulty

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because of the surpluses of unskilled laborers with which they had to compete in the host countries. As economic development progressed in Syria, UNRWA relief became necessary for only a few of the refugees there, and to some extent the same thing happened in Lebanon; for most it is now simply a welcome supplement to low wages and a token of continued identification as displaced Palestinians.

In Jordan and Gaza economic opportunity is not so great. The tiny Gaza strip, cut off from its Palestine hinterland, has no possibility of becoming self-sufficient. Nearly all the 250,000 refugees there must be relocated or continue to receive relief in order to survive. The expansion of Jordan's economy has absorbed a number of refugees, but the potential is so limited that in the foreseeable future not as many as half the 600,000 refugees can be integrated. What is the future, then, of the others in Gaza and Jordan?

A few tens of thousands could find employment in the Persian Gulf states, and many more in Syria and Iraq if these countries ever attained sufficient political stability to permit continued large-scale economic development. But an inherent irony of the situation is that where the greatest economic opportunity lies the refugees are least welcome politically and socially.

While economic conditions have improved considerably in Lebanon and Syria since 1948 and obstacles to employment of Palestinians have been removed, the refugees have not been accepted socially and politically. Not only do official attitudes and policies encourage discrimination, but the man in the street regards the Palestinians as a politically unreliable and often dangerous group whose departure from the country he would view with relief. These social pressures intensify the Palestinian's consciousness of being an outsider, already engendered by the schools and the closely knit social system. Thus, even children barely able to talk identify themselves with the Palestinian town of their parents' origin, such as Jaffa, Haifa or Lydda, rather than with Syria or Lebanon.

The Palestinians have thus developed many characteristic complexes and attitudes of a minority: they marry among themselves more frequently than with others; their friends are fellow countrymen more often than Syrians or Lebanese; their vocational objectives are to attain a middle-class status rather than that of a peasant or city worker. Even the sons of former Bedouin tent-dwellers aspire to become lawyers, doctors, teachers, businessmen and

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government employees, rather than tillers of the soil or craftsmen who work with their hands. They seek to "do well" in life to compensate for their warped childhood. UNRWA, therefore, has little difficulty recruiting candidates for its higher education and advanced vocational training programs. And it is estimated that some 50,000 Palestinians have flocked to the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms in the hope of enriching themselves from the oil boom there.

Contrasted with their apparent middle-class social and economic aspirations is the refugees' great attraction to radical political ideologies. Not only in Syria and Lebanon where they are treated as outsiders, but in Gaza and Jordan where Palestinians are in the majority, and where they find little social discrimination, they are politically volatile and easily incited to activism. In times of internal strife it is not unusual to hear Syrians or Lebanese blame the refugees; this is especially true of the merchant middle class, always concerned to maintain stability. While the fear of the Palestinians is often exaggerated, there have been a few instances where they were involved in political movements to overthrow established governments in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan.

Youth has rejected its own and all other Arab political leaders associated with the 1948 disaster. The former Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husayni, once the acknowledged leader and a folk hero of Palestine Arabs, and all those in any way identified with him, are shadowy relics of a now remote era. Old political conservatives from the landowning class and the religious hierarchy have also lost their allure. In their place, youth seeks more dynamic leaders who espouse the new socialist, republican and democratic slogans. If any individual can be said to represent the sentiments of Palestinian youth it is Egypt's President Nasser. To them he stands for a new, strong, progressive, dynamic Arab society.

Palestinians are in the forefront of the Arab unity movement. Many of them believe that attainment of a single Arab nation offers the only hope of returning to their homeland. The older generation's attachment to Palestine is primarily a nostalgia for their fields and ancestral homesteads. But their children, who never saw those fields and homes, who never lived in that familiar and comfortable environment, have created a fervent national sentiment that never before existed; and their aspirations are sup-

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ported by the Arab national movement. Regardless of success or failure in economic integration or repatriation, these new Palestinians want to create a new Palestine.

The virus of irredentism has spread from the refugees and the host countries through the whole Arab world from North Africa to the Persian Gulf. During the past decade, the redemption of Palestine has become as much a goal of Arab nationalism as was Algerian liberation. Indeed, the success of Nasserism, the Ba'ath Socialist party in Syria and other radical movements was a direct result of the Palestine disaster.

While economic integration of the refugees would lessen their visibility in the Arab capitals it would not solve the Palestine problem. As is already evident in Lebanon, Syria and the Persian Gulf, economically integrated refugees do not cease to be Palestine nationalists. For ever increasing numbers of refugees the problem is not lack of a place to live or lack of food or insufficient shelter; it is political homelessness.

Ten or more years ago, before the new generation of Arab political leaders and of Palestinian youth had come to the fore, a rapprochement with Israel on the basis of a refugee settlement might have been possible. The sentiment for Arab unity was still somewhat vague and the antagonism to Israel was due more to the refugees' personal loss than to fervent national pride. While rehabilitation and payment of compensation to refugees who owned property in what is now Israel are worthy and justified ends in themselves, they would not remove the opposition to a Jewish state in the Arab heartland. Today the refugee problem is not a cause of Arab hostility to Zionism, but a symptom. To diminish the symptom, or even to remove it, would not end the hostility.

II

If not because of the refugees, why then do Arab nationalists so resent Israel? The explanation, like that of any nationalist sentiment, is psychologically complex. Perhaps it is the desire to create a homogeneous Arab world. To Arab nationalists, an ideologically independent non-Arab enclave expressing its independence through political sovereignty in "their area" is as repugnant as was the existence of Portuguese Goa to Indian nationalists. In such issues there can be no compromise. Israel's social and economic accomplishments are as irrelevant as were

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the accomplishments of Great Britain or France in the colonial areas they once dominated. Arab nationalists consider that Israel's close ties with the West, although a strategic necessity, prove that it is merely a "bridgehead of Western imperialism." The constant reiteration by Israeli leaders that the nation was created not only for its present residents but for all Jews is an added irritant, despite the fact that this was the premise which the world community accepted as justification for a Jewish state, and is by definition the meaning of Zionism.

Neither to extremist nor to moderate Arab nationalists are the refugees the central issue in the Palestine dilemma. The former view liquidation of Israel as an immediate objective to be attained by force, if force must be used. Ultimately they would remove all "foreign intruders"—that is, Jewish immigrants—from Palestine to their lands of origin, or elsewhere.

The moderates, no less implacably hostile to a Jewish state and to Zionist ideology, are more realistic. They see that no combination of Arab states in the near future will be powerful enough to remove Israel by force. They rely on diplomatic pressure, economic boycott and blockade rather than military means to deal with the situation. It is not the physical presence of Jews in Palestine nor the existence of Jewish cultural and religious institutions to which moderates object, but the Zionist concept of Jewish sovereignty which severs Palestine from the Arab world. The moderates would be willing to concede the same internal cultural and religious autonomy to Jews in Palestine that they would grant to Lebanese Christians and to Iraqi Kurds.

Obviously there is no possibility now of political compromise between Arab nationalism and a Jewish state founded on Zionist ideology. Israel cannot be expected to forego its sovereignty, nor will the Arab states acknowledge its sovereignty. Until 1948 a few Jewish and Arab moderates proposed to compromise this dilemma by creating a bi-national, Arab-Jewish Palestine. But that possibility has receded into history. Perhaps in the distant future, when political forces in the Middle East and in the world around it have changed, when national sovereignty is no longer so greatly prized, there can be realistic hope of an Arab-Israel rapprochement.

Continued identification of "the refugee problem" with a solution of the total Palestine dilemma is not only illusory, but fosters Arab fears that the success of international attempts to liquidate

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the refugee problem would mean abandonment of the rights of Palestine Arabs. But, if the refugees are no longer the central issue and their rehabilitation will not end the conflict, is any purpose served by continuing to pour funds and energy into attempts to solve the problem? Although "Palestine is here to stay" regardless of the refugees' future, improvement of refugee conditions is itself a worthy cause. Both the United Nations and the United States (which contributes approximately 70 percent of the UNRWA budget) have undertaken a moral obligation from which they cannot easily withdraw. There is also the practical goal of reaching stability within the host countries. But to be of value, the nature of refugee assistance must be reëvaluated in the light of changing realities.

Assistance is still essential for the majority of refugees in Gaza, for large numbers in Jordan, for some in Lebanon, and for a few, mostly of the older generation, in Syria. However, to continue placing primary emphasis on relief would perpetuate the refugee mentality and undermine the initiative of the younger generation eager to escape from the refugee status. What is most important is to encourage and create opportunities for individual initiative. Relief activities should therefore continue to diminish in favor of increased education, vocational training and placement programs.

Although UNRWA's original mandate was to establish works projects which would favor integration, the framework within which it has worked from the first has been that of a temporary emergency relief agency. Originally, many believed that the refugee problem would be resolved within a few months and that UNRWA would gradually turn to works projects. However, during the early 1950s the host countries were unable either economically or politically to absorb the refugees rapidly enough to warrant cutting relief substantially. Consequently the General Assembly has periodically had to renew UNRWA's mandate, and its director must raise funds for it in much the same manner as those of a voluntary welfare organization. Although the Agency has become a more or less permanent landmark, its administration, organization, personnel, fiscal policies and general outlook have until recently had a temporary character. This weakness is still reflected in the local policies of many UNRWA administrators, although the present Commissioner General, Dr. John Davis, has increasingly shifted from outright relief to rehabilitation, with

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emphasis on vocational training. Within the limits of political expediency, attempts are being made to cut unqualified recipients of rations from the rolls and to use the funds for more creative purposes. Today nearly a third of the Agency's budget and half its personnel are used for education and technical training, and nearly 3,000 youths have been taught skills in vocational training centers. If given his way, Dr. Davis would place even greater emphasis on these projects. The obstacles are conservatism within the organization and the continued refusal of many politicians in the host countries to agree that rehabilitation projects are not simply attempts to undermine the refugees' rights.

The principal cause for the difficulties of UNRWA to date is not so much the policies of its directors as the reluctance of the United States and the United Nations to face the changed situation. They continue to hope that the refugee problem will be resolved within a few years and that then it will be possible to break the Arab-Israel stalemate. In the early 1950s the United States and the United Nations did support efforts to shift from relief to rehabilitation, but conditions in the region were not yet ripe. Many still fear that to diminish relief, or alter the organization of UNRWA radically, would jeopardize the prospects for compromise, illusory as these have proven to be.

True, it would not be easy to alter UNRWA's role from a relief to a rehabilitation agency. It has acquired far more than a welfare function. Thousands of refugees who are self-supporting continue to receive relief, not because of need, but because it gives them continued identity as Palestinians. In effect, an UNRWA ration card has become the identity card of the displaced Palestinian. Recognizing this, UNRWA has now issued cards which identify the bearer's status but do not entitle him to rations. The Agency employs thousands of Palestinian officials, physicians, teachers and clerks. Some 10,000 families depend upon it for employment and in Jordan especially they constitute a powerful pressure group. No politician in any of the host countries would dare to recommend abolishing their employment. Any sudden dismemberment of UNRWA is now impossible. What is feasible is a gradual transformation of it into an agency placing major emphasis on education, vocational training and placement.

For a number of years continued relief will be needed for the many unemployed in Gaza and in Jordan, and for the hard-core refugees in all the host countries, now perhaps numbering 300,000

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persons. They are the "aging" refugees who left Palestine as adults and have been idle for the past 15 years. Most of them were unskilled farmers and workmen, of whom the host countries already have a surplus. In these years of unemployment they have lost their modest skills and their initiative and now resist effective rehabilitation. The situation is mitigated somewhat by the Middle Eastern social system in which young members of extended families accept responsibility for the aged. But the danger exists that many children of the "aging refugees" will also become hard-core cases if they are not soon taught vocational skills to prepare them to become useful adults.

A major psychological barrier to successful rehabilitation of the younger generation is their continued identification as "refugees," a term implying that Palestinians are an underprivileged minority. To help raise their status in the host countries, the term "refugees" might be replaced by "Palestinians." They would be recognized in the Arab world as a national group striving for self-determination. The United Nations rehabilitation program for "Palestinians" would not in any way vitiate their claims to their homeland. On the other hand, it would have to be made plain by the United Nations that recognition of "Palestinians" would not imply support for them in their dispute with Israel. Obviously neither the United Nations nor the United States could take any action that contravened Israel's accepted position in the international community.

In 1960 the late Dag Hammarskjold emphasized: "No reintegration would be satisfactory, or even possible, were it to be brought about by forcing people into their new positions against their will. It must be freely accepted, if it is to yield lasting results in the form of economic and political stability." The choice of returning to the homes of their parents is not available, nor is it likely to become so. But when other choices have been available the new generation has accepted them. Young people have shown a willingness to leave their inferior refugee status if they can retain the Palestinian identity of which they are so jealous.

UNRWA, or the agency to assist "Palestinians" which might replace it, cannot create opportunities for youth without coöperation from the host countries or outside the framework of general economic development in the Middle East. This was affirmed in Secretary-General Hammarskjold's 1960 report on the refugees, when he pointed out that economic development could not suc-

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cessfully improve the over-all refugee situation unless undertaken on a regional basis. Only through an integrated program of coöperation between those Arab nations with a capital surplus and those with a capital deficit would it be possible to attain full employment of the growing indigenous populations as well as the refugees. Even with this coöperation, investment capital from abroad would also be required. Perhaps the most critical problem, then, is to achieve a degree of political and social stability that will encourage both a free flow of capital within the Arab world and investment from outside.

III

Looking back, we see that there are two aspects to the refugee problem: the humanitarian and the political. To link the two does not solve it, regardless of how much economic assistance the refugees receive or of how successful attempts are to integrate them. They will remain Palestinians, committed to redeem their homeland.

This dire forecast need not prejudice efforts to improve their lot. The younger generation will strive to better its condition with or without assistance, and regardless of the opportunity to "choose" repatriation to Israel. However, there will remain a hard core of unproductive refugees who must also be helped in quite different ways. Opportunities exist for assistance by both the United States and the United Nations to both groups. But to confuse such help with a political solution of the Palestine problem can lead only to frustration and disillusionment alike among those who receive help and those who give it.

The initiative for a new approach must come from the United States, the principal supporter of United Nations refugee activities. It is now too late to expect "time" to solve the refugee problem; and it is illusory to hope that continued relief grants will tide over the "critical" period until there is agreement between Israel and the Arab states. No such agreement is in the cards. If United States encouragement of economic development is to succeed, merely passive acceptance of drastic social changes in the Middle East is inadequate. We must not only accept such change where it has occurred, but stimulate it at a much more rapid pace in the remaining Middle East countries where we can exert influence. In Jordan, for example, the existing power structure is still a major obstacle to integration of large numbers of refugees de-

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spite minor reforms made in recent years at the instigation of the United States. Country-wide development plans should be considered in the context of regional development, and activities for retraining refugee youth should be integrated with plans for national and regional economic development. A first step in this direction is UNRWA's present survey of existing skills in the Arab world. The purpose is to determine the pattern of vocational requirements during the next decade.

The United States should use its good offices to see that refugees receive compensation for their property in Israel, not for economic or political reasons, but for the same moral reasons that we supported German payment of compensation to Jewish victims of Nazism. The best contribution the West can make to improving the lot of the refugees is to encourage conditions in the Middle East leading to a take-off into sustained economic growth. When such growth begins, the economic problem of the individual refugee will be solved.

As for the political problem of Palestine, we must reconcile ourselves to seeing it continue for a generation or more. It is an unpleasant fact of international life that the Arab-Israel conflict has progressed beyond a stage where some new blueprint can help. The best that can be hoped for under existing circumstances is to contain the conflict through the efforts of the United Nations and the larger member states. Although conciliation is no longer possible, agencies such as the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization and Emergency Force can continue to limit border tensions and can prevent them from erupting into major warfare. Efforts to contain the conflict can run parallel to efforts to assist refugee youth in the struggle to find normal lives in the expanding economy of the Middle East.

Americans often hope to resolve international problems through some makeshift mechanical device—a peace commission or an economic plan. The Arab-Israel dispute is too complex and its emotions too deep to yield to such an approach. The problem is not one made up of specific issues. It is, rather, a deep-rooted ideological conflict in which both sides feel that compromise will lead to irreparable loss of far more significance than a few miles of territory, the return of a few thousand individuals to their homes or compensation for the loss of their property.

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POLICY AND THE SCIENTISTS

By Lee A. DuBridge

SINCE the time of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin, scientists and engineers have participated in the high councils of this nation. Though these men were not elevated to high office because they were scientists and engineers, there have been many cases in which scientists, as scientists, have had a conspicuous influence on the activities and policies of our federal government.

One need not be in public office, of course, in order to have an important influence in national affairs. Indeed, the vast program of industrial and technological development of this country has been carried forward by scientists and engineers working within the private enterprise system—advancing our scientific knowledge as well as building railroads, steel mills, agricultural equipment, oil wells, dams, electric power systems and all the rest. They clearly have had an important influence on public affairs, as did hosts of other private citizens who never left their private occupations to accept government posts.

Let us look, however, at the ways in which scientists or engineers have directly participated in the operations of the federal government.

The employment of scientists by the government to work as scientists is not a new phenomenon. For a long time the military services, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Geological Survey, the National Bureau of Standards, the Smithsonian Institution and other agencies have employed technical personnel. But this situation has changed so markedly since 1940 that it is to this period that we shall direct our attention.

It is obvious that there are many ways in which scientists[1] can participate in federal affairs. It will be useful to list some of these, recognizing that some individuals could be classified—simultaneously or successively—in two or more categories.

1. The scientist may be employed in a government laboratory,

[1] We shall use the term "scientist" broadly and, for brevity, synonymously with the phrase "scientist or engineer," even though the scientists and the engineers have often contributed in quite different ways. Also we shall mean by a scientist one who has not only been formally trained in science or engineering but who has, for a time at least, actively carried on professional work in his chosen field. The term "public affairs" will be used in a restricted sense, referring only to activities, enterprises or policies directly connected with the federal government.

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such as the Naval Research Laboratory, an army "arsenal," the National Bureau of Standards or the National Institutes of Health.

2. He may work in a laboratory which is operated under a government contract by either a university, a research institute or an industrial company; examples are the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, the Brookhaven National Laboratory, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the RAND Corporation.

3. He may be an officer or active member of the National Academy of Sciences or its operating agency, the National Research Council—a private organization with a federal charter, which has a major responsibility for advising the government on scientific and technical matters.

4. The scientist may serve on one or more of the many technical advisory committees or panels set up by various government agencies—the military services, the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, and others.

5. He may be a member of certain advisory committees charged with advising on general matters of government policy in areas importantly affected by scientific and technical developments: *e.g.* the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, the President's Science Advisory Committee, or one of the many temporary commissions or panels set up to recommend policies in specified areas, including the President's Commission on National Goals (which included three scientists).

6. A scientist may serve as an administrator of important government scientific programs. He might be the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, or the Director of the National Science Foundation.

7. A scientist could, conceivably, serve in an important political office (though very few have done so), such as that of a member of the Cabinet or of the Congress.

8. Finally, a scientist may serve the interest and needs of the federal government without any official government appointment at all. Heads of colleges or universities, directors of industrial laboratories, science faculty members in universities, and other scientists have, either individually or through various nongovernmental organizations, exerted an influence on government affairs and government policy.

We shall not discuss all of these various capacities in which sci-

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entists serve their government, but shall restrict ourselves to those cases in which the scientist has a direct responsibility for policy advice or determination. It is true that it is not always easy to draw a line between technical matters and policy matters, and there is no point in drawing such a line too sharply. Clearly, however, it is one thing to give technical advice to the scientific group at the Los Alamos laboratory (or to be employed there) on problems associated with the design and development of a nuclear weapon, and it is a different thing to advise the Atomic Energy Commission, the Defense Department or the President on whether new types of nuclear weapons should be developed, or whether it is appropriate and desirable to test them in the atmosphere, underground or in outer space.

By restricting the discussion to policy matters, we are of course neglecting a vast area of effective scientific service to the government. The scores of technical advisory committees have commanded the effective services of hundreds of scientists and engineers. Some of the committees have been more effective and influential than others, but all have been important in guiding the government's scientific activities in many fields. Indeed, many major policy issues have been formulated or brought to fruition through a series of technical decisions and developments to which scientists both within and outside the government have made essential contributions. Furthermore, most scientists who have participated in policy matters had their first contact with government affairs through one or more technical committees.

What has happened in the policy field since 1940 is best brought out by considering in some detail the work of certain important government scientific agencies which have had specific policy responsibilities.

II. THE OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

In early 1940, when the United States' participation in World War II was already a possibility, a group of scientists was authorized by President Roosevelt to form the National Defense Research Committee (N.D.R.C.) to mobilize and utilize the scientific and engineering talent of the country for the purpose of increasing the nation's military power. This and later the Committee on Medical Research (C.M.R.) were subsequently incorporated into the Office of Scientific Research and Development (O.S.R.D.).The great achievements of this organization in the

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fields of radar, long-range radio navigation, proximity fuses, anti-submarine warfare, nuclear weapons, penicillin and other fields relating to wartime needs are too well known to be recited here. The important point is, however, that under the leadership of Dr. Vannevar Bush, a distinguished engineer and educator, O.S.R.D. not only managed a vast scientific and technological program but also formulated and implemented a new body of policy relating to the performance of military research and development. There were at least three important policy decisions which have affected the government's scientific program ever since:

First, military research and development need not be carried on exclusively in military laboratories directed by military personnel; it can also be done in civilian scientific laboratories directed by civilians, under the sponsorship of either a military or a civilian agency. After the war this policy was extended to non-military government research.

Second, a suitable mechanism for government financing of research in universities, industrial laboratories and other private agencies is the research or development contract. This is a written agreement between the government and the private corporation to carry out investigations in a specified area, making the results available to the government. The government pays all of the costs incurred, both direct and indirect. The university or the company continues its normal salary and personnel policies and assumes responsibility for technical management within the scope of the contract. Civil Service rules and military "control" of scientists are thus both avoided.

Third, the military services must set up suitable mechanisms for close liaison between civilian scientists and responsible military authorities to ensure that scientific developments may be governed by practical military needs and requirements, and that military tactics, strategy and training may be adapted to forthcoming new weapons. This liaison needs to be effected both at the working level and at the highest policy level. The nuclear-weapon problem is but one of many in which decisions had to be made by the Commander-in-Chief in consultation with top scientists.

In all three of these areas policies were developed and implemented under O.S.R.D. auspices—though not always without serious difficulties and misunderstandings. The military services were concerned (not without some reason) about adequate security measures, and about the willingness of scientists to recognize

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the hard facts of military requirements. The scientists were often irked by what they regarded as unduly troublesome security rules, and they were impatient with military officers who seemed to be slow to appreciate the value of their new inventions.

Yet these and other problems were, for the most part, solved, and the over-all results were of historic importance. There was an increased respect on the part of military officers for the values which scientists could contribute to military matters, and there was an increased understanding by the scientists of military needs and problems—and even of military tactics and strategy.

Hence, immediately following the end of the war, as O.S.R.D. disbanded and even before it was clear that a cold war would ensue, the military moved quickly to retain their science advisory groups, to establish new ones, and to take over or continue many university and industrial research contracts. Attention in the university contracts was shifted from immediate military matters to longer-range research, partly in recognition of its possible ultimate values and partly to retain the interest and collaboration of university scientists even after they returned to their normal peacetime activities. Thus the support of basic research by military agencies was initiated, largely under the leadership of the Office of Naval Research, which asked a committee of scientists —the Naval Research Advisory Committee—to assist in formulating and guiding the program.

When the Atomic Energy Commission was later organized, it established an extensive program of basic research supported by contracts at the universities. Still later the National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation and National Aeronautics and Space Administration followed suit—though their university agreements were termed grants rather than contracts, a distinction which need not concern us here. (In fact, NASA's predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, had made research grants to universities even before the war.)

By 1962, university and industrial research and development grants and contracts amounted to some $12 billion annually. The lessons learned and the policies established by O.S.R.D. during World War II have thus become a major factor in military preparedness and in the strength of the nation's science, technology and industry.

The work of O.S.R.D., involving the close association between men like Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant and Karl T. Compton

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with the highest civilian and military offices of government, established not only the new patterns in the scientists' participation in national affairs, but introduced a new era of government participation in the affairs of science.

III. THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

The enormous potential impact of nuclear energy on both military and civilian affairs led to the establishment in 1946 of the Atomic Energy Commission as an independent civilian agency to take over from the Army's Manhattan District the further development of this new area of science and technology. This organization brought scientists into contact with the government, on both a working and a policy level, in an unprecedented way. And, because of the highly important and often controversial nature of the issues that grew up in this field, the participation of scientists became active and widespread—and the disagreements and misunderstandings were (and are) frequent and often bitter. The disagreements—which have drawn wide public attention—have often overshadowed the wide areas of agreement and collaboration. Yet both are a part of the picture.

The official participation of scientists at the policy level in the A.E.C. has been through membership of one or two scientists on the five-man Commission itself, or membership on its General Advisory Committee (G.A.C.) composed of nine scientists.

In view of the controversies, it is important to note that the A.E.C. and the G.A.C. have counted among their members some of the most able and highly respected scientists of the nation. Thus, the disagreements have arisen not because of the inadequacy of the men involved but from the inherent difficulties of the problem and the intimate admixture of technical, political, administrative, military and security factors in many policy decisions.

It would require a whole volume to explore even those policy issues which have received great public attention, much less those that were settled more quietly. But to name a few will illustrate how difficult these questions were:

How large a stockpile of fissionable weapons was required to assure national security? (1947–1950) When or under what circumstances, if at all, should the vastly more powerful thermonuclear weapon be developed and produced? (1950) How should the responsibility for the development and operation of nuclear power reactors be divided between government and private

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agencies? To what extent shall nuclear weapons be tested in the atmosphere, underground or in outer space? What are the "tolerable" limits of atmospheric radioactive contamination? What aspects of the science and technology of nuclear energy must be kept secret, which ones "declassified," and how shall security measures be made both acceptable and effective, without impeding progress?

This incomplete list of problems which have been faced indicates that scientists have been pressed to the limit to examine the full technical background of each problem and to examine its military, political and other aspects—and then to use their best judgment in making recommendations.

The G.A.C., of course, is only an advisory body—advising the A.E.C. itself. On many problems the A.E.C. may make the final decision; on others it can only pass on its recommendations to the President. It does not have to follow the G.A.C.'s advice, of course —nor to divulge what that advice was. In no case has the G.A.C. taken the initiative in revealing its recommendations publicly. Often it was reluctant to see its recommendations made public at all, for they were based in part on secret technical information which could not be revealed. This, of course, is not an uncommon situation in military matters—the public must learn of the decisions, but it cannot be told all of the reasons for making them.

There are three essential points to bring out in this discussion, however:

First, the G.A.C. has from the start been in an important position to advise the A.E.C. on vastly important policy matters, but not to decide them. Yet, since the G.A.C. was established by statute, its advice had to be taken most seriously and was usually followed.

Second, its members have been given full information on all the known and pertinent technical, military, political and other factors (often including a résumé of sensitive international situations). Intimate discussions between G.A.C. and A.E.C. members normally precede formal policy recommendations.

Third, membership on the G.A.C. is on a rotating basis and many able men have devoted much time and thought to its work. Their performance has been excellent and a major source of strength to the A.E.C. and the nation.

Some recommendations of the G.A.C. were outdated by later unforeseen (and often unforeseeable) technical or political or

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military developments—and thus, in retrospect, seemed "wrong." Often the G.A.C. was the first to recognize the new developments and altered its proposals accordingly. Yet it is an essential requirement of any advisory body that its advice be based on what is known at the time, or what can be reasonably expected from normal developments. New scientific or technical discoveries are not foreseeable—and advice cannot be based on hopes or dreams. Thus, scientific advice is, by its nature, of an evanescent quality. It must be reviewed from time to time in the light of new developments. An enterprise wisely initiated in 1958 may have to be canceled or altered because it is obsolete in 1961—even though large sums of money may have been invested. Too often political pressures, or a false sense of economy, have prevented this from happening. On the other hand, to cancel every weapon development project because better ideas have emerged may leave the nation with no modern weapons actually in being. Equipment which is theoretically obsolete is better than none at all, and must be accepted when the new and better ideas cannot emerge from the production line in time to maintain a force adequate for current requirements.

In the same way the technical situation at one time may appear to be against initiating a proposed new enterprise for which there may be a great need but only a small chance of success. Yet, a few weeks or months later a new development may utterly change the picture—and prompt a new set of recommendations. This actually happened in the case of the thermonuclear bomb; but it was the first and not the later situation that has been publicized.

The age of technology is not an easy one to live with!

IV. THE PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

The group now known as the President's Science Advisory Committee (P.S.A.C.) was organized in 1951 under the chairmanship of Dr. Oliver E. Buckley, then just retiring from the presidency of the Bell Telephone Laboratories. Dr. Buckley visualized it as a stand-by committee to keep aware of the technical-military developments in the United States and abroad and, in case of a new emergency, to advise the President on how the scientific talent of the country should then be mobilized. It was visualized that the committee should always have available a proposed mobilization plan, including the names of the top scientists to be called on to organize and operate a "new O.S.R.D."

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For administrative convenience, this committee, while in the Executive Office of the President, was asked to report through the Office of Defense Mobilization—and that agency provided office, secretarial and other facilities, and served as a channel of communication to the White House.

As time went on, as the cold war and the Korean War developed, and as the committee met and discussed the many complex problems of nuclear weapons, guided missiles, chemical, biological and radiological warfare, the members felt that a more positive approach was needed and that recommendations on current problems should be prepared. In late 1952 Dr. Buckley retired because of failing health, and I was asked to succeed him as chairman. With the warm support of President Eisenhower as he came into office, our activities were stepped up, special studies were initiated by ad hoc panels and many reports and recommendations were made to the President on broad problems of national security. The President requested certain of these reports to be presented to the National Security Council, and even to the Cabinet. Two panel studies directed by James R. Killian, Jr., and H. R. Gaither, Jr., respectively, were especially important and influential. In 1956 my term as chairman and member of the committee ended, and Dr. Killian became chairman.

In 1957, after the Russian sputnik and the ensuing excitement, the President asked that the committee henceforth report directly to him; and he requested Dr. Killian to accept appointment, full time, to a new office—that of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. A new era of activity then began for the P.S.A.C. Its staff was greatly enlarged; many new panels were established to conduct special studies, some of which were published as unclassified reports, issued as White House papers, *e.g.* three reports on scientific and engineering education and research. An intimate relationship was established with the White House and Defense Department, and the committee became the top scientific advisory body in the government. Dr. G. B. Kistiakowsky succeeded Dr. Killian in 1959 and Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner was appointed to this post by President Kennedy, in 1961. The P.S.A.C. has considered a bewildering variety of problems—ranging from disarmament negotiations to federal aid to education. It has clearly become an essential arm of the President's staff. Its achievements —mostly not made public—have been noteworthy. Yet even here —as is illustrated by recent controversies in the space exploration

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field—the P.S.A.C. is not free of criticism, either by independent scientists or by other government agencies.

V. THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

A rather different set of functions and responsibilities was faced by those appointed to the 24-man National Science Board[2] when it was established in 1950. This was not to be an advisory agency —though its advice has been asked and given. It was not to be an operating agency in the sense of managing scientific programs. It was a granting agency—to make grants of federal funds in order to enhance the nation's scientific and technological strength.

In this field of stimulating the advancement of the research capacities of the country—including the education of more research scientists—the National Science Board was a policy-forming body. Its policies were to be implemented, within the limitations of budgets and governmental administrative regulations, by the Director of the National Science Foundation and his staff. Since the budget of the Foundation is now approaching a half-billion dollars a year, it evidently plays a key role in the national scientific program, including the field of scientific education. Its purpose is not to sponsor research primarily because of its military or industrial applications, but to sponsor basic science—the search for knowledge for its own sake. Such research (including the concomitant educational activities) must of necessity be carried out largely in the colleges and universities of the nation.

The policy function of the Board, then, was to decide how such support was to be most effectively administered, how the worth of various proposals for support was to be evaluated, and in what areas of science its funds were to be expended, taking into account the national needs and the activities of other research-supporting agencies of government such as the National Institutes of Health, the Atomic Energy Commission and the military services. In general, the National Science Foundation was expected to take leadership in evolving policies and attitudes which the government should adopt in promoting basic science.

To enable its work to go forward effectively, the National Science Board established many advisory committees and panels whose functions were to evaluate proposed scientific projects, to select candidates for fellowships, or to advise on the general needs,

[2] The National Science Foundation Act of 1950 provided for the creation of the National Science Board to serve as the responsible governing board of the Foundation.

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requirements and potentialities in the various scientific or educational areas. Often the National Science Foundation has depended on committees from the National Academy of Sciences to recommend policy in special scientific areas, *e.g.* the International Geophysical Year program, oceanographic research, Project Mohole.

The 24-man National Science Board has necessarily had a make-up somewhat different from that of other advisory bodies. Since it is a statutory body—its members appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate—it was important that the membership represent not only all fields of science, but also all parts of the country, the various types of institutions (state, private, Catholic, Negro) and, in addition, include members with interests in education, science, social science or public affairs.

When the appointment of the first members was announced, there was consternation on the part of many scientists. How, they wondered, could such a heterogeneous group of people, many of them with little or no previous government or administrative experience, ever work together and evolve sensible policies for the promotion of science? There were certainly problems; it was a new experiment. But, under the skillful leadership of men like J. B. Conant, Chester I. Barnard and Detlev Bronk, the successive chairmen, the Board did learn to work well together. The unifying influence throughout all the years since 1950, however, has been the quiet, competent leadership of Alan Waterman, the first and so far the only Director of the Foundation. As Board members have come and gone (six-year terms, with a few serving two terms), the confidence in Dr. Waterman has remained unanimous, and differing points of view have eventually been resolved.

VI. THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

No single government agency has more awesome responsibilities in scientific and engineering fields than the recently created civilian space agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Though its program carries important implications in the field of national prestige, international relations and military security, it is, in its major functional aspects, a huge program of scientific research, implemented by a vast effort in engineering development.

Directly and indirectly, NASA employs the services of more scientists and engineers than any other single agency. It directly operates an array of government research and development lab-

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oratories or "centers," is responsible for one major government-owned but privately operated establishment (the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology), coöperates with the Air Force in the operation of the huge launching facilities at Cape Canaveral, and directs a large number of industrial contracts for research and development and for the fabrication of the elaborate equipment required for space exploration. It also has the major responsibility for evolving the policies which shall govern the United States civilian space program, though of course, as for all government agencies, these are subject to approval by the President and the Congress. The National Aeronautics and Space Council (headed by the Vice President) was established to coördinate all government activities in the space field.

NASA was not provided with, and has not yet officially established, a top-level scientific policy advisory committee, such as the G.A.C. But the large scientific staff in its headquarters, the many key scientists in its various laboratories and active "space scientists" in private organizations collaborate in developing plans and proposals for the space program. Also, a close working relationship has been set up with the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences.

No enterprise ever undertaken has involved such an intimate collaboration of all the fields of pure and applied sciences as has the space program. And none has ever involved in so extensive a way the public interest and public opinion. And, except possibly for the field of nuclear weapons, no program has faced such a direct and fearsome challenge from the achievements of another nation.

Nor has any national scientific program involved such a bewildering combination of great enthusiasm—and serious misgivings. All scientists probably agree that space research is the most exciting and challenging new area of scientific endeavor ever opened up to human beings. Yet many also feel that the prestige and competitive factors have forced us to move too far too fast, to spend too much money and devote too much effort to the "spectacular" as contrasted to the purely scientific ventures. Still other scientists, however, rejoice that the international aspects of space exploits have generated so much public (and Congressional) interest that the scientific programs have been accelerated and expanded beyond what could have been dreamed of without the Russian competition. The nature and immediacy of the military values of space have also been hotly debated.

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There is little hope that these conflicting opinions will be fully compromised soon. Yet there is no longer any doubt that official national policy will continue to support the present vast, high-pressure and high-cost program. And it is also clear that purely scientific considerations will not be the only, or even the predominating, factors in the formulation of government policy.

Here indeed is an area in which scientists, government officials and representatives of the public must collaborate closely in formulating and implementing a program which adequately takes cognizance of all the elements involved. Is there an adequate mechanism for such collaboration? Apparently not, as yet. Indeed it can be argued that there is no time for such extensive collaboration and for the deliberate consideration which would be necessary to formulate a program which would command universal or even substantial agreement and support among all competent and interested parties. "We must push ahead, or be left still further behind," it is said.

It cannot be denied that the scientific results of the United States space program are already impressive. Our feats may seem less spectacular than those of the Soviet Union, largely because of our late start in developing very large rockets (another example of a technical-military decision made prior to 1954 which seemed "right" at the time but in retrospect seems, to many, to have lacked adequate foresight). Still, in terms of scientific value our space program is outstanding—reflecting effective participation by the country's scientific community. The recent brilliant success of Mariner II in collecting a great quantity of data from interplanetary space and the vicinity of the planet Venus is a fine example of scientific achievement. Also the Telstar satellite opened a new era in communication technology.

This is not the place to explore the pros and cons of the policy issues now being so vigorously discussed both in the public domain and in the private councils of government. The point to emphasize is that space research is another field in which able, intelligent and public-spirited scientists are urgently needed—not only to carry on the work in the laboratory but also, in collaboration with others, to help formulate major national policy.

VII. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The above description of a few important scientific groups within the government illustrates both the extent and the variety

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of the ways in which the government of a modern nation is involved in scientific and technical matters. And we have not touched on the ways in which such matters impinge on the affairs of the Department of State, which has a scientific adviser in Washington and scientific attachés in several embassies, and has used scientists as advisers in international negotiations; or of the Department of Commerce, which operates the National Bureau of Standards; or of other agencies. And I must leave it to others to examine the vast program of the National Institutes of Health.

Science and technology are now essential elements of national concern and national policy. Yet, most of the responsible officers in the executive branch and most of the members of the Congress have little or no scientific training. Since it appears unlikely that this situation will change—for most scientists abhor the idea of running for political office—it is imperative that ways be found to continue to bring scientists and engineers into policy-making and policy-advising positions in even more intimate and extensive ways than in the past.

Some new steps have been taken in recent years. Certain departments have placed scientists at the assistant-secretary level to supervise scientific activities within the department and to coördinate them with the programs of other departments. The Federal Council for Science and Technology, consisting of representatives of the various departments and the independent agencies, was established specifically to promote such coördination.

More recently, through a reorganization plan approved by Congress, there was established in the Executive Office of the President a new Office of Science and Technology to be headed, normally, by the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology. As a statutory body (unlike the President's Science Advisory Committee), it is authorized and directed to advise Congress as well as the executive branch on scientific policy matters. The P.S.A.C. will retain its status as a personal advisory body to the President—specifically shielded from Congress.

The National Science Board and other agencies recommended the creation of such an office to have cognizance of the work of all departments and agencies—as no other group has. Since the Office of Science and Technology is just now being organized, it is too early to foretell how effective it may be. But it does fill a serious gap in the government structure, and if it can be adequately manned with top people it can be a most effective instrument for

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giving science a voice at high levels. This voice will not be subject to the suspicion that its views are biased by a vested interest in its own operations—since it will not be an operating agency. And possibly most important of all, it will provide for the first time a top scientific group available to advise the Congress.

The creation of this office would seem to render unnecessary and obsolete the proposals for the creation of a Department of Science headed by a Secretary of Science who would be a Cabinet member. Such a department would necessarily have operating functions; this means that its head would become a special pleader for his department, as are all other secretaries. Hence it would not provide an over-all science coördinating and advisory group whose cognizance and responsibilities covered all departments. Furthermore, scientific activities have become too pervasive to be lumped into a single department; it is essential that many departments and agencies carry on such scientific activities as are appropriate and necessary to their respective missions. Also, many scientists throughout the country are properly fearful of a single "czar" of science; science is too variegated in its scope and methods to be susceptible to effective control by a single office. The present diversity of control is both satisfactory and fruitful.

VIII. AN EVALUATION

No organizational setup within the government can be effective if the best scientists do not actively participate. How have they performed in the past?

A single answer is not easy to give. Scientists have been criticized for being too opinionated, too dogmatic and too naïve in matters involving political, fiscal, military or other considerations. Some have claimed that scientists have been given too much "power"; they should "be on tap but not on top."

Since scientists are human, many of them have exhibited the same frailties for which other human beings are noted. Scientists, as scientists, are not endowed with any greater (nor any less) degree of foresight or wisdom or sense of prophecy than anyone else. Some have not been above, on occasion, plugging their own self-interests at the expense of the general welfare; others have risen to great heights of selfless and patriotic service.

But these statements miss the point of this discussion. The government must have scientific help. The question is whether the government has been—and will be—able to attract into its top

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policy-making and advisory posts *those particular scientists* who are able and willing to take a broad view, who will treat their responsibilities seriously, act and advise objectively after *all* the available facts and views have been examined.

By and large, I think it can be said that we as a nation have been very fortunate in this respect. During the war men like Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, K. T. Compton, Richard C. Tolman, Lyman J. Briggs, Roger Adams and others proved to be scientific statesmen of the very highest order. Since the war an equally impressive list can be cited: Robert F. Bacher, Detlev Bronk, Enrico Fermi, James R. Killian, Jr., G. B. Kistiakowsky, C. C. Lauritsen, I. I. Rabi, H. P. Robertson, Glenn T. Seaborg, Alan Waterman, J. B. Wiesner, Herbert F. York, J. R. Zacharias —to name only a few with whose work I happen to be personally familiar. These men have all made very great—and usually quite unpublicized—contributions to the task of helping our government enter the age of science in an intelligent and effective manner. They, along with a host of others, have given sacrificially of their time and energy to carrying on in a responsible way the tasks connected with offices which they themselves did not seek.

There also, of course, have been those who have been less than fully responsible and objective in their utterances and writings. But, for the most part, it will be found they were not at the time in responsible government posts. They spoke as individuals or through private groups. They had every right to do so, of course. And very often such individuals or groups have been well informed, objective and effective. But some were neither fully informed (possibly because of military security rules) nor fully objective. Some of the public doubts about the wisdom displayed by scientists in public affairs probably arise from the wide publicity given to statements from such unofficial sources. In contrast, the advice given by the official groups is usually not publicized at all. Scientists occupying official positions have usually been reluctant to make public statements on matters connected with their responsibilities except when their views or actions were released through appropriate channels.

Because of this situation, one should not underestimate the enormous importance of the public discussions which have been carried on by private individuals and by non-government groups. When official bodies are not fully free to publicize their views and their findings, it is doubly important that non-government

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groups, free of such restrictions, should take the lead in the necessary public education and free discussion of many national problems involving scientific and technological matters. There have been a host of statements from the public platform, articles in professional journals, in the public press, and in publications such as the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* which have contributed greatly to informing the public on various public issues, some of which were highly controversial and resulted in vigorous and often bitter debates. In a democracy such free discussion is absolutely essential and, in the long run, contributes greatly to the formation of public opinion and to the formulation of national policy. As in all public discussions, not all of the views expressed will have equal degrees of validity or objectivity.

It is fruitless to argue which groups or individuals have been "right" or adequately farsighted in their views. As has already been pointed out, the knowledge of science and the status of engineering developments change rapidly and often in unexpected directions. What is a "right" course of action today may be "wrong" tomorrow. And many considerations other than technical ones must frequently intervene and even be decisive. These factors, too, may change from time to time. Note, for example, that no political leaders were much interested in space exploration in 1956, though a number of scientists certainly were. The recent cancellation of the Skybolt project is another example of a decision forced by changes in the technical, military, fiscal or international situation—the full story of which may not be revealed for some time.

Any attempt to keep score on the number of right and wrong recommendations of scientific groups, however, is again beside the point. First, the vast majority of the recommendations of various official scientific groups were private and were given due consideration by the responsible agencies in making final decisions. Some of the recommendations were made public only long after the original report had been made, and often after either the technical or the political situation had changed. The question is not whether all recommendations were "right," or were free from criticism or controversy, but whether they were based upon the best scientific thinking of the time, whether they were made by earnest, able individuals, and whether in the long run such advice and recommendations have been in the best interests of the country.

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On these points there can surely be no dispute. The best scientists of the country have been involved; they have, for the most part, attempted desperately to evaluate all of the factors present in each situation, and have presented their findings clearly and objectively. One who has had full access to the record cannot help but be proud of the way in which the nation's best scientists, when brought into responsible posts in public affairs, have carried out their tasks conscientiously, selflessly, intelligently—and often with great brilliance and breadth of vision. We can be confident that we shall continue to find in the scientific community men who can and will contribute high talent and great wisdom to national affairs. This is fortunate, for such men will be sorely needed.

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The author, Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, grapples with the classic problem of managing power in international relations. At the end of the book he is still grappling, but he has dealt usefully with a number of questions—balance of power, collective security and world government.

POLITICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By HANS J. MORGENTHAU. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, 3 v. $25.00.

This three-volume work comprises essays by Professor Morgenthau on a variety of themes over the last 25 years. The general range of topics is suggested by the titles of the individual volumes: "The Decline of Democratic Politics," "The Impasse of American Foreign Policy" and "The Restoration of American Politics."

TOWARD AN ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. By CHRISTIAN A. HERTER. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1963, 107 p. $2.95.

The former Secretary of State, now the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, pleads the cause of Atlantic solidarity through the greater unity of Western Europe and a partnership between Europe and the United States. He draws on his long and close involvement in Atlantic affairs as Congressman, Governor, and Secretary of State, and as a private citizen, to describe both past accomplishments and tasks for the future.

THE MAN ON HORSEBACK: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS. By S. E. FINER. New York: Praeger, 1962, 268 p. $6.50.

A wide-ranging and reflective essay on the persistent if intermittent role of the military in intervening in the domestic politics of a country. A quite fruitful survey of the theme.

FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING. EDITED BY RICHARD C. SNYDER AND OTHERS. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, 274 p. $5.00.

This work includes the authors' earlier study (1954) together with some supplementary materials in criticism or application of this approach to international politics.

THE RULERS. By RENZO SERENO. New York: Praeger, 1962, 186 p. $6.75.

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SERVANT OF PEACE: A SELECTION OF THE SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS OF DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE

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UNITED NATIONS, 1953–1961. Edited by Wilder Foote. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 388 p. $6.00.

A selection of the speeches and statements of the late Secretary-General.

L'ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE. By Claude Delmas. Paris: Payot, 1962, 278 p. Fr. 20.

This essay on "political phenomenology" by a member of the NATO Secretariat tries to view the Atlantic Alliance in a new perspective and to avoid seeing it as an "epiphenomenon of Soviet policy."

OUR TIMES. By Stephen King-Hall. New York: Horizon Press, 1962, 352 p. $5.00.

The central theme of this bird's-eye survey of the twentieth century is the eclipse of the Pax Britannica.

WISSENSCHAFTLICHE POLITIK: EINE EINFÜHRUNG IN GRUNDFRAGEN IHRER TRADITION UND THEORIE. Edited by Dieter Oberndörfer. Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1962, 428 p. DM. 45.

A mélange of essays on political theory including several pieces on contemporary thinkers.

DEUTSCHLAND UND JAPAN ZWISCHEN DEN MÄCHTEN 1935–1940. By Theo Sommer. Tübingen: Mohr, 1962, 540 p. DM. 52.

This substantial contribution to the diplomatic history of the 1930s focuses on German-Japanese relations from the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1935 to the Three Power Pact of 1940.

THE AMERICAN LIBERALS AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. By Christopher Lasch. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 290 p. $6.50.

A study of the response of American liberals to the advent of the Russian Revolution and of the reasons for their optimistic misreading of what had happened.

GREAT BRITAIN AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR. By Harry Hanak. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, 312 p. $6.75.

A study of the formation of British views and opinions about the Dual Monarchy and its nationalities in the course of World War I.

AN AMBASSADOR SPEAKS. By M. C. Chagla. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962, 152 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $5.75.)

A collection of Mr. Chagla's speeches during his term as Indian Ambassador to the United States—treating Indian affairs, U.S.-Indian relations and world issues.

THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS. By Myres S. McDougal and William T. Burke. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, 1,226 p. $15.00.

This substantial work in international law is a "survey of the process of decision by which the general world community allocates access to, and authority over, the oceans during times of relative peace."

THE AGE OF OVERKILL: A PREFACE TO WORLD POLITICS. By Max Lerner. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962, 329 p. $5.95.

This essay on world politics is an effort to identify and define the major forces in our age of a superabundance of power. While it is a vast topic, and Mr. Lerner's treatment is not uniformly successful, he does discuss with sobriety and concern some very important questions.

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POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD, 1963. EDITED BY WALTER H. MALLORY. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1963, 294 p. $6.50. (Paper, $2.95.)

Brought up to date as of January 1, 1963, this standard annual reference work gives the composition of governments; sums up party programs and lists their leaders; lists newspapers, indicating their political affiliations and editors; and includes facts on the United Nations and associated international agencies. Now includes a 32-page supplement of political maps.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

DETERRENCE, ARMS CONTROL, AND DISARMAMENT. BY J. DAVID SINGER. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962, 279 p. $5.50.

The author undertakes the important, but exceedingly difficult task of trying to bring the considerations of deterrence, arms control and disarmament within a single, rational frame to promote our national security.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY. BY JOSEPH L. NOGEE. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961, 306 p. $6.50.

A serious effort to ferret out Soviet motives through an examination of the negotiations on nuclear weapons in the last 17 years. A valuable study.

THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BY LEONARD BEATON AND JOHN MADDOX. New York: Praeger, 1962, 216 p. $4.50.

This study, prepared for the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, estimates the extent to which nuclear weapons are spreading and are likely to spread. A helpful contribution to the "Nth power" problem, a term the authors dislike.

KILL AND OVERKILL. BY RALPH E. LAPP. New York: Basic Books, 1962, 197 p. $4.95.

A nuclear physicist discusses, in a "primer for everyman," the nature and implications of thermonuclear warfare and offers his proposals to check the arms race.

THE SPACE RACE. BY DONALD W. COX. Philadelphia: Chilton, 1962, 393 p. $6.95.

The author feels we are running badly behind the U.S.S.R. in the "space race" and he proposes a long-term program for getting out ahead, to the moon and beyond.

MISSILES AND THE REVOLUTION IN WARFARE. BY NELS A. PARSON, JR. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 245 p. $5.75.

A useful survey of the history and characteristics of guided missiles and their impact on military operations; an outgrowth of the author's earlier (1956) "Guided Missiles in War and Peace."

THE CHALLENGES OF SPACE. EDITED BY HUGH ODISHAW. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, 379 p. $6.95.

A comprehensive symposium—in parts quite technical—by some 20 experts, on national space programs, space research and its applications, international coöperation and particular aspects of space technology.

THE HARD WAY TO PEACE. BY AMITAI ETZIONI. New York: Crowell-Collier Press, 1962, 285 p. $3.95. (Paper, 95 cents.)

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The author, a sociologist, alarmed by the dangers of nuclear war, proposes a series of measures that might, if the Soviets respond properly, gradually reduce tensions and permit arms reduction.

ARMS AND ARMS CONTROL. Edited by Ernest W. Lefever. New York: Praeger (for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research), 1962, 334 p. $6.75. (Paper, $1.95.)

A quite comprehensive selection of readings from recent literature on the subject.

DISARMAMENT: ITS POLITICS AND ECONOMICS. Edited by Seymour Melman. Boston: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1962, 398 p.

A symposium of papers on various disarmament topics.

THE PRICE OF GLORY: VERDUN 1916. By Alistair Horne. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963, 371 p. $5.95.

An excellent account of the battle of Verdun, which gained the "unenviable reputation of being the battlefield with the highest density of dead per square yard that has probably ever been known."

1918: THE LAST ACT. By Barrie Pitt. New York: Norton, 1963, 318 p. $5.95.

A good account of military operations in the last year of the First World War.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER. By Philip Mullenbach. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963, 406 p. $8.50.

This is a well-informed and serious study of the multitude of economic issues and questions of policy formation that have been involved in the somewhat slow, but potentially most promising, reactor power development. At the end the author puts forward his recommendations for an active public policy in this area.

THE GREAT ASCENT: THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN OUR TIME. By Robert L. Heilbroner. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 189 p. $4.00.

The author tackles some of the formidable objective and subjective programs involved in the effort of underdeveloped nations to achieve self-sustaining economic development. He is less optimistic than many.

PROFIT POTENTIAL IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By Robert Theobald. New York: American Management Association, 1962, 299 p. $12.00.

A reference work of information about some 75 countries, designed to be useful to a corporation considering investment abroad or establishing a company branch.

U.S. PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT ABROAD. Edited by Raymond F. Mikesell. Eugene: University of Oregon Books, 1962, 599 p. $10.00.

This book is an extensive collaborative investigation of U.S. foreign investment, both public and private. A useful source of information on the subject.

FOREIGN TRADE AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. By Charles P. Kindleberger. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, 265 p. $6.00.

A comparative but analytical study of the impact of foreign trade on national economic life.

KRIZIS MIROVOVO KAPITALIZMA NA SOVREMENNOM ETAPE. By

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A. A. ARZUMANYAN. Moscow: Akademia Nauk SSSR, Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii, 1962, 145 p. 64 k.

A brief Soviet exposé of the crisis and inevitable decline of the capitalist-imperialist world.

CULTURAL AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS. EDITED BY ROBERT BLUM. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1963, 184 p. $3.95.

A group of essays, prepared for the American Assembly, Columbia University, dealing with various facets of international cultural relations, education and science.

The Second World War

THE IRONSIDE DIARIES, 1937–1940. EDITED BY COLONEL RODERICK MACLEOD AND DENIS KELLY. London: Constable, 1962, 434 p. 35/.

These are posthumously published extracts, for the period 1937–1940, from the diary of the late Field Marshal Lord Ironside, who was Chief of the Imperial General Staff for the first nine months of World War II. The temper of the time is well reflected in an observation of January 5, 1940: "What a curious thing it is that we have no more strategic ideas than building up an enormous army in France, protecting England, and waiting to see what the Germans are going to do."

KRIEGSTAGEBUCH. BAND I: VOM POLENFELDZUG BIS ZUM ENDE DER WESTOFFENSIVE (14.8.1939–30.6.1940). BY GENERALOBERST HALDER. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1962, 391 p. DM. 56.

This first of three volumes of General Halder's important war diary covers the period from the Polish campaign to the end of the victorious campaign in the West in 1940.

THE UNINVITED ENVOY. BY JAMES LEASOR. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962, 249 p. $5.95.

A somewhat over-dramatized account of Rudolph Hess's odd airplane flight to Scotland in May 1941.

SOLDIERS AND POLITICIANS. BY LT.-GEN. MAURICE A. POPE. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962, 462 p. $7.50.

The bulk of these memoirs by a Canadian officer deals with the wartime and postwar years when he served as Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in Washington, Chief of the Canadian Military Mission to Berlin and Ambassador to Belgium and Spain.

DER FELDZUG GEGEN SOWJETRUSSLAND 1941 BIS 1945. BY ALFRED PHILIPPI AND FERDINAND HEIM. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1962, 293 p. DM. 24.

Two authors collaborate in this study of the planning and execution of the German military campaigns in the U.S.S.R.

I WAS CICERO. BY ELYESA BAZNA IN COLLABORATION WITH HANS NOGLY. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 212 p. $3.95.

An engaging story of espionage and rascality by the man who lifted documents from the British Ambassador in Turkey and sold them to the Nazis. The general lines of the story are familiar from "Operation Cicero," by L. C. Moyzisch (1951).

HITLERS WEISUNGEN FÜR DIE KRIEGFÜHRUNG 1939–1945. EDITED BY WALTHER HUBATSCH. Frankfurt/Main: Bernard und Graefe, 1962, 330 p. DM. 39.

A collection of directives and orders from the military high command.

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LA GUERRE DES BLINDÉS. By Major Eddy Bauer. Paris: Payot, 1962, 2 v. Fr. 50.

An elaborate history of armored warfare in the Second World War by a former Swiss officer.

The United States

THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY. By James MacGregor Burns. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1963, 388 p. $5.95.

In this stimulating study of American politics, Professor Burns develops the idea that we actually have a four-party political system—largely independent Congressional and Presidential wings of both the Republican and Democratic Parties, and that many of our political impasses and falterings relate to the complex workings of such a structure.

THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: A HISTORY. By Richard W. Leopold. New York: Knopf, 1962, 848 p. $11.75.

A first-rate general history of American foreign policy, from the foundation of the Republic, but with greatest emphasis on the years since 1889 and particularly since 1939.

THE REPUBLICAN OPPORTUNITY. By Raymond Moley. New York: Duell, 1962, 272 p. $4.95.

As the title indicates, Mr. Moley believes the Republican Party has a necessary and potentially rewarding role to play in our national life, in seeking more decentralization of power and decision and the lessening of governmental intervention.

THE EXTREMISTS. By Mark Sherwin. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963, 242 p. $5.00.

The late News Editor of the New York *Post* surveys the American political Right and especially the more extreme and frantic manifestations.

THE POLITICS OF HOPE. By Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Boston: Houghton, 1963, 298 p. $5.00.

A selection of Mr. Schlesinger's essays on American history, politics and personalities, written in the decade before he went to Washington to be President Kennedy's Special Assistant.

PERSONNEL FOR THE NEW DIPLOMACY. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962, 161 p. $2.95. (Paper, $1.45.)

This is a report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, constituted at the request of Secretary of State Rusk. It covers the personnel problems and needs of the Department of State, A.I.D. and U.S.I.A., and offers a number of recommendations for meeting the increasing demands on our foreign service.

TOWARDS AN AMERICAN ARMY. By Russell F. Weigley. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 297 p. $7.50.

A history of military thought and dispute connected with the growth of the U.S. Army from its origins to the Second World War.

MARCH TO CALUMNY. By Albert D. Biderman. New York: Macmillan, 1962, 326 p. $5.95.

Protesting strongly against the widely accepted impression that American P.O.W.s behaved poorly in the Korean War and collaborated wholesale, the author works to

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set the record straight. His particular target is Eugene Kinkead's book, "In Every War But One" (noted here October 1959).

FREEDOM AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Thomas J. Dodd. New York: Bookmailer, 1962, 321 p. $5.50.

A selection of recent speeches, chiefly on foreign affairs, by the Senator from Connecticut.

THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ALTERNATIVES BEFORE US. By Edward F. Denison. New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1962, 297 p. $4.00.

An effort to measure the various sources of economic growth in the United States in the last 50 years and to make an estimate for the future. Not for the casual reader.

TRENDS IN NATURAL RESOURCE COMMODITIES. By Neal Potter and Francis T. Christy, Jr. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for Resources for the Future), 1962, 568 p. $17.50.

A comprehensive statistical compilation for the period 1870–1957 in the United States and covering, by commodity, prices, output, consumption, foreign trade and employment.

THE ECONOMICS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES. By Seymour E. Harris. New York: Macmillan, 1962, 382 p. $7.00.

Professor Harris, who is quite frank about his sympathies for the Democratic Party, here deals with the economics of the two major U.S. parties, and especially of the two leaders, Eisenhower and Kennedy.

IN BRIEF AUTHORITY. By Francis Biddle. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 494 p. $5.95.

In this volume of his memoirs—a sequel to "A Casual Past"—Mr. Biddle writes of his years in the Roosevelt Administration as Chairman of the N.L.R.B., circuit judge, Solicitor General, Attorney General, and, later, judge at the Nuremberg trials. A thoughtful contribution to our picture of the New Deal and war years.

YANKEE FROM THE WEST. By Burton K. Wheeler with Paul F. Healy. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 436 p. $5.95.

The lively memoirs of the long-time Senator from Montana.

ROOSEVELT AND HOWE. By Alfred B. Rollins, Jr. New York: Knopf, 1962, 479 p. $5.95.

A fine biography of Louis Howe and his long and politically very important relationship with Franklin Roosevelt extending from 1911 to Howe's death in 1936.

PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1946. Washington: G.P.O., 1962, 581 p. $6.00.

The latest in a series of volumes of Presidential papers.

THE WINDS OF FREEDOM. By Dean Rusk. Boston: Beacon Press, 1963, 363 p. $4.95. (Paper, $2.45.)

A selection of the speeches and statements of the Secretary of State from January 1961 to August 1962.

FORRESTAL AND THE NAVY. By Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Robert Howe Connery. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 359 p. $6.95.

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A scholarly account of Forrestal's activities during the years he served in the Navy Department.

AN AFFAIR OF HONOR. By Robert E. Quirk. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press (for the Mississippi Valley Historical Association), 1962, 184 p. $5.00.

A study of Woodrow Wilson and the U.S. military occupation of Veracruz, Mexico, in 1914.

EUGENE V. DEBS: SOCIALIST FOR PRESIDENT. By H. Wayne Morgan. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962, 257 p. $5.75.

This is chiefly a survey of the successes and failures of the socialists in American national politics between 1900 and 1925.

MR. WILSON'S WAR. By John Dos Passos. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 517 p. $6.95.

This volume in the Mainstream of America Series is a lively, episodic and somewhat impressionistic narrative of American life and politics from the assassination of McKinley to Wilson's defeat on the League of Nations issue. For the general reader.

A TRAGEDY OF HISTORY. By Bert Andrews and Peter Andrews. Washington: Robert B. Luce, 1962, 235 p. $4.75.

A posthumously published account of the Hiss case, by the then Washington bureau chief of the New York *Herald Tribune*. Interesting but no revelations.

DENIAL OF EMPIRE. By Whitney T. Perkins. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1962, 381 p. Gldrs. 35.

A study of the American experience with governing dependencies—Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Philippines and the Pacific Islands.

THE FUTURE OF ALASKA. By George W. Rogers. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for Resources for the Future), 1962, 311 p. $6.50.

A study of Alaska's economic potential and problems as a state in the Union.

Western Europe

HISTOIRE DES NATIONS EUROPÉENNES. By Maxime Mourin. Paris: Payot, 1962, 3 v. Fr. 69.

An extensive but modestly conceived history of the European nations since 1918. The work is limited to political, diplomatic, economic and social developments and aims chiefly at providing a factual and impartial review of the events of this period.

FONCTIONNEMENT ET PERSPECTIVES DE LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER. By Nicolas Morard. Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1962, 233 p. Swiss Fr. 20.

A summary of the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community, its operation, and the prospects for the future of this effort at partial integration.

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. By Gerhard Bebr. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1962, 268 p. $10.00.

A systematic analysis of the structure and functions of the Court of Justice vis-à-vis the institutions of the European Communities.

THE PATH TO EUROPEAN UNION. By Hans A. Schmitt. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962, 272 p. $6.00.

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A history and interpretation of the progress toward Western European Union, which the author sees as a fusion of both conservative and revolutionary elements.

BANKING IN WESTERN EUROPE. Edited by R. S. Sayers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, 403 p. $6.75.

An account of the banking institutions and systems in France, West Germany, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Spain and Portugal.

LABOR LEADERSHIP IN ITALY AND DENMARK. By Joseph A. Raffaele. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962, 436 p. $10.00.

A comparative study of labor relations, selecting two quite dissimilar European countries as areas for inquiry.

IN SEARCH OF FRANCE. By Stanley Hoffmann and Others. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 443 p. $8.95.

A group of French and American scholars have collaborated closely to create this solid symposium on recent changes in France covering such themes as the economic resurgence, social change and continuity, foreign policy and the national character.

PROMOTION AND CONTROL OF INDUSTRY IN POSTWAR FRANCE. By John Sheahan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, 301 p. $5.95.

A close analysis of the remarkable French economic performance in the decade 1950–1960 and the bearing on this of the new promotion and control techniques that have been applied by the government and privately.

LES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES. By Jean Baillou and Pierre Pelletier. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1962, 378 p. Fr. 18.

As the preface observes, the Quai d'Orsay is "plus discuté que connu." In this informative book the authors describe the administration of foreign affairs in France and the organization of French diplomacy.

THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC: MILITARY REVOLT IN FRANCE. By James H. Meisel. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962, 309 p. $5.95.

This work, by a student of political power and its overthrow, is an examination of the army's role in bringing about the fall of the Fourth French Republic, and of some of the rather far-reaching implications of this form of political action.

LA VIE POLITIQUE D'ÉDOUARD HERRIOT. By Michel Soulié. Paris: Colin, 1962, 626 p. Fr. 32.50.

A solid and well-documented biography of a leading political figure of the Third Republic in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

ACTION FRANÇAISE. By Eugen Weber. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, 594 p. $10.00.

A full-scale treatment of the principal royalist and nationalist current of twentieth-century France. A somewhat paradoxical and self-contradictory movement: "Responsible in great part for the moral rearmament of France before 1914, its campaigns seem to bear an equal responsibility for France's being caught morally disarmed by the Second World War."

DARE CALL IT TREASON. By Richard M. Watt. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963, 344 p. $5.95.

A highly interesting investigation of the 1917 mutinies in the French Army, their immediate cause, their earlier roots in the structure of the French military and po-

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litical system, and the reconstruction of order and morale by Pétain and Clemenceau.

A HISTORY OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC. By Erich Eyck. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, 373 p. $10.00.

This welcome translation of the first volume of a notable history of the Weimar Republic carries the narrative as far as President Ebert's death and Hindenburg's election.

THE NUREMBERG TRIAL. By Joe J. Heydecker and Johannes Leeb. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1962, 398 p. $6.00.

A history of the Third Reich as reflected in the evidence of the Nuremberg trial. The picture is largely familiar by now.

ZUR VORGESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN MARK. By Hans Möller. Basel: Kyklos-Verlag; Tübingen: Mohr, 1961, 534 p. DM. 34.

A documentary history of German currency reform plans in 1945–48.

HEYDRICH: HITLER'S MOST EVIL HENCHMAN. By Charles Wighton. Philadelphia: Chilton, 1962, 288 p. $5.50.

A substantial account, by a British correspondent, of a central Nazi figure whose murderous career was cut short by assassination in 1942.

SAARPOLITIK 1945–1957. By Robert H. Schmidt. Berlin: Duncker, 1962, 899 p. DM. 86.

The third volume of this monumental work on the Saar since World War II (Volumes I and II noted here July 1960 and July 1961) deals with events from the collapse of the E.D.C. in 1954 to the reunification of the Saar with West Germany in 1957.

AUSTRIAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM BEFORE 1918. By Andrew Gladding Whiteside. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962, 143 p. Gldrs. 11.75.

A monograph dealing with "the emergence of a National Socialist party from the German nationalist labor movement in the multi-national Austrian empire."

STRUKTURWANDLUNGEN DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT. Edited by R. F. Behrendt and Others. Berne: Stämpfli, 1962, 618 p. Swiss Fr. 49.

This *Festschrift* for Fritz Marbach comprises numerous monographs on a variety of features of the Swiss economy and society.

THE BRUTAL FRIENDSHIP. By F. W. Deakin. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 896 p. $10.95.

In this massive, skillful, scholarly and well-documented work the Warden of St. Antony's College, Oxford, has explored the collapse of Italian Fascism under the military disasters encountered from 1942 and in the setting of the "brutal friendship" (the phrase is Hitler's) with Nazi Germany. An authoritative and valuable contribution to the history of Italy and of the Second World War.

ITALY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Vera Lutz. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1962, 342 p. $7.20.

A British economist examines some of the special features and problems of the Italian economy and then pursues certain specific topics in the north-south split, the structure of agriculture, wages and labor costs.

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SPANISH FURY: THE STORY OF A CIVIL WAR. By James Cleugh. London: Harrap, 1962, 286 p. 21/.

While this work is not as impressive as the recent study of the Spanish Civil War by Hugh Thomas, it is, nevertheless, a good, pro-Nationalist history of that bitter struggle, by an author who knows the country well and sympathetically.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES-IV: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF THE 22ND CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by Charlotte Saikowski and Leo Gruliow. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 248 p. $8.50.

A useful translation from the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* of material from a highly important Party Congress.

RUSSIAN PANORAMA. By K. P. S. Menon. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, 278 p. $4.00.

An account, pleasant but largely non-political, of his extensive travels through the Soviet Union, by the Indian Ambassador from 1952 to 1961.

REUNION IN MOSCOW. By Markoosha Fischer. New York: Harper and Row, 1962, 240 p. $5.00.

The Russian-born wife of Louis Fischer writes sensitively and feelingly of a visit to Moscow after a lapse of more than 20 years.

SOVIET AFFAIRS, NUMBER THREE. Edited by David Footman. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1962, 142 p. $3.75.

These St. Antony's Papers comprise, in addition to papers on pre-revolutionary and revolutionary themes, studies on the Red Army and Urban Youth Employment.

DEATH IN THE FOREST. By J. K. Zawodny. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962, 235 p. $6.50.

An excellent study of the responsibility for the wartime murder, in the Katyn Forest, of several thousand Polish officers. The evidence seems clear that it was a Soviet act.

IM VORZIMMER DER DIKTATUR: 12 JAHRE PANKOW. By Fritz Schenk. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1962, 412 p. DM. 16.80.

An inside view of the East German régime by a man who, before his flight to the West, worked in the economic planning office.

ON THE TIGER'S BACK. By Aderogba Ajao. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1962, 149 p. $3.50.

The story of the disillusionment of a young Nigerian who spent the years 1952–58 in a Communist training school in East Germany.

SURPLUS LABOR IN GREEK AGRICULTURE 1953–1960. By Adam A. Pepelasis and Pan A. Yotopoulos. Athens: Center of Economic Research, 1962, 187 p.

An effort to measure chronic and intermittent labor surpluses in Greek agriculture and to indicate their implications for the development of the Greek economy. The authors see a quite serious economic and social problem emerging.

COMECON: DER GEMEINSAME MARKT IN OSTEUROPA. By Emil Hoffmann. Opladen: Leske, 1961, 174 p. DM. 39.

A useful study of the progress of economic integration in the Soviet bloc.

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The British Commonwealth of Nations

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY. By F. S. Northedge. New York: Praeger, 1963, 341 p. $6.50.

This volume in the Minerva Series of Students Handbooks offers a very able and well-balanced account of British foreign policy from the end of World War I to the beginning of the 1961 negotiations on Britain's entry into the European Economic Community.

GREAT BRITAIN SINCE 1688: A MODERN HISTORY. By K. B. Smellie. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962, 462 p. $7.50.

An able general history of Great Britain since the Glorious Revolution. About a third of the volume is devoted to the twentieth century.

ANATOMY OF BRITAIN. By Anthony Sampson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962, 662 p. $6.95.

An amiable, very readable, but ultimately quite damning guide to Britain's ruling Establishment, from the aristocracy to the B.B.C.

BRITISH ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1688–1959. By Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962, 348 p. $11.50.

An effort that should be of interest both to the historian and the economist to "establish the main quantitative features of the British economy over as long a period as the available statistics would permit." The authors are acutely aware of the difficulties and pitfalls of such an endeavor.

JOHN ANDERSON, VISCOUNT WAVERLEY. By John W. Wheeler-Bennett. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963, 430 p. $10.00.

The author, who has written a number of notable works in contemporary diplomatic history and biography, here considers the life of a man whom he considers "the greatest public servant of his day." Viscount Waverley served long in the Colonial Office, and was in the cabinets of both Chamberlain and Churchill, as Home Secretary, Lord President of the Council and Chancellor of the Exchequer.

THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM. By Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, 163 p. $4.00.

A study of the continuing tension and controversy between the Protestant and Catholic communities of Northern Ireland. The two authors, Quakers, hope to cool tempers a bit.

CABINET GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA. By S. Encel. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962, 367 p. $11.50.

A thorough study of Australian cabinet government, its relation to the party system, its makeup and procedures.

The Middle East

ARABIC THOUGHT IN THE LIBERAL AGE, 1798–1939. By Albert Hourani. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1962, 403 p. $6.75.

This valuable history is, in the author's words, "a study of that stream of political and social thought which began when, in the first half of the nineteenth century,

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educated men in the Arabic-speaking countries became aware of the ideas and institutions of modern Europe, and, in the second, started to feel its power."

THREE DAYS. By Zeev Sharef. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962, 298 p. $4.95.
An account of the last three days of the British Mandate, May 12–14, 1948. The author was a member of the Haganah.

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A study of business leadership in the developing economy of Lebanon.

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Although there has been no dearth of books on Middle Eastern oil, this work by two professional economists has the merit of dealing directly and knowledgeably with the problems of the industry itself, chiefly in the Persian Gulf area: investment, prices and receipts, costs and outlays, and returns on investment. Concluding chapters discuss government receipts and the contribution of the industry to the local economies.

THE PERSIAN GULF IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By John Marlowe. New York: Praeger, 1962, 280 p. $7.50.
A general account of the development and vicissitudes of the oil-rich area since the beginning of the century.

MIDDLE EAST RECORD. VOLUME ONE, 1960. Elmont (N.Y.): Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press; Tel Aviv: Israel Oriental Society, Reuven Shiloah Research Center, 1962, 582 p. $12.50.
This is the first volume in an annual series prepared by the Israel Oriental Society, treating of politics and international relations. The volume reviews international developments, intra-area relations and domestic affairs in Cyprus, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, Sudan, Turkey and the United Arab Republic.

South and Southeast Asia

ASIA IN THE EUROPEAN AGE, 1498–1955. By Michael Edwardes. New York: Praeger, 1962, 351 p. $8.50.
A general history of European expansion into Asia and the subsequent ebb of empire in the twentieth century.

SEATO: SIX STUDIES. Edited by George Modelski. Melbourne: Cheshire (for the Australian National University), 1962, 302 p. 75/.
These studies in an Australian symposium deal with the function and organization of SEATO, Australia's relation to the organization, the participation of the Asian states, and the problems of Communist China and neutralism.

THE EVOLUTION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN, 1858 TO 1947. By C. H. Philips and Others. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, 786 p. $14.40.
A useful collection of documentary source materials relating to the development of the peoples of India and Pakistan in the last century of British rule.

KRISHNA MENON. By Emil Lengyel. New York: Walker, 1962, 253 p. $5.00.
A popular but not very revealing or scholarly biography of India's most controversial public figure. The volume went to press before the recent Chinese-Indian clash affected Mr. Menon's fortunes.

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THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY. By Myron Weiner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, 251 p. $5.00.

This quite important and original work investigates the effects on political processes of operating in a setting of economic scarcity. India is used as a case study.

ECONOMIC CHANGE IN RURAL INDIA. By Walter C. Neale. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, 333 p. $7.50.

This scholarly study in agrarian history traces the story of land tenure and the market for land in Uttar Pradesh from the British conquest to the present. Among his conclusions: "Land reform does not make new men of peasants. New men make land reform."

QUIET CRISIS IN INDIA. By John P. Lewis. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1962, 350 p. $5.75.

A study dealing with the problems of India's economic development, our stake in its success, and what the role of American aid might be.

AFTER NEHRU, WHO? By Welles Hangen. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963, 303 p. $6.95.

Portraits of eight Indian leaders who give promise of holding a leading position after Nehru's departure from the political scene.

BRITAIN AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA. By Saul Rose. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, 208 p. $5.00.

This volume in the series, Britain in the World Today, deals with Britain's role in recent years—the collapse under the Japanese invasion and postwar developments in Burma, Malaya, Singapore and Borneo. In the author's view a "program of progressive withdrawal" seems still to be the best course.

POLITICS IN THAILAND. By David A. Wilson. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (for the Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University), 1962, 307 p. $5.75.

A study of the structure of politics and political relations in Thailand. The author had the advantage of spending four years in the country in the 1950s.

THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA. By Herbert Feith. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (for the Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University), 1962, 618 p. $8.75.

As the title indicates this is the story of the defeat and eventual abandonment of the effort to create a constitutional democracy over the years between 1949 and the inauguration of "guided democracy" in the spring of 1957. A serious and informative narrative and analysis.

SOCIAL CHANGES IN JOGJAKARTA. By Selosoemardjan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (for the Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University), 1962, 440 p. $6.75.

A valuable study by an Indonesian scholar of social and economic change in the Sultanate of Jogjakarta from the last years of Dutch rule down to 1958.

THE PHILIPPINES: A YOUNG REPUBLIC ON THE MOVE. By Albert Ravenholt. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962, 204 p. $4.25.

The author, who has had much experience in Southeast Asia, here gives a brief introduction to the Philippine Republic, its background and prospects.

FAITH IN THE FILIPINO: THE RIPENING REVOLUTION. By Raul S. Manglapus. Manila: Regal Publishing Co., 1962, 204 p.

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A collection of speeches and papers since 1959 by the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RIVER: RED CHINA TODAY. By Edgar Snow. New York: Random House, 1962, 810 p. $10.00.

The author of the influential report on the Chinese Communists in the 1930s, "Red Star over China," here reports on a return visit after a quarter century. The author enjoyed unusual access to places and people, and his report on the contemporary scene has much of interest. The organization is rather chaotic, however, and Mr. Snow, while occasionally critical, feels obliged to defend the Mao régime against all assailants.

THE WILTING OF THE HUNDRED FLOWERS: THE CHINESE INTELLIGENTSIA UNDER MAO. By Mu Fu-sheng. New York: Praeger, 1963, 324 p. $7.50.

The author, a Western-trained Chinese intellectual who spent a year in Communist China in the late 1950s, discusses the plight of intellectuals under the present régime. The book is written calmly and is mercifully free of exhortations.

PEASANT NATIONALISM AND COMMUNIST POWER. By Chalmers A. Johnson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, 256 p. $5.75.

This study deals centrally with the Chinese Communists during the Yenan period and the organization of the peasantry against the Japanese. Touching also on peasant mobilization in wartime Jugoslavia, the author draws some interesting, if debatable, conclusions about the effect of such national mobilizations upon the success and character of Communism.

DATELINE—PEKING. By Frederick Nossal. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963, 224 p. $5.75.

The author, a journalist who has worked on Australian and Canadian newspapers, reports on an eight-month tour of duty in Communist China in 1959–1960 for the Toronto *Globe and Mail.*

ESCAPE FROM RED CHINA. By Robert Loh as told to Humphrey Evans. New York: Coward-McCann, 1962, 378 p. $5.75.

An illuminating eyewitness account of life in Communist China, by a Chinese intellectual who spent eight years working for the new régime and then fled in 1957.

MAO TSE-TUNG ON GUERRILLA WARFARE. Translated and with an Introduction by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (Ret.). New York: Praeger, 1961, 114 p. $4.50.

General Griffith has written a useful essay introducing his earlier (1940) translation of "Yu Chi Chan," which Mao wrote during the war with Japan. It was General Griffith who first drew the public's attention to Mao's important writing on guerrilla warfare.

Africa

AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS. By Vernon McKay. New York: Harper and Row, 1963, 468 p. $6.75.

A good study of Africa's proliferating relations with the outside world—in the

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U.N., through various "pan" movements, with the Soviet Union and with the United States. The author, formerly with the State Department, is now Professor of African Studies at Johns Hopkins.

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A documentary history comprising administrative pieces, printed and oral testimony.

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A set of essays dealing with social and economic problems in Algeria, Franco-Algerian economic coöperation and the Sahara.

MODERN LIBYA. By Majid Khadduri. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963, 404 p. $7.50.

A discussion of Libya's political development since liberation, by the Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Johns Hopkins.

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A useful reference containing more than 800 brief biographical sketches.

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A translation of Lumumba's "Le Congo, Terre d'Avenir, est-il Menacé?" (noted here October 1962), a statement of Congolese aspirations and goals as of 1957.

GUILTY LAND: THE HISTORY OF APARTHEID. By Patrick Van Rensburg. New York: Praeger, 1962, 224 p. $4.95.

The author, a South African liberal in exile, describes his conversion from Afrikaner nationalism and attempts to analyze the roots of the bitter racial conflict.

FROM MADAGASCAR TO THE MALAGASY REPUBLIC. By Raymond K. Kent. New York: Praeger, 1962, 182 p. $4.85.

A straightforward introduction to the political, social and economic background of the Malagasy Republic.

Latin America and the West Indies

THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES. Edited by John C. Dreier. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, 146 p. $3.95.

Five lectures, by Milton S. Eisenhower, Raúl Prebisch, José Figueres, Teodoro Moscoso and Dean Rusk, appraising the Alliance for Progress, its background, purposes and prospects.

LATIN AMERICA: THE ELEVENTH HOUR. By Gary MacEoin. New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1962, 224 p. $4.50.

The author argues the not startling case that Latin America is in the midst of revolutionary change and that the United States must respond constructively.

THE UNITED STATES, CUBA, AND CASTRO. By William Appleman Williams. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962, 179 p. $3.25.

Professor Williams, the author of a number of critical appraisals of U.S. diplomacy past and present, here plunges into the Cuba controversy, his chief target being the writings of Theodore Draper.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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

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

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

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Two advanced physics students are producing a solar-powered, transistor audio-oscillator—the "From Sun to Sound" experiment—provided by the Bell System. The experiment requires students to calculate and design as well as construct some of the basic electronic components.

"Just give 'em the facts and get out of the way!"

How the Bell System is helping to develop gifted young scientists and engineers

Tomorrow's top scientists and engineers are hidden in high school classrooms today. The problem is to find them, inspire them. And the Bell System is helping this national effort with a unique series of teaching aids.

One of these units is illustrated here and five more described at the right. They are already being used in thousands of high schools.

Now in its third year, this science program has aided busy teachers and spurred eager students. As one Bell Laboratories man remarked, "Just give 'em the facts and get out of the way!"

The program will continue, with the cooperation of leading educators, as long as it serves a useful purpose. And the Bell System will benefit only as the nation benefits—from better teachers and abler young scientists and engineers.

Three other aids offered to America's schools:

Wave Motion Machine, which illustrates behavior common to sound, light, electricity. Unit also includes film, books, lecture.

Ferromagnetic Domains, a basic approach to the study of magnetism, including books, a motion picture and four demonstration units.

Solar Energy Experiment for advanced students, containing all the materials necessary to turn silicon slabs into working solar cells.

Aids to be offered in Fall, 1963:

The Speech Chain, various classroom materials for physics and biology teachers on the interdisciplinary study of speech and hearing.

Speech Synthesis, for advanced students. Circuitry, electronic components, biology. Completed unit simulates speech sounds.

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A high-speed propeller under test in Vosper's Cavitation Tunnel at Portsmouth, England

This revolution is above the water

When HMS "Brave Borderer" was commissioned in 1960 it meant that a revolutionary form of marine power unit had been accepted. The three Bristol Siddeley lightweight Proteus gas turbines in the Vosper-built vessel had completed three years of intensive trials with the British Navy and passed with flying colours. Now the way was open to build faster, more compact vessels because the Marine Proteus packs more horsepower per cubic foot of space than any other marine engine of equivalent output. It also has the additional advantage of being able to produce full power within two minutes of a cold start over a wide range of climatic conditions.

This Bristol Siddeley marine engine has now been ordered—by the navies of Britain, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Italy and the United States—for a range of vessels from patrol boats to hydrofoils. Bristol Siddeley Engines Limited. Central Office: Mercury House, 195 Knightsbridge, London SW7. Power Division: PO Box 17, Coventry, England. Aero-Engine Division: PO Box 3, Filton, Bristol, England.

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

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ID19: 5 PASSENGER 4 DOOR SEDAN



AMI-6: 4 PASSENGERS



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Men singled out for jobs like that of this instructor have high technical and teaching qualifications. Many have 25 years' experience in the automotive industry. Their classes are small—6 to 8 mechanics at a time. They have added immeasurably to the skills of GM dealer servicemen throughout the country with more than 16,700,000 hours of classroom instruction since the first GM Training Center was established ten years ago. Result—better service for GM car owners.

Thirty General Motors Training Centers across the nation, with 262 classrooms, contribute to the training and development of GM dealer manpower, just as every state in the nation contributes manpower to the entire General Motors team. Indeed, the world over, GM's greatest asset is its *people!*

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Photographed in front of The British Museum, London.

"... simply can't get over running into you in London, Bob— how long have you been here?"

"I just flew in day before yesterday."

"Not really? How did you fly?"

"AIR-INDIA."

"But wait a minute—you said you just got here from New York?"

"That's right."

"And you flew AIR-INDIA from New York to London? Why?"

"Well, you see, I make the trip pretty often—and I really enjoy myself on AIR-INDIA. The atmosphere's so sumptuous and relaxing."

"Oh!—I'll bet it's those beautiful sari-clad hostesses you go for."

"They're great, all right. In fact, the whole crew really puts themselves out for you ... little extra touches of service you don't often find. Terrific food, too."

"You make it sound practically irresistible. They fly jets, I suppose?"

"Nothing *but* jets—Boeing 707's. And just to give you an idea how good their pilots are, AIR-INDIA has one of the best records in the world for punctuality."

"My goodness, you really *are* sold, aren't you?"

"Just giving you the benefit of my experience, that's all. Why don't you fly AIR-INDIA sometime, and see?"

"I'm way ahead of you. Booking my flight back to New York on AIR-INDIA next week!"

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What's going on at Republic Aviation?

Apollo Space Suit life-support studies; a Mach 2/VTOL/variable-geometry aircraft design; fluid-power systems for a supersonic transport; 77 parts for NASA's Saturn; studies for the Synchronous Meteorological Satellite; re-entry capsules for NASA's Project Fire; the F-105D and F-105F (two-place) Mach 2 fighter-bombers; guidance for the Bullpup missile; training simulators and control systems for submarines; studies for the Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory; electronic ground support equipment; the Bikini Photo Drone; the magnetic-induction nuclear gyro . . . and too many other aerospace and hydrospace projects to include.

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And who's doing it?

Eighteen thousand people, including weapon system analysts, mathematicians, oceanographers, nuclear physicists, biochemists, radiobiologists, physicians, metallurgists, microbiologists, plasma physicists, astronomers, astrophysicists, psychologists, physiologists, astrobiologists . . . and chemical, cryogenics, communications, radar, guidance, orbital mechanics, human-factors, propulsion, acoustics, design criteria, reliability, hydraulic, flight dynamics, structural, applied mechanics, nuclear, computer, hydrodynamic, thermodynamic and aerodynamic engineers.
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

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Envelopes are great. Nothing quite like them for doing some pencil reckoning. To get a rough idea of where you've been. Or a quick tally on where you stand. Or even a boxcar figure on where you're going.

But don't count on envelope scribbles when you're making a final decision. When you have to be specific and sure. When rough figures might add up to a breath-taking loss.

That's when you toss away envelopes and pencil stubs, and turn to IBM data processing. An IBM system can handle the necessary variables—do precise figuring—give the hard information you need in time for decision. And action.

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A key figure in Chase Manhattan's financial pioneering from the Far East to the Americas, William Beatty has earned a reputation for being among the first on the frontiers of national development. With this background he has logged a knowledge in depth of Africa's practical trade problems, and acquired a real intimacy with its people and their financial needs.

To businessmen who want to expand to Africa, William Beatty's experience and knowledge can be of great help. So, too, can Chase Manhattan's African branches which locally implement the financial planning provided by William Beatty and his International Department staff.

Certainly it will be well worth your while to talk to the people at Chase Manhattan about your African interests. All you need do is write to International Department, The Chase Manhattan Bank, 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York 15, N. Y., or call LL 2-2222 any time.

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

Who's wiring Africa for sound?

Modern-day Africa demands modern communications equipment. The need is for radio, television, telegraph, and telephone . . . all the methods of instant information and entertainment Americans take for granted. Ghana and the Congo recently installed powerful radio transmitters. Nigerians already own 600,000 radios. The Republic of South Africa expects television by 1965, with an estimated potential of 1,000,000 sets behind it.

For Africa to communicate in modern terms, thousands of items are needed, and they are being supplied. But this demanding market is finding its voice without enough American help. The American businessman lags in developing trade not only for communications equipment in Africa, but for practically every type of equipment in every area. The great bulk of these markets is being gobbled up by other overseas suppliers.

Now is the time to act to participate in this mushrooming market. Our African specialists, with their knowledge of African markets, customs and needs, can help you pinpoint your opportunities with practical, up-to-the-minute information. These specialists are available in Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Washington, Windsor, Ontario, and in our many offices in Africa. Write our Trade Development Department, and ask for *African News Digest,* our monthly summary of African economic news south of Sahara.

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

TATUS SYMBOLS...IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS

It used to be that critical management decisions uld wait until the next executive committee meeting. Today—in business, industry and national defense, the ce of decision-making is tremendously accelerated. Instrumentation, data communications and computers e pressed into service. But the critical moment comes when their signals and codes must be delivered to man beings. At this point, the hardware must say, in the vernacular: "Now look, this is how things stand." / T System companies have developed many sophisticated 'read-out-display' devices to accomplish this. They nge from high-speed printers to slow-scan television. One especially versatile device, driven directly from mputers which may be in remote locations, projects refined data in any desired form—tabulation, text, mbol, map, graph—in a full spectrum of colors for rapid discrimination. Its uses range from command of litary operations to industrial administration, air traffic control and no end of other possible applications. / T is active in developing advanced data-processing, data-communication and display systems on a global ale—handling data traffic between the U.S. State Department and embassies abroad...working as the nerve nter for a worldwide weather service. These are fields of growing importance to the world's largest inter- tional supplier of electronics and telecommunications. / International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. eadquarters: 320 Park Avenue, New York 22, New York.

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Why Some People Don't Buy Harper's

By John Fischer
Editor

Harper's is a singular kind of magazine, with a special flavor. Some people like it—so much, in fact, that they become lifelong addicts. Yet when taken regularly and in moderation it appears to do them little harm.

In honesty, however, it must be admitted that other readers find it hard to stomach. They complain that it is unsettling—even dangerous—and that its contents are too sharp and pungent for general taste.

Harper's has never been produced for the mass market. Its founders designed it 111 years ago for a small, specific clientele. They had no other choice.

A century ago, before the days of universal public education, the so-called educated class was the only group that had the ability, the leisure, and the money to read much of anything. It was, in effect, the governing class of the country—those people in the professions, industry, and public service who largely decided the issues and set the standards of taste for the rest of the population.

Within six months of its founding, the magazine had reached a circulation of 50,000 copies, a remarkable figure for the time. (The editor—a young man named Henry J. Raymond—was encouraged by this success to branch out on his own; he founded The New York Times.)

Harper's was treasured by its subscribers; hundreds of them bound their old copies into leather-covered volumes, and carried them across the plains in covered wagons or around the Horn to the gold camps of California. By the light of whale-oil lamps they were read aloud in innumerable family circles from Maine to Oregon. By the time the Civil War broke, Harper's was firmly established as the leading national monthly—"a mirror," as a later editor put it, "of American life and ideas."

During the succeeding generations, Harper's has, of course, undergone many changes in format, content, and editorial techniques. Yet its chosen audience remains much the same; those people who assay considerably higher than average in discrimination, intellectual curiosity, and concern for the national well-being. As a result, it has developed certain characteristics:

1. It deals primarily with ideas. Especially the ideas which will make important news a year—or five or ten years—later. In fields ranging from oceanography to economics, from the theater to religion, Harper's tries to find the fresh, seminal thinkers whose ideas may have a real impact on the future shape of the world.

2. It provides a highly selective kind of news coverage. Harper's makes no attempt to cover the ephemeral happenings which fill about 90 per cent of the space in news magazines and the daily press. What it does attempt to report are those events and personalities that may have a lasting historical significance—and it tries to cover them in a more authoritative, carefully considered, and analytic fashion than the daily or weekly publications can ordinarily achieve. Harper's articles have shaken up state governments, labor unions, political parties, and state and federal laws.

3. It seeks an independent assessment of public issues. Harper's keeps apart from any party, pressure group, or commercial interest. It peddles no ideology, grinds no private axes. It tries to reflect the widest possible spectrum of responsible opinion—including many opinions with which the editors personally disagree. It is skeptical of the public relations counselor and the official pronouncement. It has a special respect for the sharp-eyed individual observer who, as Frederick Lewis Allen, former editor of Harper's, once said: "...sits all by himself, unorganized, unrecognized, unorthodox, and unterrified."

4. It welcomes controversy. The mass media usually have to shun controversial subjects, because they dare not risk offending any substantial number of their readers. Harper's does not try to woo everybody—and it assumes that its kind of reader is tough-minded enough to enjoy a lively argument, even when it rubs him on a raw spot. Consequently, Harper's is able to examine the behavior of Sacred Cows—for example, U. S. Savings Bonds, the veterans' and farmers' lobbies, the giant charity fund-raising outfits, and the F.B.I.—with a candor not often found elsewhere.

5. It provides a vehicle for the artist in literature. The short story writer, the poet, the essayist, the critic, and the humorist find here a welcome for their best work—uncramped by popular formulas or conventional forms. And the work of an entirely unknown writer is considered just as eagerly as that of a William Faulkner or Arthur Miller.

All too often these five standards measure the aspirations rather than the accomplishments of the editors. Yet now and then they feel that they have come somewhere near the mark, and that a proportion of the things they publish may have a permanent value.

We hope that at least some of those who try Harper's will find the flavor robust, well matured, and a pleasure. In the meantime, we have tried to explain why some people *don't* buy Harper's. *And* why *many do.*

What better time to start your Harper's subscription? You may have up to 13 monthly issues for only $3.87 at the special new reader's rate.

Harper's magazine



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TIME IS SOMETHING YOU CAN PUSH AROUND

Until now, man has never believed he could win his war against the clock. You can hardly blame him. The moment he developed anything new or wonderful, time in its remorseless way began to destroy it. Da Vinci's rueful comment seemed right, "Oh Time, Thou that consumest all Things!" And yet, Da Vinci was wrong—refuted by his own Mona Lisa, still around nearly five centuries later.

In these five centuries, man—stubbornly determined to remake his universe instead of re-making himself to fit—has evolved a new view of our ancient foe. Far from being the eternal tyrant, time is actually something you can push around. Only a little, so far. But camera, printing press and sound recording prove that time cannot wipe out the past. And the present lasts far longer than it used to. For we've made time slow down . . . curbed the old despot's destructive disposition by learning to postpone, almost indefinitely, the damage he can do. The things we use and enjoy most—cars, clothes, furniture, home—now change far less in a year than they used to change in a day.

Many of our triumphs over time . . . and his tag-along troops of fungi, fumes, ozone, water and ultra-violet rays . . . are being won by Cyanamid research. And being worn by you. Today, a fabric that's born beautiful stays that way, protected and pampered by one of Cyanamid's many textile finishes. Wear your new golf jacket long and hard; the efficient PERMEL PLUS® finish lasts as long as the jacket, fights off rain, dirt and stains. Carry your clubs to the tropics, in a canvas or leather bag; resins and fungi-fighters ward off rot and mildew. And just relax when your wife walks in with a new print dress that looks gossamer-frail. Time will have little effect on it; only a shift in style can make it out of date.

Cyanamid science is fighting time on a lot of fronts. Even money lasts longer; a buck may be hard to hang on to—but it's much harder to tear. The resins that reinforce our greenbacks make other kinds of paper last longer, too. Paper napkins used to fall apart before the picnic started. When a paper towel got wet, you threw it away. Not any more—thanks to resins.

Metal becomes practically impervious to time with CYMEL® resins which put a mar-resistant finish on metal furniture strong enough to take a kick from a spike-heel shoe without showing a scratch. On an automobile it can deliver 100,000 miles of roadwork and still stay fresh and glossy. And ultra-violet rays—time's secret weapon to make plastics dark and brittle—get tamed by CYASORB® light absorber now used to preserve—among other things—the plastic windows in convertibles.

The same Cyanamid science that has slowed down time has managed to speed it up, as well. Instead of waiting for a cotton plant to lose its leaves when time and nature dictate, calcium cyanamide makes it possible to shed the leaves speedily and then harvest mechanically. In giving Americans their healthy, high protein diet, AUREOMYCIN® chlortetracycline has dramatically shortened the time it takes to put high grade meat on your table. The traditional "chicken every Sunday" has become chicken any time you want it; plump, tender broilers are readied for market in about half the time it once took. Some plants, too, are getting their internal clocks re-set. The red poinsettia is a case in point. The plant you get next Christmas will probably be a perfectly matured beauty, its size controlled quite independent of normal growing time by a new Cyanamid plant growth regulant.

In many big and little ways, time isn't pushing us around quite as much as he used to. We're giving the "bald old cheat" a pinch here, a pull there. We may never be able to turn time off and on like a water tap, but sure as spaceships, we *can* make him change his ways.

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